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Matjaž Zwitter, chairman 
This course has been organised as a joint venture of European School of Oncology, Milano, ltaly 
and Institute of Oncology, Ljubljana, Slovenia 
Under The High Patronage of Mrs. Štefka Kučan 
lntroduction andwelcome 
It is easier to adapt to technical innovations than to sociological and cultural changes 
of the modem world. It is often easier to perform a complex medical procedure 
than to bring a decision about what should, or should not be done. 
We share a special privilege to chair the first course of the European Scool of Oncology 
devoted to ethical issues in oncology. We wish you a pleasant, vivid and memorable tirne. 
Matjaž Zwitter Charles G. Vella 
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Alberto Costa, MD, European Institute of Oncology; director, 
European School of Oncology, Milano 
Prof. Raanan Gillon, MD is a philosopher and general medical practitioner. 
He works part tirne as Prafessor of medical ethics at lmperial College School of 
Medicine and part tirne as Senior National Health Service Partner in a London 
general medical practice. He is also the editor of the Journal of Medical Ethics, 
which is one of the most frequently cited medical ethics/bioethics/healthcare 
ethics journal in the world. He has written extensively on medical ethics, 
including Philosophical Medical Ethics (Wiley 1985 and ten subsequent re­
prints) and is senior editor of and contributor to a massive prizewinning 100-
author textbook, Principles of Healthcare Ethics (Wiley 1994, reprinted 1996). 
In 1999, along with Alastair Campbell, he was awarded the Hastings Center 
Henry Knowles Beecher award "tor contributions to ethics and the lite 
sciences" and was the first non-American to achieve this award. 
Prof. Raanan Gillon, MD, general practitioner and philosopher, lmperial College, London University; 
editor, Journal of Medical Ethics 
Nora K;earney, RNG, MSc is a Senior Lecturer in Cancer Nursing at the 
University of Glasgow and currently lmmediate Past President of the 
European Oncology Nursing Society. Board Member of the lnternational 
Society tor Nurses in Cancer Care, Federation of European Cancer Societies 
and University of Glasgow Cancer School. She chairs and is a member of 
a number of professional committees both national and international in the 
field of oncology. 
Nora Kearney, RNG, Msc, Nursing and Midwifery School, University of Glasgow; 
president, European Oncology Nursing Society 
Georges B Kutukdjian, PhD graduated in Philosophy and Social Anthrapo­
logy. He is author of several articles, essays and publications on contemporary 
literature, social anthropology, human rights issues, bioethics and the ethics of 
science. Fram 1968-1971, he worked at Laboratoire d'anthropologie sociale, 
Col/ege de France. Fram 1971 he was associated with UNESCO. He was among 
other things responsible tor prajects related tci socio-economic development, 
human rights and peace ( 1972-1991 ), Director of the Bioethics Unit and Secre­
tary-General of the lnternational Bioethics Committee (IBC) ( 1992-1997), and is 
presently, Senior Director of the Division of the Ethics of Science and Techno­
logy, Secretary-General of the lnternational Bioethics Committee (IBC) and Exe­
cutive Secretary of the World Commission of the Ethics of Scientific Knowled­
ge and Technology (COMEST). 
Georges B. Kutukdjian, PhD, director, Division of the Ethics of Science and Technology, UNESCO, Paris 
.. .. 
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Prof. Tore Nilstun, PhD studied philosophy and achieved his PhD in moral 
philosophy in 1979. In 1992, he became the Associate professor of Philosophy 
and Assistant Director at Department of Medica! ethics, Lund University, Lund, 
Sweden. He is currently holding posts of Vice-chairman of Clinical Ethics 
Committee at Lund University Hospital and Vice-chairman of Research 
Ethics Committee at lnternational Association tor Research on Cancer (IARC) 
in Lyon, France. 
Prof. Tore Nilstun, PhD, moral philosopher, Department of Medical Ethics, Lund University, Lund 
Prof. Povl Riis, MD, PhD is Professor of Medicine at the University of Copen­
hagen Medica! School, Copenhagen, Danemark. From 1979-98 he served as 
Chairman of Central Research Ethics Committee of Danemark. He is a co-foun­
dor of Danish National Committee on Scientific Dishonesty and co-author of 
the Second Declaration of Helsinki. He also works as an evaluator of European 
Union (EU) Framework Programmes and is a member of DEBRA group at the 
Council of Europe. 
Prof. Povl Riis, MD, PhD, Ministry of Science, Kobenhavn 
Prof. Antonella Surbone, MD, PhD, FACP graduated in medicine and philo­
sophy in Milan and Rome, ltaly and subsequently in Philadelphia and New 
York, USA. In 1983, she started practicing medica! oncology at the lstituto 
Nazionale Tumori in the Division of Medical Oncology. From 1985 to 1987 she 
was a Clinical Associate at the National Cancer Institute in Bethesda, USA. She 
is currently an Associate Attending Physician and Member of Memorial Sloan­
Kettering Cancer Center in New York, USA. She holds a teaching appointment 
as Associate Professor of Clinical Medicine at Cornell University Medica! Colle­
ge in New York, USA. She has studied ethics at the Catholic University of 
Rome and philosophy at Fordham University in New York. 
Prof. Antonella Surbone, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York, USA 
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Prof. Borut Telban, PhD studied pharmacy at the University of Ljubljana, Slo­
venia. After graduation, he carried out 38 months of anthropological research 
in Papua New Guinea, which lead in 1994 to PhD in anthropology at Research 
School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University in Canberra, 
Australia. From 1995-96 he was Leach/RAI Fellow at the University of Manc­
hester and in 1997, he was a Visiting Fellowat the Anthropology Department 
of Australian National University. He wrote many publications and books on 
anthropology, among them "The Role of Medica! Ethnobotany and Ethnomedi­
cine: A New Guinea Example". He is currently working as a Research Fellow at 
the Scientific Research Centre of the Slovene Academy of Sciences and Arts. 
Prof. Borut Telban, PhD, anthropologist, Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Ljubljana 
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Prof. Jože Trontelj, MD, PhD graduated from the Medical Faculty of Ljublja­
na, Slovenia and later specialized in Neurology. Since 1986, he is Professor of 
Neurology at Medical Faculty of the University of Ljubljana. He is currently wor­
king in the field of clinical neurophysiology. He is a member of Slovene Aca­
demy of Sciences and Arts. He serves as Chairmen of the National Medical 
Ethics Committee since 1995. He holds several important posts at the Council 
of Europe, where he is slovene delegate to the Steering Committee on Bioet­
hics, member of the Working Party for Ethics of Biomedical Research, and 
member of CDBI Bureau. He participated in drafting the Oviedo Convention and 
the Protocol on Biomedical Research of the Oviedo Convention. 
Prof. Jože Trontelj, MD, PhD, Institute tor Neurophysiology, Clinical Center, Ljubljana 
Branko Zakotnik, MD, PhD studied medicine in Ljubljana, Slovenia and 
graduated in 1979. Since 1988, he is working as a specialist of Interna! 
Medicine at the Department of Medical Oncology, Institute of Oncology 
in Ljubljana. His main clinical fields of interests are breast cancer, soft tissue 
and bone sarcoma and head and neck cancer. He is a member of numerous 
international oncological societies, among them European Society of Medical 
Oncology (ESMO). He is currently Head of the Ethics Committee at the 
Institute of Oncology in Ljubljana. 
Branko Zakotnik, MD, PhD, Institute of Oncology, Ljubljana 
Prof. Matjaž Zwitter, MD, PhD is Head of the Department of Radiation Onco­
logy at the Institute of Oncology in Ljubljana, Slovenia, and Associate Professor 
for Radiotherapy and Oncology at the University of Ljubljana Medical School. 
He is a graduate of the Ljubljana University where he also completed his trai­
ning in radiotherapy and oncology. After fellowships in London and Stanford, 
he returned to his home University and conducted a number of clinical trials in 
the fields of malignant lymphomas, pediatric oncology, brain tumors, and lung 
cancer. In 1997, Drs. Antonella Surbone and Matjaz Zwitter co-edited a book 
entitled Communication with the cancer patient: information and truth which 
was published in the Annals of the New York Acadademy of Sciences. His cur­
rent research interests include ethical issues in oncology, treatment for lung 
cancer, and biology of Hodgkin's disease. 
Ass. Prof. Matjaž Zwitter, MD, PhD, Institute of Oncology, Ljubljana 
Janez Žgajnar, MD, MSc graduated in medicine in Ljubljana, Slovenia in 1991. 
Since 1998, he has been employed as a surgeon at the Department of the 
Surgical Oncology at the Institute of Oncology, Ljubljana. His main field of 
interest is breast cancer. He has been particpating in the lnternational Breast 
Cancer Study Group (IBCSG) from ·l�92. From January 2000, he is Fellow of 
the Senology Department of the European Institute of Oncology in Milan. 
He is also member of several oncological societies, among them European 
Society of Surgical Oncology (ESSO). 




Charles G. Vella Rev. Mgr. graduated in Philosophy and Theology at the Ponti­
fical Gregorian University, Rome and the Venerable English College, Rome and 
later specialized in family lite and counseling at the Family Institute, Chicago, 
U.S.A., and in communications at the B.B.C., London. Since 1986, he is Direc­
tor for Social Relations at the Scientific Institute University Hospital San Raffae­
le in Milan, where he is member of the Ethics Committee and co-editor of the 
hospital organ "Sanare lnfirmos". For 9 years he has been a representative of 
the government of Malta at the Council of Europe for Social Policy and Bioet­
hics. He is a member of the Ethics Committee of the Cambridge Journal of Bi­
oethics, USA, and of KOS monthly review of medicine and Science. He is aut­
hor of a number of books on family, counselling and ethics. 
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Prof. Gregory Luke Larkin, MD, MSPH, FACEP is the Director of Research 
for the Department of Emergency Medicine at the Mercy Hospital, Mercy Provi­
dence Hospital, and Emergency Medicine Association of Pittsburgh, USA, and 
Clinical Ethics Consultant, Eastern Mercy Health System. An Associate Profes­
sor of Emergency Medicine at the University of Pittsburgh School of Medicine, 
he also works as a physician at the Emergency Department of the Mercy Hos­
pital. He has served as Chair of the American College of Emergency Physicians 
(ACEP) Committee on Ethics, and as Chair of the Society for Academic Emer­
gency Medicine (SAEM) Code of Ethics Subcommittee. He is author of many 
publications on ethical issues, including "A Code of Ethics for Emergency 
Physicians" and "Virtue in Emergency Medicine". 
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Sunday, June 25 
Afternoon session: 
INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAL ETHICS 
• Matjaž Zwitter, Charles G Vella: Welcome and introduction to the course
• Ranaan Gillon: The four basic principles of medical ethics
Coffee break 
• Charles G Vella: Bedside ethics and humanisation of caring
• Charles G Vella: Ethical committees
Welcome reception 
Monday, June 26 
Morning session: 
THE ETHICAL PRINCIPLE OF AUTONOMV IN MEDICAL PRACTICE 
• Georges B Kutukdjian: Understanding cultural diversity
• Gregory L. Larkin: The process of communication
Coffee break 
• Gregory L Larkin: Evolution of the concept of patient's autonomy
Free communications 
• Patricija Ecimovic: Medica! graduates in oncology
• Albina Bobnar: Commitment of a nurse in communication
with cancer patients
• Eugenij Dem in: Ethical problems in communication with cancer patients:
relationship between them and society
Lunch 
Afternoon session: 
• Tore Nilstun: Ethics of cancer prevention and screening programmes
• Janez Žgajnar, Alberto Costa: Difficult decisions in cancer surgery
Coffee break 
• Branko Zakotnik: Difficult decisions in medica! oncology
Free communications 
• Jacqui Horne, Rachel Jackson: Ethical issues surrounding the use
of quality of lite questionnaires in clinical trials
• Vojko Flis: The problem of autonomy in modem medica! ethics

























Tuesday, June 27 
Morning session: 
SCARCE RESOURCES - HOW TO DEFINE PRIORITIES 
• Tore Nilstun: Understanding the ethical principle of justice 9:00 
• Povl Riis: Misconduct in Clinical Research 9:45 
Coffee break 10:30 
• Nora Kearney: Elderly patients with cancer: where are they in our priorities? 11 :00 




DEATH, DYING, AND EUTHANASIA 
• Lars Johan Materstvedt: The meaning of euthanasia and physician-assisted
suicide
• Ranaan Gillon: Euthanasia and the debates about killing and allowing to die
Coffee break 
• Gregory L Larkin: Advance directives
• Metka Klevišar: Detabooing of death - an essential condition for a better
quality of life of the dying
Round table discussion: 






Matjaž Zwitter and course participants: Cancer care - an ethical dilemma 17:30 
Banquet 20:00 
Dinner talk: 
• Borut Telban: Human values: anthropological perspective
Wednesday, June 28 
Morning session: 
ETHICS OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 
• Jože Trontelj: Reflections on the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine 9:00 
9:45 • Matjaž Zwitter: Ethical issues of clinical research in oncology
Coffee break 
Povl Riis: Fraud and misconduct in medica( research 
Course evaluation and closing remarks 
10:30 
11 :00 







Medica! ethics: four principles plus attention to scope 
Raanan Gillon 
The "four principles plus scope" approach provides 
a simple, accessible, and culturally neutral approach 
to thinking about ethical issues in health care. The 
approach, developed in the United States, is based 
on four common, basic prima facie moral commit­
ments--respect for autonomy, beneficence, non­
maleficence, and justice-plus concern for their 
scope of application. It offers a common, basic 
moral analytical framework and a common, basic 
moral language. Although they do not provide 
ordered rules, these principles can help doctors and 
other health care workers to make decisions when 
reflecting on moral issues that arise at work. 
Nine years ago the BMJ allowed me to introduce to its 
readers' an approach to medica! ethics developed by 
the Americans Beauchamp and Childress,' which is 
based on four prima facie moral princip les and anention 
to these principles' scope of application. Since then I 
have often been asked for a summary of this approach 
by doctors and other health care workers who find it 
helpful for organising their thoughts about medica[ 
ethics. This paper, based on the preface of a large 
multiauthor textbook on medica[ ethics,' offers a brief 
account of this "four principles plus scope" approach. 
The four principles plus scope approach claims that 
whatever our personal philosophy, politics, religion, 
moral theory, or life stance, we will find no difficulty 
Imperial College of 
Science, Technology and 
Medicine, 
London SW7 1NA 
Raanan Gillon, visiting 
professor of medica/ echics 
BMJ 1994;309: 184-8 
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in comm1ttmg ourselves to four prima facie moral 
principles plus a reflective concern about their scope of 
application. Moreover, these four principles, plus 
anention to their scope of application, encompass most 
of the moral issues that arise in health care. 
The four prima facie principles are respect for 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. 
"Prima facie," a term introduced by the English 
philosopher W D Ross, means that the principle is 
binding unless it conflicts with another moral principle 
-if it does we have· to choose between them. The four
principles approach does not provide a method for 
choosing, which is a source of dissatisfaction to people
who suppose that ethics merely comprises a set of
ordered rules and that once the relevant information is
fed into an algorithm or computer out will pop the
answer. What the principles plus scope approach
can provide, however, is a common set of moral
commitments, a cornmon moral language, and a
common set of moral issues. We should consider these
in each case before coming to our own answer using our
preferred moral theory or other approach to choose
between these principles when they conflict.
Respect for autonomy 
Autonomy-literally, self rule, but probably bene1 
described as deliberated self rule-is a special anribute 
BMJ VOLUME 309 16JULY 1994 
of ali moral agents. If we have autonomy we can make 
our own decisions on the basis of deliberation; some­
times we can intend to do things as a result of those 
decisions; and sometimes we can do those things to 
implement the decisions (what I previously described 
as autonomy of thought, of will or intention, and of 
action). Respect for autonomy is the moral obligation 
to respect the autonomy of others in so far as such 
respect is compatible with equal respect for the 
autonomy of ali porentially affected. Respect for 
autonomy is also sometimes described, in Kantian 
terms, as treating others as ends in rhemselves and 
never merely as means-one of Kant's formulations of 
his "categorical imperative." 
In health care respecting people's autonomy has 
many prima facie implications. It requires us to consult 
people and obtain their agreement before we do things 
to them-hence the obligation to obtain info1med 
consent from patients before we do things to rry to help 
them. Medica! confidentialiry is another implication of 
respecting people's autonomy. We do not have any 
general obligation to keep other people's secrets, but 
health care workers explicitly or implicirly promise 
their patients and clients that they will keep confidential 
the information confided to them. Keeping promises is 
a way of respecting people's autonomy; an aspect of 
running our own life depends on being able to rely on 
the promises made to us by others. Without such 
promises of confidentialiry patients are also far less 
likely to divulge the often highly private and sensitive 
information that is needed for their optimal care; 
thus maintaining confidentialiry not only respects 
patients' autonomy but also increases the likelihood of 
our being able to help them. 
Respect for autonomy also requires us not to deceive 
each other (except in circumstances in which deceit is 
agreed to be permissible, such as when playing poker) 
as the absence of deceit is part of the implicit agreement 
among moral agents when they communicate with each 
other. They organise their lives on the assumption that 
people will not deceive them; their autonomy is 
infringed if they are deceived. Respect for patients' 
autonomy prima facie requires us, therefore, not to 
deceive patients, for example, about their diagnosed 
illness unless they clearly wish to be deceived. Respect 
for autonomy even requires us to be on tirne for 
appointrnents as an agreed appointment is a kind of 
mutual promise and if we do not keep an appointment 
we break the promise. 
To exercise respect for autonomy health care workers 
must be able to comrnunicate well with their patients 
and clients. Good comrnunication requires, most 
importantly, listening (and not just with the ears) as 
well as telling (and not just with · the lips or a 
wordprocessor) and is usually necessary for giving 
patients adequate information about any proposed 
intervention and for finding out whether patiems wam 
that intervemion. Good communication is also usually 
necessary for finding out when patients do not want a 
lot of information; some patients do not want to be told 
about a bad prognosis or to participate in deciding 
which of severa! treatments to have, preferring to leave 
this decision to their doctors. Respecting such attitudes 
shows just as much respect for a patient's autonomy as 
does giving patients information that they do want. In 
my experience, however, most patients wam more not 
less information and want to participate in deciding 
their medica! care. 
Beneficence and non-maleficence 
Whenever we try to help others we inevitably risk 
harming them; health care workers, who are committed 
to helping others, must therefore consider the prin­
ciples of beneficence and non-maleficerice together and 
BMJ VOLUME 309 16 JULY 1994 
aim at producing net benefi.t over harrn. None the less, 
we must keep the cwo principles separate for those 
circumstances in which we have or recognise no 
obligation of beneficence to others (as we stili have an 
obligarion not to harm them). Thus the traditional 
Hippocraric moral obligation of medicine is to provide 
net medica! benefit to patients with minimal harm­
that is, beneficence with non-maleficence. To achieve 
these moral objectives health care workers are com­
mitted to a wide range of prima facie obligations. 
We need to ensure that we can provide the benefits 
we profess (thus "professional") to be able to provide. 
Bence we need rigorous and effective education and 
training both before and during our professional lives. 
W e also need to make sure that we are ofrering each 
patient net benefit. Interestingly, to do this we must 
respect the patient's autonomy for what constitutes 
benefit for one pacient may be harrn for another. For 
example, a mastectomy may constitute a prospective 
net benefit for one woman with breast cancer, while for 
another the destruction of an aspect of her feminine 
identiry may be so harmful that it cannot be outweighed 
even by the prospect of an extended life expectancy. 
The obligation to provide net benefit to patients also 
requires us to be clear about risk and probabiliry when · 
we make our assessments of harrn and benefit. Clearly, 
a low probabiliry of great harm such as death or severe 
disabiliry is of less moral importance in the context of 
non-maleficence than is a high probabiliry of such 
harm, and a high probabiliry of great benefit such as 
cure of a life threatening disease is of more moral 
importance in the context of beneficence than is a 
low probabiliry of such benefit. We therefore need 
empirical information about the probabilities of the 
various harms and benefits that may result from 
proposed health care imerventions. This information 
has to come from effective medica! research, which is 
also therefore a prima facie moral obligation. The 
obligation to produce net benefit, however, also 
requires us to define whose benefit and whose harms 
are likely to result from a proposed intervention. This 
problem of moral scope is particularly important in 
medica! research and population medicine. 
One moral concept that in recem years has become 
popular in health care is that of empowerrnent-that is, 
doing things to help patients and clients to be more in 
control of their health and health care. Sometimes 
empowerment is even proposed as a new moral 
obligarion. On reflection I think that empowerment is, 
however, essentially an action that combines the two 
moral obligations of beneficence and respect for 
autonomy to help patients in ways that not only respect 
but also enhance their autonomy. 
Justice 
The fourth prima facie moral principle is jusrice. 
Justice is often regarded as being synonymous with 
fairness and can be sumrnarised as the moral obligation 
to act on the basis of fair adjudication between 
competing claims. In health care ethics I have found it 
useful to subdivide obligarions of justice into three 
categories: fair distribution of scarce resources 
(distributive justice), respect for people's rights (rights 
based justice) and respect for morally acceptable laws 
(legal justice). 
Equaliry is ar the heart of justice, but, as Aristotle 
argued so long ago, justice is more than mere equaliry 
-people can be treared unjustly even if they are
treared equally." He argued that it was irnportant to
treat equals equally (what health economists are
increasingly calling horizontal equiry) and to treat
unequals unequally in proportion to the morally
relevant inequaliries (vertical equiry). People have
argued ever since about the morally relevant criteria fof
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regarding and treating people as equals and those for 
regarding and treating them as unequals. The debate 
flourishes in moral, religious, philosophical, and 
political contexts, and we are no closer to agreement 
than we were in Aristotle's tirne. 
Pending such agreemem health care workers need to 
tread warily as we have no special justification for 
imposing our own personal or professional views about 
justice on others. We ·certainly need to recognise 
and acknowledge the competing moral concerns. For 
example, in the comext of the alloc::nion of resources 
conflicts exist between severa! common moral concerns: 
to provide sufficient health care to meet the needs of all 
who need it; when this is impossible, to distribute 
health care resources in proportion to the extent of 
people's needs for health care; to allow health care 
workers to give priority to the needs of "their" 
paciems; to provide equal access to health care; to allow 
people as much choice as possible in selecting their 
health care; to maximise the benefit produced by the 
available resources; to respect the autonomy ·of the 
people who provide those resources and thus to limit 
che cost to taxpayers and subscribers to health insurance 
schemes. Ali these criteria for justly allocating health 
care resources can be morally justified but not ali can be 
fully met simultaneously. 
Similar moral conflicts arise in the context of rights 
based justice and legal juscice. 
PERSONAL DECISION ,vlAKING 
The best moral strategy for justice that I have found 
for myself as a health care worker is first to distinguish 
whether it is I or an organisation, profession, or sociery 
itself that has to make a decision. For example, "how 
should I respond to a particular pacient who wants an 
abortion?" is distinct from, "what is this hospital's 
organisational view on abortion?" and "what is the 
medica! profession's collective view on abortion?" and 
"what is society's view as expressed in law and 
practice?" 
Firstly, for decisions that I must take myself 
I must uy to exclude decisions that have no moral basis 
or justification. Neither pursuit of my own self interese 
-for example, accepting bribes from patiems,
hospitals, or drug manufacturers-nor accion that
discriminates against pacients on the basis of personal
preference or prejudice can provide a just or morally
acceptable basis for allocacing scarce health care
resources or for any other category of justice. Moreover,
it is not my role as a doctor to punish paciems;
withholding antibiotics from smokers who do not give
up smoking or refusing to refer heavy drinkers with
!iver damage induced by alcohol for specialist assess­
ment on the grounds that they are at fault is not a just
or morally acceptable basis for racioning my medica!
resources.
Secondly, I should not waste the resources at my 
disposal; so if a cheaper drug is likely to produce as 
much benefit as a more expensive one I should 
prescribe the cheaper one. Cost and its team mate 
opporcuniry cost are moral issues and central to 
distribucive justice. If I believe, however, that an 
expensive drug is clearly and significantly better for my 
pacient than a cheaper alternative and I am allowed 
to prescribe it then I believe that I should do so. 
Thus, like many British general practitioners, I try 
oxytetracycline first when treating acne, but if it 
does not work well I prescribe the more expensive 
minocycline; for depression I usually start with tri­
cyclic amidepressants, but if they do not work well 
or the side effects are unacceptable I prescribe the new 
and expensive 5-hydroxytryptamine uptake inhibitors. 
Thirdly, I should respect pacients' rights. For 
example;· my "disapproval of a patient's lifestyle would 
not be a morally acceptable justification for refusing to 
provide a certificare of sickness if he or she cannot work 
because of sickness. I have no special privilege as :1 
health care worker, however, to create societal rights 
for my patiems. For example, while I might think that 
ali my unemployed patients should receive sickness 
benefit, in Britain they have a right to receive it only if 
they cannot work because of sickness; I have a right, 
therefore, to provide a cer,ificate of sickness only if this 
is the case. 
Fourthly, I ought to obey morally acceptable laws. 
Thus, even though I may disapprove of breaking a 
patient's confidence, if he or she has one of severa! 
infeccious diseases I am legally obliged to notify the 
relevant authorities. If I believe that the law is morally 
unjustified I am morally entitled to break the law; but 
this gives me no legal emitlement to break the law, 
and I should be prepared to face the legal consequences 
of disobeying it. I should also decide exactly what I 
mean by a morally unjustified law. I suggest, though 
here do not argue, that it is the processes through 
which laws are enacted that confer moral legitimacy 
not the content of the laws. Thus if a law is enacted 
through a democratic political system-and hence 
one that fundamentally respects autonomy-which 
represems conflicting views within its population and 
makes laws on the basis of certain common moral 
values thaf reflect the four princip les then that law is 
morally acceptable, and prima facie we are morally 
required to obey it. 
ORGANISATIONAL, PROFESSIONAL, ANO SOCIETAL 
DECISIONS 
My roje in taking decisions about justice that are 
organisational, professional, or societal should only be 
as a member of the relevant organisation, profession, 
or sociery. It is therefore morally consistent to pursue 
at different levels objectives that are mutually in­
consistent. The medica] directorate at the hospital 
where I work may have decided to prohibit the 
prescription of a particularly expensive drug. As a 
member of that directorate I may have argued in favour 
of prescribing the drug in special cases, but my 
arguments were rejected. It is morally proper for me as 
a clinician to accept the directorate's decision and act 
accordingly even when faced with an exceptional case 
in which I believe the expensive drug would be 
preferable. It is also morally legitimate for me to poim 
to such cases ("shroud waving") in my political role 
as a member of a democratic society, arguing, for 
example, for more resources for health care than, say, 
for defence. 
As members of sociery we are stili feeling our way 
· even at the leve] of defining what the competing moral
concems of justice are. W e must be particularly wary
of apparemly simple solutions to what have been
perceived as highly complex problems for at least
2500 years. For example, populist solutions in
distributive justice such as have occurred in Oregon
in the United States' and technical and sirnpli"stic
economic solutions such as the system of costed qualiry
adjusted life years (QALYs)' are tempting in their
definitiveness and simpliciry; they fail, however, to
give value to the wide range of other potentially
relevant moral concems. Until there is far greater
social agreement and understandirig of these exceed­
ingly complex issues I believe it is morally safer to seek 
gradual improvement in our current methods of trying
to reconcile the competing moral concems-to seek
ways of "muddling through elegantly" as Hunter
advocates'-than to be seduced by systems that seek to
convert these essentially moral choices into apparently
scientific, numerical methods and formulas.
As Calabresi and Bobbitt suggested in the 1970s, 
rationing scarce resources that prolong life and enhance
health often entails tragic choices-choices between
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people and between values. Societies seek strategies to 
minimise the destructive effect of such choices, 
including tendencies to change their strategies over 
tirne.' Calabresi suggests that we are like a juggler 
rrying to keep too many balls in the air; like the juggler 
we must do our best to improve our juggling skills to 
keep more balls in the air for more of the tirne and to 
avoid letting any bali stay on the ground for too long. 
We must accept, however, that in the context of 
competing and mutually incompatible claims there will 
always be some balls on the ground. Moreover, we 
should not be surprised that there will always be some 
people dissatisfied after justice has been done because 
by definition not everyone's claims can be met. 
Scope 
We may agree about our substantive moral commit­
ments and our prima facie moral obligations of respect 
for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and 
justice, yet we may stili disagree about their scope ·of 
application-that is, we may disagree radically about 
to what or to whom we owe these moral obligations. 
Interesting and important theoretical issues surround 
the scope of each of the four princip les. We clearly do 
not owe a duty of beneficence to everyone and 
everything; so whom or what do we have a moral duty 
to help and how much should we help them? While we 
"' clearly have a prima facie obligation to avoid harrning 
� everyone, who and what count as everyone? Similarly, 
i: even if we agree that the scope of the principle of 
� respect for autonomy is universal, encompassing 
� ali autonomous agents, who or what counts as an 
E: autonomous agent? 
!;; Who ·or what falls within the scope of our obligation 
"' to distribute scarce resources fairly according to the 
princip le of justice? Is it everyone in the world? Future 
people? Just people in our own countries? And who or 
what has rights? Do plants have rights? Does the 
environment have rights? Does a work of ari: have 
rights? Do animals have rights and if so, which 
animals? Conversely, against whom may holders of 
rights claim the correlative moral obligation? Similar 
questions concem the scope of legal justice. 
SCOPE FOR HEAL TH CARE WORKERS 
Fortunately for health care workers some of these 
issues of scope have been clarified for them by their 
special relationship with their patients or clients. In 
particular, the controversial issue of who falls within 
the scope of beneficence is answered unambiguously 
for at least one category of people: ali health care 
workers have a moral obligation to help their patients 
and clients. Patients or clients fall within the scope of 
the health care workers' duty of beneficence. This 
fact is established by the personal and professional 
commitments of the health care professionals and their 
organisations-they ali profess a commitrnent to help 
their patients and clients, and to do so with minimal 
harm. This commitment is underwritten by the 
societies in which they practise, both informally and 
through legal rules and regulations that define the 
health care professionals' duties of care. 
Two issues of scope are of particu!ar practical 
importance for health care workers. The first is the 
question of who falls within the scope of the prima facie 
principle of respect for autonomy. The second is 
the question of what is the scope of the widely 
acknowledged "right to life"; who and what has a right 
to life? 
Obviously the scope of the principle of respect for 
autonomy must include autonomous agents-we 
cannot respect the autonomy of a boot or anything else 
that is not autonomous. But who or what counts as an 
autonomous agent? When we disagree about whether 
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or not to respect the decision of a girl of 14 to take the 
oral contraceptive pili we are in effect disagreeing 
about the scope of application of the principle 
respect for autonomy. 
Similar questions about the scope of respect for 
autonomy arise in other paediatric contexts, in the care 
of severely mentally ill or mentally impaired people, 
and in the care of elderly people who are severely 
mentally impaired. Some patients clearly do not fall 
within the scope of respect for autonomy; newborn 
babies, for example, are not autonomous agents as 
autonomy requires the capacity to deliberate. But 7 
year olds usual!y can deliberate to a degree. How much 
capacity for logical thought and deliberation and what 
other attributes are required for somebody to be 
an adequately autonomous agent? Possible other, 
necessary attributes include an adequately extensive 
and accurate knowledge base, including that bom 
experience and of accurte perception, on which to 
deliberate; an ability to conceive of and reflect on 
ourselves over tirne, both past and future; an ability to 
reason hypothetically-"what if' reasoning; an ability 
to defer gratification for ourselves as an aspect of self 
rule; and sufficient will power for self rule. 
However these philosophical questions are an­
swered, health care workers increasingly acknowledge 
that the autonomy of even young children and severely 
mentally impaired people should prima facie be 
respected unless there are good moral reasons not to do 
so. Moreover, those reasons will depend highly on the 
context; a young child or a severely mentally impaired 
person may not be autonomous enough to have his or 
her decision to reject an operation respected but be 
autonomous enough to decide what food to eat or 
clothes to wear. When patients who are not adequately 
autonomous for all their decisions to be respected make 
decisions that seem to be against their interests then 
important issues arise about who should be regarded as 
appropriate to make decisions on their behalf and 
about the criteria that they should use to do so. 
The second important issue of scope for health care 
workers concerns the "right to life." Who or what has 
this right to life? To answer the question we have 
to · determine what is meant by the right to life. 
Specifically, is it simply the right not to be unjustly 
killed or does it also include a right to be kept alive? 
The scope of the first right will clearly be greater than 
the scope of the latter: we have prima facie moral 
obligations not to kill ali people but we have obligations 
to keep alive only some people. Even with the first 
definition of the right to life (a right not to be unjustly 
killed) a question of scope arises; although all people 
clearly fall within its scope, do (non-human) animals? 
And what do we mean by people? In response to 
this last question much debate, often extremely 
acrimonious, occurs in health care ethics over the right 
to life of human embryos, fetuses, newborn babies, 
and patients who are permanently unconscious or even 
brain dead. 
It is salutary to reflect that these contentious issues 
are not about the content of our moral obligations but 
about to whom and what we owe them-that is, they 
are. questions about the scope of our agreed moral 
obligations. Our answers are reasoned and carefully 
argued but deeply conflicting, either religiously or 
philosophica!ly. Such disagreement about scope does 
not justify accusing those who disagree with us of 
bad faith or incompatible moral standards; in principle 
it is open to resolution within our shared moral 
commitment. 
Conclusion 
The four principles plus scope approach is clearly 
not without its critics. And the approach does not 
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purport to offer a method of dealing wim conflicts 
between the principles. But I have not found anyone 
who seriously argues that he or she cannot accept any 
of these prima facie principles or found plausible 
examples of concems about healm care ethics that 
require additional moral principles. 
The four principles plus scope approach enables 
health care workers from totally disparate moral 
cultures to share a fairly basic, common moral commit­
ment, common moral language, and common analytical 
framework for reflecting on problems in health care 
ethics. Such an approach, which is · neutral between 
competing religious, political, cultural, and philo­
sophical theories, can be shared by everyone regardless 
of their background. It is surely too important a moral 
prize to be rejected carelessly or ignorantly; for the 
sake of mere opposmon; or for the fun of being a 
philosophical "Socratic gadfly." 
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1. INTRODUCTION
There is today a very striking gap between theory and practice in the debate on ethical issues. There is
often the feeling that academic debates do not consider bedside ethics, which need to be person cente red. 
Often answers are given based on "licif' and "non licit". Academic or economic arguments alone do not 
suffice, we need above ali a philosophy of care and a person centered ethics. Health care economists often 
do not have such a basis. 
2. THE SITUATION OF HEALTH CARE
Health care differs in many countries, even within Europe itself. Today the emphasis is often on "man­
aged health care". Globalisation of business has even invaded health care systems. 
Arnold Relman, former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, deplores the intrusion of methods 
and jargon into medicine, at the cost of pushing aside ethical values. Health care - he affirms - is a service to 
the human person in which words like "profit" and "marketing" should be heard very little if at ali. 
1 think the challenge is how to be able to twin through justice management with humanisation, in a 
perspective of ethical values. 
3. HEALTH: A PRIMARYVALUE
Health is the most important value in human life. Every choice made should safeguard the value of the
human person. There should be greatest respect to the ethics of responsibility, subsidiarity and solidarity. 
This calls for the principles of justice and equity, which are central in any health policy, which concerns 
choices, accessibility, costs and benefits, priorities and profit. 
1 would like to comment on the ethical term of justice. Justice in various contexts, as in the Bible or in non­
religious context as in Aristotle, is used almost interchangeably with the word "rights". Rights as conceived 
in the U.N. "Declaration of Human Rights", in the "European Social Charter" and in "The Rights of the Pa­
tients". 
In the light of these documents the term "justice" is seen within the ethical values of: equality, freedom, 
responsibility and efficiency. 
Within the concept of Bedside Ethics the basic concept emerges from these values. This implies that 
fundamental to the health care system is solidarity, which means we have to build a caring society and not 
just a welfare society (T.Beauchamp - J.F.Childress 'Principles of Biomedical Ethics'). 
• Ethics Consultant and Responsible for Public Relations at the 'lstituto Scientifico Universitario Ospedale San Raffaele,
Olgettina Str. 60, 20132 Milan, ltaly- tel. ++39/02/2643.2477 -fax ++39/02/2643.2576 - Email vella.charles@hsr.it
- Member of the Ethics Committee of European Institute of Oncology, Milan.
- Former Member of the Ethics Committee of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg. 
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4. PERSONALISTIC ETHICS
On ali these values we build our approach to "Bedside Ethics", where the patient is a partner (E.Pellegrino)
and a brother. These values are applied to the doctor-patient relationship in a personalistic approach. This 
type of ethics can be applied by ali, whether they are believers or not for there is a general orientation by 
philosophers and ethicists of various creeds. 
Ethics should not be just the concern of university teachers or of Ethics Committees. It is the way of 
being, relating and professional know how of all those in health care (doctors, nurses, administrators, cares, 
etc.). 
Today in many hospitals there is the Ethical Consultant who is a specialist in bioethics and operates as a 
clinic consultant in the wards of the hospital. Often this person works with the Ethics Committee, the doc­
tors, the chaplains and nurses. 
The Ethical Consultant does not have to be a doctor, though he works daily with various departments in 
the hospital (emergency, medicine, surgery, gynaecology, intensive care, etc.). He is often asked for an 
ethical consultation from the doctors and at places he also make "the rounds" with the doctors. 
The Ethical Consultant should not be confused with the social worker or the psychologist. 
5. HUMANISATION
The concept of humanisation is founded on the human and spiritual values of man. For Christians man is
"the image of God" and "the glory of God", who is "above ali other creatures" (Salm 8,9). 
The Hun ker Krehl affirmed that "a doctor is not an academic, he is not an artist neither is he a technician". 
He is exclusively a doctor. His skill has many things in common with ali three, but essentially he is above ali 
three, because the motive of his action are men as much as man" (Un'Ala per Guarire - Don Luigi M.Verze). 
Humanisation is not an added comfort in the hospital, but it means receiving, accepting, caring and 
healing man with a deep sense of humanity. The dignity and rights of man are first and foremost. What 
makes a hospital of excellence is not the structures or the technologies, but the humanity of the men and 
women who work day in and out therein. 
Doctors and nurses are ali called to be experts of great human sensitivity, in a relation of giving with 
generosity and authenticity. 
At "San Raffaele" we believe that: (i) the hospital is first and foremost for those who work therein, other­
wise they cannot create a human climate for the patients; (ii) ali are calied to give their very best to the 
patients and (iii) each doctor is invited to consider his profession as "medicina-sacerdozio" (medicine-priest­
hood). 
As a framework for humanisation the Lombardy Reg ion (Regione Lombardia) has established the Project 
"Umanizzazione del Servizio Sanitario Regionale" (Humanisation of the Regional Health Service) to pro­
mote the humanisation hospitals. 
In conclusion, here are some practical strategy and methodology to render the hospital more human in 
its caring and healing: 
1. Construction of a Humanisation Working Group (or Committee) to plan and work out a program me for
hospitals carers and patients.
2. The welcoming of patients on admittance in the hospital (welcome by head nurse, distribution of
"Carta dei Servizi", information, etc.).
3. Humanisation of the Emergency Division (with a special section for children: toys, TV, etc.).
4. The guarantee of the "privacy" and confidentiality of the patients.
5. Open spaces for the patients and their families.
6. Religious and social assistance of the patients and their families.
7. Psychological support and counselling services.
8. Service of voluntary group, well motivated and prepared.
The integration of values in a process of humanisation can improve the quality of health-care. 
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l. INTRODUCTION
General presentation of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, adopted
unanimously and by acclamation by the General Conference of UNESCO on 11 November 1997 and en­
dorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1998. 
II. Universal DECLARATION on the Human GENOME and HUMAN Rights
Preambular paragraphs and articles relevant to the principle of autonomy, in particular, about informed
consent and about the information of a patient (article 5), as well as about confidentiality of genetic data 
from third parties (article 7). 
III. The principle of Autonomy and imparting information
Some of the issues will be outlined in the context of: genetic screening and testing; genetic counselling;
genetic finger-printing; population genetics; and, experimentation on human subjects. 
IV. Conclusion
lmportance of national legislation and international co-operation.
• Dr. Georges Kutukdjian, UNESCO, Unite Bioethique, 1, rue Miollis, 75752 Paris, CEDEX 15, France
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UNIVERSAL VALUES, PLURALISM, AND 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY 
One of the most important lessons that we learned from the work of 
the colleagues from all over the world who have contributed to this book 
is that Western cultural hegemony is indeed a myth-a myth we should 
deny and oppose and for which we should substitute a universal cultural 
sensitivity. As was recently said, "ethical norms and human rights are 
universal not because they are recognized by certain countries or cultures, 
but because the human dignity in which they are grounded is universal." 
And "genuine respect for human dignity requires deeper understanding 
of the patient's values, culture, family and community." 1 
The implications are twofold: that differences exist, and that there is 
something universal about human dignity and therefore an ethical duty 
to respect it. 
The first of these is what we could also refer to as pluralism. Pluralism 
is a de facto reality of our multiethnic societies, but also-most impor­
tantly-it is an essential principle of democracy. Pluralism,does not have 
to lead to the intrinsic pessimism of cultural relativism, by which the eth­
ical debate is paralyzed.2 On the contrary, pluralism enriches ethics by 
fostering historical concreteness and by adding the dimension of the non­
repea tibility of values,3 which always express themselves within a predse 
contextual dimension. The common ethical principles that stem from the 
equal right of every human being to life and dignity4 and that have led to 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights5 are real and cross-cultural in 
their essence. However, the modality in which they are expressed is influ­
enced by cultural and historical differences-i.e., by their context. 
The medica! act is no exception, as it always takes place in a contex­
tual dimension. Both physician and patient are bound in a network of 
beliefs, customs, experiences, prejudices, rules, responsibilities; and both 
have limited choices. This is why, for example, formalistk informed con-
1 
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sent requirements can be possible and beneficial in certain contexts (see 
the prevailing Westem attitude), but not in others. The different empha­
sis that different cultures place on autonomy versus community as basic 
ethical principles shapes the medical act as well as any other interaction 
among members of a society. 
However, the issue goes beyond cultural differences, and facing some 
more fundamental questions will help us move from the descriptive level 
to the ethical. When speaking of truth-telling, we imply that we know the 
meaning of truth. Do we? Do we know what truth is as persons? Do we 
know it as doctors? It seems that the answer is no,.we do not know what 
truth is. What we can know, though, is how we perceive truth. If we per­
ceive truth as the mere opposite or absence of falsehood, we imply that 
truth is a fixed object that merely awaits description and/ or verbaliza­
tion.2 In medicine, this leads to seeing information as a procedure, rather 
than a process. The justification for this is that there exists an objective 
static medical truth, and that truth equals information; hence, information 
suffices. But this is not the case, for truth is a relational state and devel­
ops over tirne and space through interactions that modify and shape truth 
itself. Accurate, comprehensible, continuous information remains an 
essential element of truth, but truth goes well beyond information alone 
to reach the level of communication. 
This is no easy task, and it will be increasingly difficult in the face of 
modem medicine with its high technology, superspecialization, and eco­
nomic pressure. But it is indeed now that we need to restore a human 
face to medicine, and one way of doing so is by practicing cultural sensi­
tivity6,7 and intense, systematic imaginative empathy.8 All the contribu­
tions to this book seem to be in favor of this approach: they are not only 
honest reports of various ways of facing the issue of truth-telling, but they 
are also an incredible source of practical and theoretical suggestions for 
each one of us to practice imaginative empathy. 
Imaginative empathy is difficult, as it requires a reappraisal of the 
physician's role that we will achieve only through major changes in the 
educational system. The education and training of doctors must aim at 
developing not only the scientific curriculum but also the moral character 
of each physician. Sooner or later we will all be patients, and we will 
hope to meet a doctor to trust for his or her moral character no less than 
for his or her expertise, because it is only on the basis of both that healing 
is possible. 
Communication requires honesty, humility, and the complete aban­
donment of the doctor's more or less explicit desire for power. Imposed 
formalistic informationJor instance, can be a means of increasing the doc­
tor's power, rather than of giving freedom to patients. Giving such infor­
mation can, as much as witholding the truth, be a way of delegating the 
entire burden of decisions to the patient, thus avoiding professional 
responsibilities.9 Excessive medicalization of life and death, in which 
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technology, hospitals, and health-care teams leave no place for the 
patient' s personal system of support-family, friends, values, religious 
beliefs �nd practices-is another sign of the abuse of the doctor's power; 
it is dangerous, ineffective, and ethically unjustifiable. Last but not least, 
there are things in life that cannot-and should not-be communicated. 
Forcing the barriers of the incommunicable is an intrusion into the 
patient's privacy and intimacy-another abuse of the doctor's power. 
The patient-doctor relationship is asymmetrical. For the patient dis­
ease is a personal-most often devastating-event in his or her life, with 
a past, a present, and a future, however short it might be. The doctor, on 
the other hand, must focus on the objective dimension of the disease. The 
patient's and the doctor's narratives are different. The patient is 
inevitably in a more vulnerable position. The ethics of the patient-doctor 
relationship must take into account this asymmetry. All the contributions 
to this volume show us that we must care. We cannot stop at the view of 
the autonomous moral agent, whose moral responsibility exhausts itself 
in relationships among peers. We need to add the dimension of trust and 
of respect of the patient's vulnerability: the doctor as a moral agent is 
called to acknowledge the asymmetry of the relationship with the patient 
and should consider sensitivity, including cultural sensitivity, as a funda­
mental ethical requirement. 
CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND THE CHANGING WORLD. 
When the relationship between communication in medicine and cul­
tural diversity is analyzed, three conclusions emerge . First, cultural 
diversity is a reality that cannot be ignored. Second, in a rapidly chang­
ing world patients and physicians are among those who will most clearly 
experience the tension between the old and the new. Last but not least, 
justice in the availability of proper medical care is of great importance 
when sincere communication between patient and doctor is sought, par­
ticularly for underprivileged patients throughout the world . 
Modern medicine is certainly not a folklore festival, and nice words 
about the rich diversity of cultures may sound idealistic when the pri­
mary objective of a physician is effective treatment for cancer. However, 
one of the important messages of contributors to this volume from all 
parts of. the world is that the rich diversity of cultures is a reality. No mat­
ter how unusual some of the beliefs, rituals, and sociological pattems may 
be to an outsider, the physician cannot ignore the patient's cultural back­
ground and his or her support network. Human understanding of dis­
ease and death is an important part of all cultures and religions. It is 
closely linked to how we define the position of an individual in a society. 
The seeds of this understanding have been sown early in childhood, and 
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their roots are far-reaching. Beliefs about causes and classification of dis­
eases, assumptions about the links between the body and external and 
intemal spiritual forces, the existence and life of the soul before birth and 
after physical death of the body-these are etemal questions whose 
answers greatly influence the ways in which patients cope with disease 
and suffering. The consumer-oriented approach of favoring treatment 
over prevention, excessive emphasis on the effectiveness of modern treat­
ments for cancer, and the lack of efforts to integrate the acceptance of our 
own mortality and the de:rnands of our life seem to be typical products of 
the Westem world and of this century. Most modern Western cultures 
appear to exorcise suffering and dying and limit exposure to these events. 
Thus the norm becomes health and happiness, while sickness is seen as a 
deviation to be avoided at all cost. In more traditional cultures, on the 
contrary, disease, suffering, and death are not taboo, not even for children; 
on the contrary, they are occasions and most powerful tools for instilling 
and inspiring religious, spiritual, and philosophical beliefs. 
In our multicultural, multiethnic societies the outer appearance and 
behavior of an individual human being may change with the adoption of 
another cultural pattem. In critical situations, however, it is the roots, not 
branches or leaves, that determine our responses: when facing serious 
disease or death we often retum to the cultural values and practices to 
which we were first exposed in childhood. Moreover, there is an active 
effort to preserve cultural identity, which is not only understandable but 
very appropriate: in the new world of continuous stress and of global 
marketing (including political marketing), old cultural traditions find a 
new and most important role in relieving tensions, preserving local iden­
tity, and preventing the dissolution of human diversity into a pool of six 
billion competing individuals. 
The world is changing, however; and compared to changes in the past, 
those of today are rapid and global. People in remote villages feel the 
waves of modem life with new technologies and emphasis on everyone' s 
individual capabilities, rights, and responsibilities. The tension between 
the old and the new is felt worldwide, very likely to an equal extent in 
developing and in economically well-developed countries. We have said 
that patients and physicians will clearly feel tensions between the old and 
the new-the patients, since their health and life are at stake; and physi­
cians, since they have to strive to achieve an often impossible balance 
between responsibility towards the patient, which includes establishing a 
sincere relationship, and the expectations of the patient's support net­
work. Often relatives or other figures in the patient's life attempt to dom­
inate the situation in an effort to protect the ill person from too painful a 
truth. In such a situation, the patient may silently sink into a passive 
role-and offer a nice example to those physicians who still believe that 
most patients do not wish to be properly informed about their disease. 
The physician's task is also to reveal the true, often hidden expectations, 
SURBONE & ZWITTER: EDITORS' PERSPECTIVE 5 
questions, fears, and misconceptions of the patient, while respecting his 
or her cultural and family backgrounds. This may involve lengthy, some­
times hostile argument with those who feel that they are in charge of the 
patient. Often the physician tries not to cross the line beyond which the 
family would reject him as healer, or beyond which the effort to introduce 
more sincerity into the interhuman relations would actually lead to their 
total obstruction. The goal is to break down, not to build, barriers. 
JUSTICE 
Justice in the availability of proper medical care, we have said, is the 
third aspect that illustrates the influence of a particular culture upon the 
process of communication with the cancer patient. There is no doubt that 
for many patients the possibility of a cure lies in the hands of those who 
decide on the allocation of resources for medical care and cancer treat­
ment. Many of our colleagues, especially those from the developing 
countries, mention the critical shortage of appropriate medical institu­
tions, equipment, drugs, and manpower. To what extent are patients 
informed about this? It seems that quite often physicians are reluctant to 
suggest a transfer of a patient to another institution, for instance, very 
likely at substantial financial and emotional cost, without a guarantee for 
a cure. Although this might be seen as a patemalistic position, it is often 
the most honest solution. The major impact of economic considera­
tions on the quality of health care for patients in different socioeconomic 
groups and in different societies is an ethical quandary, and it also affects 
the issue of communication. 
Specific problems of communication with wornen in the developing 
countries and with the underprivileged in some of the most developed 
countries, such as the United States-two groups particularly suffering 
from lack of proper medical care-have rarely been mentioned even in 
this volume written by very open, sincere, honest physicians. 
Discrimination against women is not only linked to certain traditions, reli­
gions, or cultures, but also extends to the so-called democratic societies. 
Behind almost ideal constitutional rights we still find men in dominating 
positions, and this is reflected in differences of access to health care and 
research. 
The existence of grossly underprivileged populations in some affluent 
countries seems to be an unavoidable consequence of the Westem empha­
sis over the last two centuries on personal achievement and success. Yet, 
even for a large part of the North American and European populations, 
reliance on complete autonomy and individual self-determination may be 
more illusion than reality: the underprivileged and those who are sirnply 
unlucky (perhaps because of the unexpected occurrence of a serious dis­
ease) would probably be happy to subscribe to a system of greater inter-
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dependence and solidarity. For the majority of the world population, 
emphasis on absolute autonomy is neither a goal nor a dream. 
What are the specific aspects of communication with the cancer 
patient if this patient is, for instance, a single mother of two preschool 
children in Russia, or a man in the United States whose potentially life­
saving treatment will not be covered by insurance? Clearly, many press­
ing questions remain unanswered. 
We hope that this book will open an intense, productive discussion on 
all aspects of truth-telling, from its philosophical and anthropological 
foundations to its social and political implications. 
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On se Jait un idole de la verite elle meme: car la verite, hors de la charite, n' est 
pas Dieu; elle est son image, et un idole qu'il ne Jaut point aimer ni adorer. 
-PASCAL
Pascal's words ("We make an idol of truth in itself. But truth, outside 
of love, is not God: it's simply His image, an idol that we should neither 
love nor adore") still represent one of the most powerful warnings against 
the idolatry of truth-an idolatry that is perpetuated by our lirnited reflec­
tion upon the many epistemic and ethical implications of truth. 
Truth and epistemology: What is truth? Is truth a simple matter of 
coherence account? Is truth a matter of adherence? If so, to what? Does 
a single truth exist? If more than one truth exists, will the many truths one 
day reconcile in a single one? Does truth exist outside of relationships 
(the "love" of Pascal), outside of a connectional dirnension? 
Truth and subjectivity: Does truth exist outside of contexts? Are facts 
sufficient to determine truth? 
Truth and medicine: Is the objective component of medical truth suffi­
cient to speak of truth? Should medicine not combine cognitive and affec­
tive information to reach the truth? Is truth a unilateral concept or is it a 
concept shared between patient, doctor, and society? Finally, are patient 
and doctor sirnply engaged in discovering a truth that is already there, or 
are they creating a truth? If the latter, is it an historical or a narrative 
truth? 
Truth and ethics: Can there be a technology of ethics? Are truth and 
truth-telling objects of ethical inquiry? 
ETHICS IN MEDICINE 
For the ancient Greeks, the sphere of ethics was not distinguished 
from that of esthetics; according to Aristotle courage is beautiful.1 Exactly 
what, then, does ethics mean? 
7 
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The word ethics has two different roots: E0oa and T]0oa. The word 
e0oa means habit, custom. There is a dimension of ethics that has been 
called reactive,2 aimed at preserving the identity of mankind. In this 
respect, ethics relies on a system of rules of behavior, hence on habits 
reflecting ethical virtues. The word T]0oa, on the other hand, means home 
or usual place. Ethics, then, is the home of human beings, and it implies 
an active, continuous effort at understanding how mankind remains in 
this home.3 
Ethics in medicine can be defined as the dimension in which both 
patient and doctor find themselves at home-a home in which they 
remain by acting according to ethical virtues. 
TRUTH AND MEDICAL ETHICS 
Truth is not merely the opposite of falsehood; rather, it is a relational 
state, which evolves through interactions in tirne. Truth can suddenly 
reveal itself when least expected. Truth can develop slowly, and we may 
be asked to wait patiently for it. Truth is a matter of now as well as of 
tomorrow. Can we affirm truth with certainty? Even if we think we rec­
ognize it for ourselves, can we impose it on others? Truth should above 
all be respected. 
In the patient-doctor relationship, we need to respect the truth by the 
act of truth-telling, in which telling does not strictly mean using words, 
nor does it indica te which words; and in which truth does not equal infor­
mation, but goes far beyond it. 
In its action/ activity implications, in its epistemological and its narra­
tive component, truth-telling seems to be the real object of medical ethics 
and of our daily work as physicians. 
Truth-telling is, however, only a component of a larger project, that of 
making truth. Truth is no longer a matter of idolatry: it is a matter of dis­
covering as well as creating and recreating, in medicine as well as outside 
of medicine, in disease as well as outside of disease. 
INFORMATION AND TRUTH 
Clearly, information is only one component of truth. Information 
reflecting mere objective scientific truth does not take into account that 
the latter is a chimera. No knowledge is ever abstract from the context in 
which it was produced: knowledge is always situated knowledge, and 
this includes scientific knowledge. Medical truth is never value free, nor 
does the patient-doctor relationship ever take place in a value-neutral 
context. 
In medicine, there is an objective dimension of truth, which can be 
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expressed through information. The nature and likely course of disease 
itself, the treatment options, the possible side effects, the likely prognosis 
are all objective elements of medical truth. However, there are two more 
dimensions of truth in medicine, and they are equally important: the sub­
jective-i.e., the patient's perception of the disease-and the contextual, 
which varies according to the historical, cultural, and religious back­
grounds of the patient and the doctor. These three dimensions can be 
expressed only in the process of communication. 
COMMUNICATION 
Information becomes truth only in the context of communication. But 
what is communication? The origin of the word, from the Latin commu­
nis, implies sharing something in common. Hence, communication can be 
defined as the process by which meanings are exchanged between indi­
vid uals through a common system of symbols, such as language, ges­
tures, and signs. In the patient-doctor relationship, communication is the 
timely and appropriate answer to the problem of truth. 
Communication is a bidirectional process. It implies information, but 
it goes beyond information. It is not only verbal, but also consists of a uni­
versal language of signs, gestures, objects. It develops over tirne. It takes 
into account all the variables that, by their interaction, can modify the 
truth in the patient-doctor relationship: the patient, the health-care team, 
the family, society in its entirety, the disease and its course, the medica­
tions. Communication is creative and never results from imposition. 
Communication respects and expresses the truth. 
OBSTACLES TO COMMUNICATION 
That communication is not an easy task we know from our personal 
lives, long before we enter our profession. In the patient-doctor relation­
ship, many are the obstacles to communication. As in the rest of life, we 
face problems of language, reality and its limits, expectations and finally 
the presence of the incommunicable. 
Language is about words, about meanings, and about imagination. 
Language is the major obstacle to communication, insofar as it refers not 
only to the linguistic property of a certain group of people, but also to the 
meaning that different persons attribute to the same words. "But is lan­
guage the only language?" asked Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Notebook.4
Later on, he wrote: "Since language stands in intemal relation to the 
world, it and these relations determine the logical possibility of facts." 
Language is not merely a convention; on the contrary, it stands in a close, 
interna!, logical relationship to the world. Language and facts are thus 
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connected in a new dimension. 
When thinking of language in the patient-doctor relationship, we 
might wish to think of the role of narrative in medicine. Medicine is 
based upon narratives-the patient's but also the doctor's. Illness narra­
tive is a mainstay of medica! practice: the stories that patients tel1 us are 
the first moment of the relationship and, indeed, shape it. Do patients' 
narratives depict objective experience only? Do they follow cultural mod­
els (templates, plots, literary roles)? And finally, to what extent do 
patients and doctors share the narrative? Because doctors have their nar­
ratives too, they work in a cultural context, they belong to multiple con­
texts (the general culture and also the medical culture). Doctors speak 
about medical knowledge as absolute, natural, universal; but is not med­
ical knowledge also a narrative? 
Reality has limitations that communication does not overcome. On 
the contrary, the limitations of reality can become obstacles to communi­
cation. Let us think of the following: we are not immortal, economic pres­
sure is increasing, distributive justice needs to be considered, major 
therapeutic advances are not common, available therapies have severe 
side effects, more is not always better. Finally the medicalization of life 
and its quality is ineffective and dangerous. Communication about these 
issues is difficult, as it engages us in facing those limitations of reality 
against which we struggle and fight. We do not like these limitations of 
reality, and we tend not to talk about them. Actually, we participate in 
creating different expectations for us and our patients. 
That expectations are often unrealistic is a fact. But who creates expec­
tations? Society and culture first, the patient and his or her microenvi­
ronment, doctors, and medicine itself. Our goal should be to establish 
realistic expectations without subtracting hope. It is often an impossible 
task, as it involves some aspects of our lives, some webs of our thoughts 
that are incommunicable. 
There is a threshold in the patient-doctor relationship, as in every rela­
tionship of life, that we cannot overstep. We need communication, but we 
also need privacy and respect. The "ponderable imponderables" (in 
Simone Weil's powerful expression) exist; the "ultimate concems" of Paul 
Tillich cannot be communicated. There is a tirne when the incommunica­
ble takes precedence. 
TRUTH IN MEDICINE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 
The medical act involves a moral agent as well as values and goals. 
The agent, who is both the patient and the doctor, has character and 
virtues, responsibility and rights, a certain degree of free will and control. 
The agent also has memory, imagination, creativity. 
The values involved in the patient-doctor relationship are attributed to 
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the act by the agents. The values are attributed to an act before, during, 
and after the act takes place. The a priori attribution of values is contex­
tual, insofar as H is learned and shared among persons in a particular con­
text. 
The telos of the medical act is healing. However, the goals of the med­
ica! act (and its consequences, too) might not necessarily be the same for 
the patient and the doctor, as they are strongly influenced by the asym­
metry of the patient-doctor relationship. Think of the different meanings 
that a partial remission has for the patient and for the doctor where can­
cer is concerned, or consider the debate on quality of life and how to mea­
sure it. 
Indeed, active work of communication is needed for the patient and 
the doctor to esta�lish and reach a common purpose of the medical act. 
Unlike relationships among peers, the patient-doctor relationship cannot 
be described simply as a contract. There is a state of slavery induced by 
disease that renders the patient vulnerable; also, it makes the purpose of 
the medical act that of setting the patient free from the slavery of disease. 
We all are so familiar with our medical terminology that we probably no 
longer pay attention to its meaning: "disease-free," "freedom from 
relapse," "freedom from symptoms" are recurrent idioms in the medical, 
and especially the oncological, literature. Spiritual freedom, achieved by 
sharing the path to make truth, is also a goal of medicine. 
In this book we read about the complexity of the issue of communica­
tion with a patient affected by a serious, often lethal, disease. We shall 
learn about different contexts, about different ways and-honestly-quite 
different degrees of informing patients, about different efforts to make a 
truth between the doctor and the patient. Also, we shall learn about dif­
ferent ethical frameworks and justifications of different practices of infor­
mation-or noninformation-throughout the world. 
FOR A POSSIBLE ETHICAL INTERPRETATION OF DIFFERENT 
PRACTICES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 
In reading the different chapters of this book, I first felt a strong posi­
tive feeling of breathing honesty-in itself a moral value. Then, I was fas­
cinated by everything I learned, by the many facts and values that I had 
been ignoring. Finally, I tried to understand what the common ethical 
background behind such a tremendous variety of practices could be. 
It is certainly not my intention to analyze or systematize the work of 
others. On the contrary, I am simply offering a review of what appear to 
me as the two dominant leitmotifs with respect to the ethics behind those 
practices: an interpretation resting on the interplay of the principles of 
respect for autonomy and of beneficence towards the patient on the one 
hand; an interpretation stemming from phronesis, or practical wisdom, on 
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the other-the former emphasizing the act, the latter the agent. As a mat­
ter of fact, after reading all the chapters, the two appear to be closely inter­
twined. 
While "what is truth" is a metaethical question, ethics is faced with the 
issue of truth-telling-as previously alluded to, an action-oriented prob­
lem. And we might remind ourselves of the Kantian definition of ethics 
as a practical philosophy.5,6 
Quite often, the issue of truth-telling is approached from the point of 
view of principles of medical ethics-namely, respect for autonomy and 
beneficence. Many contributors have employed this terminology, or 
implied it in their discussion. The word "autonomy" refers to the 
patients' rights to be respected in their life and dignity, as well as their 
right to self-determination with regard to their health. The word "benef­
icence/' on the other hand, refers to a duty of the physician-that of doing 
the patient's good. Implicit in the latter is the assumption that the med­
ical knowledge of the doctor translates into a certain responsibility to 
determine what is best for the patient; this need not necessarily be a form 
of patemalism, as most of the contributors show in their chapters. There 
are other principles of medical ethics, such as nonmaleficence and justice, 
although these are not directly involved in articulating the discussion 
about truth-telling. Most ethical theories see truth-telling as a specifica­
tion of the principle of autonomy.7
Kant, in his Foundations of the Metaphysics oj Morals,5 defined truth­
telling as essential in order to respect the autonomy of each individual­
the only way to treat a person as an end and never as a means. For Kant, 
indeed, the "sublimity" of a person comes from being morally 
autonomous. Kant spoke of the "autonomy of the will," which he con­
trasted with "heteronomy"-the former referring to acting according to 
the categorical imperative, the latter to acting according to motivations 
other than universal moral principles. Never does autonomy in Kant 
assume any libertarian connotation, as it does in present Westem cultures 
and bioethics. Mill, on the contrary, regarded autonomy as necessary for 
each person to shape her life-a process he preferred to call "individual­
ity."a 
The use of principles in bioethics is derived primarily from the work 
of W. D. Ross,9 to whom we owe the definition of "prima facie" duties or 
principles. There are many different moral obligations that present them­
selves in any given situation, and at times they conflict. These different 
moral obligations are basic, valid moral principles, but because they can 
conflict, it may be impossible to honor them all at the same tirne. In this 
sense, they are not absolute, and they can be "rendered wrong": moral 
principles for Ross are thus conditionat prima facie. In Ross's work there 
is no hierarchy of principles, although he tends to assume that nonmalef­
icence takes priority over beneficence. 
The lack of a hierarchical order leads, in my opinion, to an important 
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consequence-that any choice, even the right one, will always leave out 
something that we know to be of moral value, and that does not cease to 
be such. Bence moral life can be difficult, if not tragic: moral dilemmas 
exist; they are the rule rather than the exception. We do not live in Kant's 
world of noumenal moral duties, where "obligationes non colliduntur"; 
and when dilemmas arise, they do not destroy obligations as such. Moral 
dilemmas are a fact of life, a "misfortune of moral life."10 They are not 
simply the result of imperfect understanding of the duties of the case; and 
Kantian theory ignores "regrets and related considerations" by eliminat­
ing "the ought that is not acted upon."11
There have been many lines of criticism of the use of prima facie 
duties, and excellent reviews of these issues have recently appeared in the 
literature. 12 I shall briefly summarize these criticisms for the reader who 
is not necessarily familiar with the subject. First, one could deny the exis­
tence of conflicts of duties when seeing conflicting duties as conditional. 
Second, acceptance of prima facie duties could devastate common sense 
morality, by hiding actual duties. The provisional character of prima facie 
duties with their qualifications has also been severely attacked as lacking 
a theory of reference and thus being inadequate in accounting for the 
complexity of moral life: autonomy per se, for instance, does not mean 
anything if we do not specify (somehow a priori with reference to a sys­
tematic moral theory) its subject and its content. Also, the use of prima 
facie duties has been criticized as being procedurally emphatic. Finally, it 
has been seen as abstracted from the real world of morality and from the 
sociocultural context. The latter indeed appears to be a valid criticism to 
me, while the previous seem to ignore the instrumenta! value of prima 
facie duties. If we consider them as being at an intermediate level 
between a systematic moral theory and the pluralism of different narra­
tives, they provide us with an effective tool for a preliminary reading of 
the moral experience. They enable us to define the duties at stake in a par­
ticular moral experience and/ or moral dilemma. They also enable us to 
recognize the elements necessary to formulate a moral judgment in a con­
crete situation.13 Thus prima facie duties may help in the "delimitation of 
a range of acceptable actions"-which seems to be the purpose of an eth­
ical code. 
The use of principles in bioethics has been extremely valuable in pro­
viding instruments by which to frame moral dilemmas in medicine.7
Truth-telling, for instance, can easily be framed in terms of autonomy and 
beneficence, although often our final ethical choice finds its justification 
outside the framework of principles alone. 
This is first because autonomy and beneficence cannot be abstracted 
from the contextual dimension. As seen repeatedly in the discussion 
about truth-telling in medicine, contextual aspects can never be elimi­
nated, as moral life does not happen in the world of ideas; it happens in a 
here and now, in a given society, with its cultural background, its eco-
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nomic and political circumstances. And the patient-doctor relationship is 
no exception: it is, indeed, always part of a broader patient-doctor-soci­
ety relationship. Contextualism does not necessarily mean relativism, but 
it brings to the surface the reality of pluralism in our world: different 
interpretations and different expressions of moral principles in different 
cultures coexist with the same universal right to dignity of every human 
being and with the same universal duty to respect this dignity.14,15 
It is, indeed, the aim of this book project to show in how many differ­
ent ways truth-telling can occur and under which circumstances truth­
telling might not occur, at least not in the Western understanding of the 
word. An initial explanation for these cultural differences, as we have just 
seen, is that the two principles of autonomy and beneficence cannot be 
abstracted from the contextual dimension, and, on the contrary, depend 
on the shared meaning of each in any given culture.16 A second explana­
tion is that autonomy and beneficence are interrelated principles, never 
existing without each other; truth-telling, then, stems from a balance 
between the two. That this is not a "semantic somersault"17 is proved by 
the extensive literature on the subject, and certainly by the many contri­
butions to this book. 
Also, as previously alluded to, important justifications for the differ­
ent ways of approaching truth-telling in the patient-doctor relationship lie 
outside the strict world of principles. Virtues, responsibility, and trust 
play equally essential roles, by emphasizing the moral agent and her char­
acter and role in solving ethical dilemmas. 
Thus truth-telling becomes a matter of phronesis, of practical wis­
dom-which is itself a leitmotif of our book and its narratives. Phronesis 
-in Aristotelian terms1-refers to the "prudent weighing of the alterna­
tives in situations of uncertainty and stress."18 Its roots resting upon the
integrity of the physician, upon his or her moral character, phronesis
leads to the timely and appropriate way of responding to each individual
patient's needs, including that of being told the truth that he or she wishes
to hear.
Thus truth-telling becomes a matter of responsibility, both the doctor' s 
and the patient's. The professional responsibility is the doctor's, whose 
situation in the patient-doctor relationship is that of the more knowl­
edgeable, hence more powerful, figure. The doctor has responsibility as a 
healer; and we all know to what extent cultural and personal sensitivity 
can increase the therapeutic efficacy of the medical act. The patient's 
resp,onsibility lies in his or her narrative, as well as in being honest in the 
relationship with the doctor. Finally, there is their mutual responsibility 
in sharing the process of making truth, in coauthoring a truth for the pre­
sent and the future. 
Thus truth-telling becomes a matter of trust. 19 The patient-doctor rela­
tionship is an asymmetry, and as such it escapes the realm of contractual 
relationships among peers. Kantian autonomy, based on reciprocal 
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promises and on a moral accountability limited to autonomous equal rela­
tionships, does not cover all aspects of the patient-doctor relationship. 
The patient and the doctor are, indeed, equal human beings, with equal 
moral and social status and deserving equal respect. The patient-doctor 
relationship is also a form of covenant, and as such it calls for special 
attention to the expectations and promises of both partners. But the 
patient-doctor relationship is in essence a fiduciary act, based on mutual 
trust. Unlike most other contracts, it involves a very delicate aspect of our 
being human: the dependence that we all have on our body and its func­
tioning-the basis of human life. When we put our health and life in 
someone else's hands, we need to trust in more than the doctor's honor­
ing his or her part of the contract. We need to trust in the doctor's caring 
for us. After all, do we not all speak of medical care?
CONCLUSIONS 
Truth-telling is only one step in the patient-doctor relationship and in 
the process of communication. Many other variables contribute to the 
cocreation by the patient and the doctor of an evolving truth: the role of 
society both as macro- and microenvironment, the evolution of the dis­
ease, the pharmacological component, the "unexpected" in life. 
Truth-telling is an essential step, though, to care; and we should never 
feel relieved of our responsibility to be truthful to our patients, according 
to our cultures and to sensitivity to individual circumstances. 
Truth-telling, finally, is not only toward our patients, but also among 
our professional colleagues: the honesty of each of the contributions to 
this volume is proof of this dimension of truth-telling. Honesty is at the 
core of this project, its main value. We will leam from others' experiences 
about different ways of making truth within the context of a highly val­
ued patient-doctor relationship. 
Can it be that one of the determining aspects of the healing process is, 
indeed, how much the patient and the doctor value their particular rela­
tionship? It does appear to be so, from my personal experience and, if I 
have correctly interpreted the contributions to this volume, from the expe­
rience of many others throughout the world. 
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UNLIMITED HUMAN AUTONOMY -
A CuLTURAL BrAs? 
A
UTONOMY has become a dominant bioethi­
cal value in the Western world. It is the basis of 
many ethical decisions, and considerations of auton­
omy · influence legislators, judges, and the public 
alike. The predominance of autonomy has been de­
scribed by one of its critics as verging on the "tyr­
annous."1 
In this essay I describe three recent events in Israel 
that run counter to this trend. They include court 
decisions and the enactment of laws that clearly 
place Israel in a unique, and perhaps lonely, position 
in the Western world. The rriost recent event was a 
decision2 by a district judge who ordered the force­
feeding of a group of political prisoners engaged in 
a hunger strike. They had reached a stage of the 
strike that, in the opinion of physicians in the prison 
service, was endangering their lives. The judge 
stated clearly that when there is a conflict between 
life and dignity, the preservation of life takes prece­
dence. 
By coincidence, one of the prisoners was hospital­
ized in the department of interna! medicine that I 
head. Since this was a most unusual and delicate sit­
uation for the ent1re staff, I decided that rather than 
have the house officer proceed immediately to the 
admission history taking and physical examination, I 
would first meet with the prisoner to discuss the is­
sues. He was a pleasant, articulate young man in his 
20s who had the usual appearance of an ultra-ortho­
dox Jew, with a beard, side locks, and a large skull­
cap. He was engaged in reading a religious tract. 
After a few pleasantries, I explained that he had 
been sent to the hospital to be fed, even against his 
will. I pointed out that I was under two sets of or­
ders, one from the legally consi:ituted Israeli court 
and the other, since I am an orthodox Jew, from a 
divine edict that commands me not to let a fellow 
human die if such an event can be prevented. He re­
sponded quite calmly that he rejected the authority 
of the court, since he regarded it as part of the .cor­
rupt system against which his pro�est was directed. 
With respect to the �iY,ine edict, he pointed out that 
there are situations in which one is commanded by 
this same divine authority to sacrifice one's life for a 
greater cause. He indicated that he would not be 
dissuaded from this firmly held position. 
I indicated that we had the will and the ability to 
feed him even against his will and that it would be 
much more pleasant for ali concerned if he did not 
resist being fed through a nasogastric tube. He asked 
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for tirne to think it over and shortly thereafter stated 
his position. He requested assurance that the tube 
feeding meet his particularly high standards for ko­
sher food and that he be permitted to deposit a 
letter, with copies sent to a list of government au­
thorities, indicating that he was being fed against 
his express wishes and that I would bear the legal 
and criminal consequences. When this was accom­
plished, he offered no resistance and accepted tube 
feeding "under protest." 
The decision by this Israeli court stands in striking 
contrast to a recent situation in Turkey in which at 
least 12 hunger strikers died; to previous political 
hunger strikes in Ireland and South Africa; and to 
the generally accepted position of Western bioethi­
cists, as reflected in the Tokyo Declaration.3 I am 
convinced that my particular hunger striker was ul­
timately pleased with the turn of events. He received 
the necessary attention, yet he was prevented from 
dying by a superior power. In essence, he was able 
to have his cake and eat it too. 
The second event, which took place a month ear­
lier, was the enactment of a patients' rights bill4 by 
the Knesset, Israel's national legislature. Much of 
the law was relatively noncontroversial, but one clause 
in the original bili created considerable debate. It 
required that informed consent be obtained before 
treatment, as in most Western countries, and it spelled 
out in some detail the information to be provided to 
the patient. The legislators were faced with a major 
dilemma, however: what to do when a patient refus­
es a treatment that is clearly lifesaving. The govern­
ment's chief legal counsel convened a meeting of 
about 30 physicians, philosophers, lawyers, and cler­
gy to discuss this issue. The civil libertarians in the 
group, of course, took the standard Western position 
- namely, that under no circumstances could ther­
apy be rendered against the will of a competent
patient, unless the patient's illness threatened the
welfare of others, as in the case of certain communi­
cable diseases.
But others in the group would not accept this po­
sition. As one of Israel's leading philosopher-ethi­
cists stated dramatically: "l simply am incapable of 
standing idly by and watching while someone lies on 
the railroad tracks waiting for an approaching train 
in order to commit suidde, without making an ef­
fort to prevent that person's death, even against the 
person's will." The fina! compromise, a bit unusual 
by any standard, permits a competent patient to be 
treated against his or her expressed will if the legally 
constituted hospital ethics committee is convinced 
that there is "reason to believe that after receiving 
the treatment the patient will give . . . retroactive 
consent." 
This compromise might legitimately be seen as a 
bit ofTalmudic legerdemain to justify physicians' pa­
ternalism and disregard of patients' wishes. But I 
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would contend that it allows a less simplistic ap­
proach to a patient's refusal of therapy than does the 
conventional Western view. Indeed, on occasion, pa­
tients who are fully competent in the legal sense 
refuse Jifesaving therapy, but the reason for the re­
fusal may well be an irrational fear, which is not 
always overcome even by repeated attempts at per­
suasion. One might perhaps see forcing people to 
undergo lifesaving therapy as an action that does re­
spect their autonomy and for which they may ulti­
mately be grateful; their judgment may be tempo­
rarily compromised by irrationality, although they 
remain within the bounds of legally defined compe­
tence. Such overriding of patients' expressed wishes 
should be rare, and indeed is so in Israel, but the Is­
raeli system now provides an avenue of escape from 
rigid adherence to the constraints of laws based on 
autonomy, which may lead to needless deaths. 
The two events I have described were preceded by 
a landmark decision in 199 3 by the Israeli Supreme 
Court5 that perhaps best articulates the Israeli posi­
tion on autonomy. In the decision, which concerned 
the treatment of a child with Tay-Sachs disease, the 
vice-president of the Court described Israeli law and 
society as an amalgam of two values that may at 
times conflict. On the one hand are the values of 
Jewish tradition, which place great emphasis on the 
sanctity of human life. On the other hand are the 
values of Western democracy, which stress human 
autonomy. These two fundamental principles may 
conflict when questions about ending a patient's life 
at the patient's request are raised. The vice-president 
therefore enunciated a precedent-making position 
that, in accordanc_e with ):he principle of the sanctity 
of human life, unequivocally ruled out any action 
that could be construed as active euthanasia or phy­
sician-assisted suicide, even when it was. taken in re­
sponse to a patient's express wishes. At the same tirne, 
the decision recognized, out of respect for human 
autonomy, the.right of a terminally ill,· suffering pa­
. tient to reject intrusive an:d uncomfortable therapy 
that cannot cure ·the basic illness. 
These three _ examples provide a glimpse into how 
a society that by' niany standards is an integral part 
of the Western scientific'and medica! world deviates 
considerably from Western norms jn certain funda­
mental respects. The i:easons are multiple and coin­
plex. Clearly,howi;:ver, Jewishfaith and_ c�ture place 
enormous emphasis on the value of human life. This 
position has been expoundedin terms of what I call 
the "mythology'.' of the infinite value o'f human life.6 
The biblical admonition_ '�D.o not stand idly by 
your friend's bk:iod''7 Čreates 'an. imp�tative for ex­
tensive involvemeni tn the affaifs;of other:S, for their 
benefit - more so than is generally accepted in the 
West. In addition, the_ concept of mutual i:esponsi­
bility among Jews has' been clearly. articulated: "All 
Jews are responsible for each other's deeds. "8 Fur-
thermore, the trauma of the Holocaust, whose sur­
vivors abound .in Israel, is often remembered in 
terms of the failure of the nations of the world to 
take action to prevent the death and suffering of 
others. These are a few factors that, I believe, con­
tribute to the Israeli ethos, which calls into"question 
a policy of nonintervention when human life is at 
stake. 
The conventional Western view says to competent 
people who wish to end their lives, "If that is your 
autonomous desire, we will not obstruct you in any 
way." Indeed, most Western countries have abol­
ished the criminality of suicide. The traditional Jew­
ish view says, "You are so valuable to us, beyond 
what you mean to yourself, that we simply cannot 
permit you to die. We care so much about you that 
we are willing even to violate your human rights in 
order to save your life." These two contrasting ap­
proaches represent, on the one hand, an individual­
istic view of society, a:rtd on the other hand, a per­
ception of society more as a community, even a 
family. It is perhaps no coincidence that one of the 
chief proponents of the communitarian movement 
in the United States9 is a former Israeli. 
Classic Western bioethics and law do not accept 
unlimited human autonomy, either. They override 
individual autonomy when respecting it would en­
danger others, as when antituberculous therapy must 
be imposed, but they respect autonomy almost to­
tally when others are not directly affected. The Is­
raeli view described here may be seen as a rejection 
of the idea that. a p�r�on's actions in ending his or 
her life affect oruy th# '.persori. Instead, it asserts 
that a person's death_diiriirushes others as well and 
that therefore s9_ci�ty is"perni.itiea. to intervene. 
The widely'.ac:cepteq.·.JY�štetn· approach by which 
a hunger striker'�. exp_ressed desire to .die is accepted 
at face vali.le and bywhich :;ociery is absolved of any 
responsibility fo{j>reventing :Such a death seems 
somewhat simplisti�;-).s is dear from the story of the 
hunger striker Lhave tolci_ here; A Western court 
would have had ni:>"difficulcy: &ciding not to feed 
him, and .. indee�(t;be'jsŠue·_would ·probably not have 
been brought :to a_}:q'ul:t/b\i(that might have been 
a rragic err�t\:i):J_'.'/.F{,;��/t\/::: · ._ : ..Eyen the'štron.g�st,:a'dyqč:at<;�}of autonomy would 
do well also'. io: foiiM<l}fthi pdŠsibility that some of 
i:he �-most .artic:tjla:f�tts_e�p:µri.gly determined hunger 
. strik.ers niay· n'dt q(ftilly a'_u_foriqmous in their ac­
tions.- Pressur.e�. ff.9gi\_poµJ:tc.a,ll,y _like-minded col­
leagues, the need_,tc/'š�y�_'_fac;�}and other factors may 
preclude a totallyj;i,i�oµ9mdus·d_ecišion. An error by 
. which dignity is. ��hie1Jnf�y9r':of life may be reme­
diable, · but orie::fliat.'d.eniesAifesaving action is irre­
vers�ble. · · _ ',/i?/-/�-:/?fz;)// { · 
· ::,In describ_ingJli ; c3:5(of;this h.'unger striker, I do 
ri'ot in any way' meaif·'to' asšert. iliat people do not 
have the right to sacrifice their lives for a higher 
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cause. The world is a better place because of many 
such martyrs. Nor do I countenance the complicity 
of physicians with totalitarian regimes when they 
force-feed fasting protesters in a manifest attempt to 
break the resistance of legitimate protest move­
ments. But I do think that the issue is much more 
complex than is suggested by the politically correct 
view that feeding hunger strikers by force is always 
unethical. 
Israel is not alone in limiting autonomy in favor 
of preserving life. At a 1992 conference on the 
cross-cultural dimensions of inedical ethics, a speak­
er described the prosecution and conviction in India 
of a physician who allowed a patient to die because 
he did not impose treatment against the patient's 
will.10 
There is deep disagreement in the West about 
many bioethical issues, whether they are classic ones 
such as abortion and euthanasia, or issues related to 
advances in biology and medicine, such as genetic 
engineering and new techniques of reproduction. 
But there -is a fairly strong consensus about the re­
spect given to patients' autonomy in a wide range of 
ethical situations, and about the priority that auton­
omy should be accorded. The consensus may create 
the illusion that this Western approach is almost 
a canonical truth. It is important, however, to be 
aware of and sensitive to trends that run counter to 
Sa11d D1111cs 
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prevalent Western axioms and dogma and that may 
contribute significantly to bioethical thinking. 
SHIMON M. GLJCK, M.D. 
Ben Gurion University of the Negev 
Beer Sheva 84105, Israel 
I am indebted to Joha11a11 Ben Bassat, Brenda Glick, Ve/vel 
Greene, and Frank Leavitt for reading the ma1111script and for their 
helpful commmts. 
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MEDICAL GRADUATES IN ONCOLOGY 
Patricija E6imovi6* 
MD, Institute of Oncology, Ljubljana, Slovenia. 
Oncology is emotionally as much as professionally a demanding medica! field. Stigmatization of cancer 
by lay people and medica! professionals alike, and frequent helplessness while encountering dying or pallia­
tive patients are the main emotional burdens and cause many young doctors to turn away from residency in 
any of the oncological specialties. Those of us who enter oncological residency are thrown in the realm of 
ethically difficult decisions combined with strong emotional reactions from patients, their relatives, and our 
own. 
Lacking any forma! training from the medica! school, we mostly deal with ali that by empirical on-the-job 
learning and random experience, sometimes just copying often-inadequate practices of our older colleagues. 
Some of us make it; others hide behind good technical skills and minimize communication with the pa­
tients, moving towards imminent burn-out syndrome. 
It does not need to be like that. While being successful in dealing with ethical dilemmas may require 
certain character traits, it is also definitely something that can be learned. Many medica! schools in Western 
Europe and the USA have recognized that and provide active courses in biomedical ethics ( 1,2). Learning at 
bedside and from clinical colleagues is also beneficial if it is done properly. The third very effective way of 
learning to deal with ethical dilem mas is by guided discussion about ethical problems. It also helps to lessen 
the emotional stress, thus preventing the development of the burn-out syndrome. It is also an efficient way 
of developing moral character, as was established by Kohlberg (3). 
The skill a young oncologist needs to develop the most is communication. Learning about biomedical 
ethics and ethical dilem mas remains purely academical if we don't know how to communicate our decision 
to the patients and their relatives. Or better, to communicate a common decision with them. It is also the 
paramount skill for dealing with emotional reactions of ali involved. 
As a conclusion, 1 would like to appeal to senior colleagues and faculty members to encourage, promote 
and contribute to teaching of biomedical ethics and communication skills to medica! students and resi­
dents. It is the next step from mastering their technical skills to making them better doctors. 
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COMMITMENT OF A NURSE IN COMMUNICATUON 
WITH CANCER PATIENTS 
Albina Bobnar* 
Institute of Oncology, Ljubljana, Slovenia 
Let us not pretend that Slovenia is a country where cancer patients are properly informed of their desease. 
A personal appreciation of cultural values and ethics norms of health workers has an arbitrary role in decid­
ing what should be told to cancer patients as well as in presuming what the patients expect to be told. The 
commitment of a nurse to provide the patient with adequate information is extremely valuable. The recent 
training course on communication with the cancer patient held this spring in Ljubljana and organized by the 
Section of Oncology Nurses of Slovenia, was the right opportunity to find out what is their viewpoint regard­
ing the communication of the truth to cancer patients. Most of the participants to this course had, on aver­
age, 12 years of experience in nursing cancer patients in hospitals. 
After the introductory part of the course in which the communication dilem mas were approached only 
theoretically, we continued the work in five focus groups. Open conversations of an hour and a half in the 
groups revealed what cancer, a severe, chronic disease, bringing along distress, pain, fear, uncertainty and 
death, means to any of the nurses involved in cancer patients care. The general opinion was that the pa­
tients are not sufficiently informed, irrespective of the questions which they do or do not ask. Many commu­
nication barriers may stanci in the way to an open talk with the patient: lack of knowledge, lack of tirne, lack 
of experience, work overload, and, in addition to that feeling the heavy burden of the disease to the patient, 
as well as fear and helplessness. During the course, the need for a training seminar that would teach the 
nurses how to master and improve the comminication with cancer patients, became apparent. 
On the other hand, the most painful experience for a nurse is the patient who does not wish to learn and 
tace the truth. Are there any limits in empathizing with the patient who should be ready to fight the diseases 
despite the threat of the death? Though the term commitment to inform properly is being frequently men­
tioned, it has not been materialized yet because, in practice, cancer is, as it has always been, a ta boo. It does 
not concern us as long as it does not touch us. 
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ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN COMMUNICATION WITH CANCER PATIENTS: 
RELATIONSHBP BETWEEN THEM AND SOCIETY 
Eugeny Demin* 
Petrov Research Institute of Oncology, St. Petersburg, Russia 
Diagnosis of cancer is a shattering experience for patients and their relatives and the community. For 
them. it is often the beginning of a long trip into the world of torments and painful hesitations. Paradoxically, 
the advances in methods of cancer treatment are not changing the general position of society to consider 
cancer patients as persons of another class or even to exclude them from the community. 
What are the reasons for this attitude? Why do the persons, who face malignancy, meet unfriendly and, 
sometimes, opposed attitude? It is a general knowledge that they are not contagious and cannot transmit 
the disease to others. Many oncologists can confirm that the word "cancer" is such a shock to patients that 
they cease to follow most of what the doctors has to say. Why is cancer so shocking a diagnosis, while the 
mortality of for example heart diseases is higher then in most malignancies? 
These and other questions are not so ungrounded as it may seem at first sight. As soon as we, oncologists, 
are unable to prevent cancer in general, it is absolutely required to reduce its destructive psychological 
impact on society. Unfortunately, it is exactly professionals, who remain the most conservative in terms of 
skills to communicate both with patients and with people in general. Cancer patients are afraid of death as 
well as of the unpredictable reactions of their family and close neighborhood. 
It is a pity that the information concerning cancer is not talked about openly in Russia as much as it 
should be in order to make it easier for people to cope with this disease realistically. The majority of informa­
tion is more of fear and a miserable end rather than to educate them with the aim of to secure their coopera­
tion in the battle against cancer. 
The author is involved with breast cancer patients and analyses the problem of communication in this 
particular branch of oncology and suggests that there are four key elements to be considered. In Russia, 
there is no doubt that women with breast cancer are not sufficiently advised and educated in all aspects of 
the disease which would enable them to carry the responsibility for their own health. A survey of breast 
cancer patients showed that they are mostly influenced and educated about their disease by professionals, 
mass media, cancer patients' close relatives, and survivors of cancer, the latter contributing mostly psycho­
social support. AII of them should therefore function together in their separate manners, keeping in close 
contact with both healthy women and present patients to assist communication and understanding. The 
foundations of improved communication should be truth, training, patience, compassion, and respect. A 
correct communication must convince people that they can and have to be examined whenever they need 
to. It must help them understand what the words "malignancy and cancer'' mean in terms of current re­
search and has to help them accepting radical therapy confidently. The author is very proud that the Russian 
Reach to Recovery Organization HOPE and himself in his role of its president do all their best in promoting 
this process in our country. 
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Paternalisin and Health Behavior 
Tore Nilstun 
Smoking is a preventable health risk to smokers 
as ,veli as to nonsmokers who are exposec.1 to 
tobacco smoke (Eriksson, La.Maistre, & Newell, 
1988; Healtby Peop!e 2000, 1991; Peto, 199-i), 
anc.1 costs relatec.1 to the use of tobacco are sub­
stantial (Hocking, Grain, & Gordon, 1994). It is 
therefore not surprising that far-reaching mea­
sures have been suggestec.1 to protect individuals 
against the dangers of smoking (Leppo & Verio, 
1986: Roemer. 1993). frequently with strong op­
position from the tobacco industry (Editorial, 
199-i; Stanton & Begay. 1994).
Attempts to modify smoking behavior raise
the controversial issue of paternalism, and the 
purpose of this chapter is to discuss the ethics of 
paternalism in the context of health mainte­
nance. health restorJtion, anc.1 health improve­
ment. First, the concept of „ paternalism" is de­
fined: seconc.1, different types of paternalism are 
identitied; third, the relevant value premises are 
formulated and appliec.1 in the analysis of pater­
nalistic measures suggestec.1 to protect against the 
dangers of smoking. 
Tore Nilstun • Department of Medica! Ethics, lJniversity of 
Lund. S-222 22 Lund. Sweden. 
flc111d/J11ok 11/ f/ealth Bebal'ior Researcb IV: Re/e1·a11ce Ji>r 
Pro/essi<>na/s mul /ssues for tbe Future. edited by David S. 
Gochman. Plenum Prcss. �cw York, 1997. 
DEFL'iITIONS OF PATERNAUSM 
In the Compact Edition of the Oxford En­
g!ish Dictimwry (1971), patenza!ism is c.letinec.1 
as follows: 
Deji11iti11n /: thc claim or attcmpt to supply thc nccus 
and to control thc lite of a nation. a community. a 
group oran inuividual in a way like that of a fathcr 
towarus his childrcn. 
111ere have heen severa! attempts in the literature 
on medica! ethics to make this detinition more 
precise. TI1ough the basic idea is usually pre­
servec.1, the meaning is somewhat changec.1, as 
illustratec.1 by the following examples: 
Deji11itim1 .l: P-atcrnalism, thcn. is thc intcntional ovcr­
riuing of nnc pcrson ·s known prctcn:nn·s or ac­
tions hy .1nothcr. whcrc thc pcrson who ovcrridcs 
justifies the action hy thc goal ofhcnctiting or avoid­
ing harm to thc pcrson whosc will is ovcrriddcn 
(lkauchamp & Chilurcss. 199-1. p. r., ). 
Dejinition 3: P-.itcrnalism [isJ thc usc of (varying Jc­
grces of) <.:ocrcion to imposc anothcr·s vision­
whcrc the 1>ther might be thc statc. private institu­
tions, or individuals-on a singk individual or dass 
of individuals (Agich, 1993. p. 3). 
Definition -1: Paternalism rt:fcrs to behaviour that at­
tempts to interft:re with the autonomy of an individ­
ual without his/hcr consent (cxplkit or presumed) 
for the exprcss purpose of bencfiting that indiviu­
ual (Veatch & Spicer. 199-i). 
Dejiniti<m 5: Bridly. patcrnalism is the bclid that it 
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can bc: right to ordc:r the livc:s of other.- for thc:ir 
own good. irrespectivc: of thc:ir own wishes or judg­
mc:nts (Harris. 1985. p. 194). 
Dcji11iti<m 6: Patc:rnalism is thc: protection of individ­
uals from sdf-inflicted harm, ... Decisions are taken, 
choices made and frec:dom inhibited. ali for the 
good of the patient. There is no element of consent 
(Downic & Calman. 1994. p. 163). 
Dcji11iti<m -:_. P-.iternalism char.icteristically involves 
making peoplt-'s decisions for them or kt:eping cer­
tain information from them on the groumb that it 
would hc heltn for them not to knllw (Shinc­
bournc: & Bush. 1994). 
J)cji11itio11 8: J>-.itcrnalistic actions lmcam thatl A is
acting towards B for thc purposc: ofbcnetiting B hut
without ll's informed conscnt (:'Jikku. 1994).
J>c:/i11iti1111 <J: I' acts patcrnalistically towards Q if and
only if (a) P acts with thc intent of a\'C:rting some
harm or promoting some good for Q. (h) P acts
contr.iry to the currcnt prdcrcnces. dc�ircs or dis­
positiom of Q. (c) P's act i:, a limitation of Q's
autonomy (Dworkin. 1992).
On the population levd. howeY<.:r. there are
severa! problems with these definitions. First, 
most of the ddinitions (2. 4. 6, 8, and 9; possibly 
also 5 and 7) require that the beneficiary be 
identical \Vith the one ,vhose autonomy is lim­
ited. But in health behavior modification, the 
would-be patemalist is usually an authority that 
acts toward the whole population or a group 
with the purpose of benefiting some unidentified 
persons (Nikku, 1994). \Vhen health behavior 
modification is the issue, acts with the motive 
of benefiting a group or class of individuals (and 
not a particular individual) would not be pater­
nalistic by these definitions. 
Second, according to some of the definitions 
(2, 3, and 9), an act is paternalistic only if the act, 
asa matter of Jact, contradicts the current pref­
erences, desires, or dispositions of the individual 
or the group. According to the other definitions 
(1, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8), this condition is not neces­
sary; they require only that the person who acts 
paternalistically not know what these prefer­
ences, desires, or dispositions are. The first con­
dition (that the act should contradict such prefer­
ences ... ) is, in the view of this chapter, too 
strong. But the second condition (that the pater­
nalist not know what these preferences, desires, 
or dispositions are) is too weak. l11is chapter 
proposes a somewhat modified version of the 
second requirement in the last definition (9). l11e 
condition "P acts contrary to the current prefer­
ences, desires or dispositions of Q" should be 
replaced with a somewhat weaker requirement: 
"P has no reason to believe that the act agrees 
with the current preferences. desires, or disposi­
tions of Q." 
l11e following definition incorporating this 
substitute second condition and a slight reword­
ing of the third is suggested: 
P acts paternalistically toward an individual or a 
group Q if and only if 
( l) P acts with the intent of a\'erting some harm
or promoting some good for Q;
(2) P has no reason to belie,·e that the act agn:es
with the current preferences. desin:s. or dis­
positions of Q; and
(3) P's act is a limitation of Q's right to self­
determination.
DIFFERENT TYPES OF PATERNAUSM 
On the basis of these three conditions. six 
different types of paternalism may be identified. 
The requirement that P act with the intent of 
averting some harm or promoting some good for 
Q suggests the first distinction. If the would-be 
paternalist's only motive is to benefit an individ­
ual Q (in one way or another) the act may be 
called individual paternalism. It is also called 
medica! paternalism (Giesen, 1988). But if the 
motive is to protect a group or class of individuals 
from harm, the act may be called social paternal­
ism (Kjellin & Nilstun, 1993). The expressions 
"pure paternalism" and "impure paternalism" are 
sometimes used to indicate this distinction (Beau­
champ & Childress, 1994, p. 275). 
In the clinical setting, individual paternalism 
is more common than social paternalism: l11e 
motive is primarily to benefit a particular patient. 
Antismoking policies (which are based on the 
idea that individuals are not to be relied on in 
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ever, aim at the prevention of harm to the general 
public, both smokers and nonsmokers. Most 
such attempts to modify health behavior there­
fore exemplify social paternalism. 
The second requirement in the definition 
relates to the current preferences, desires, or 
dispositions of Q. Since Q may prefer in some 
situations that P act and in other situations that P 
abstain from acting, a distinction is sometimes 
made between actiue paternalism and passive 
paternalism. Passive paternalism obtains when P 
refuses to execute the positive preferences of Q. 
Debates about paternalism typically focus on ac­
tive paternalism, i.e., situations in which P acts 
on the grounds that it is to Q's benefits even 
though Q prefers nonintervention (Beauchamp 
& Childress, 199➔, p. 288). 
Many smokers prefer nonintervention. At­
tempts to modify their smoking behavior would 
therefore. as a rule, exemplify active paternal­
ism. Passive paternalism is probably more fre­
quent in other areas, e.g., in sports medicine, 
when a physician refuses to provide an athlete 
with anabolic steroids. 
The third requirement in the definition re­
lates to the concept of autonomy, Depending on 
the degree to ·which Q is an autonomous person. 
weak paternalism can be distinguished from 
strong paternalism (Feinberg, 1971). In weak 
paternalism, the would-be paternalist intervenes 
to protect persons against their own nonautono­
mous actions; in strong paternalism, the purpose 
is to protect persons against their autonomous 
actions (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994, p. 277). 
Unfortunately, there is no general agreement 
on where to draw the line between weak and 
strong paternalism. One attempt , which makes 
much sense, was made by Harris (1985, pp. 195-
201). His point of departure was that perfect 
autonomy is, like any ideal, unattainable. l11e line 
should therefore be drawn where an individual is 
as autonomous as can reasonably be expected. 
This is the case when there are no apparent 
defects in the agent's control (such as mental 
illness or drug addiction). reasoning. or availabk 
information relevant to the decision at l1ancl Ac­
cordingly. most of the current attempts to modify
health behavior related to smoking \Vould be 
classified. if they were classified as paternalistic 
at ali, as strong paternalism. 
ll1ese six different types of paternalism are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Other subclasses of pat<:rnalism hav<: also 
b<:en suggested. For instance .  H;iyry. 1 Uyry. and 
Karjalainen ( 1989) distinguish thr<:e kvels of pa­
ternalism: pater11alistic patenwlism (such as 
Table l. SL-x Different Types of Paternalistic Acts" 
by P toward Q, and Their Respective Frequency 
in Smoking Behavior Modification at the Population Levci 
Characteristics of the 
patern;ilbtic ;ict Type of patcrnalism 
P's intention is to: 
Benefit only an indivi<.lual Q lrn.lividual paternalbm 
Benefit a group or dass Q Sod;il paternalism 
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some: goo<l for Q: (2) P has no reason to hc:lic:vc: that thc: :1t:t agrt·n with thc: currc:nt prc:fc:rc:ncc:s. 
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health education in schools, total ban on adver­
tisements, and sale restrictions to minors), weak 
paternalism (such as health education in mass 
media, by health professionals, and by voluntary 
organizations), and stmng paternalism (such as 
a ban on brands exceeding an upper limit of 
hazardous substances). 
VALUE PREMISES 
Justification of paternalism requires value 
premises. Such premises are often taken from or 
inspired by ethical theories. l11is chapter there­
fore pro\·ides a shc>rt summary of the three most 
discussed and applied theories in medica! ethics: 
utilitarianism. libertarianism, and justice as fair­
ness. 
·ni ere are se,Tral forms of utilitarianism. Ac­
cording to act utilitaricmism. an act is right if 
and only if it maximizes utility (Jeremy Bentham . 
1-89: John Stuart Mili. 1861)-or. in some ver­
sions. minimizes suffering (Popper. 1966). Ac­
cording to mle utilitarianism, an ethical rule is
right if and only if general compliance with the
rute maximizes utility. and a particular act is right
if and only if it falls under such a rute. According
to classical utilitarianism, the aim should be the
maximization of aggregate utility, ·white al'erage
utilitarianism requires maximization of utility
per capita. There is no general agreement on the
definition of utili(J'. Some define it as pleasure or
happiness (and absence of pain or suffering);
others, as satisfaction of preferences or needs.
The most influential modem exponent of 
the libertarian theory is Nozick (1974), but a 
similar theory was earlier formulated by John 
Locke (1690). The basic assumption of the theory 
is the liberty of all individuals to do what they 
please with themselves and their property, pro­
vided that they do not interfere with the like 
liberry of others. A further limitation on the right 
to liberry is given by the harm principle. This 
principle says that the liberty of one person 
should be restricted only to prevent harm to 
others (Feinberg, 1973; Mill, 1859). TI1e right to 
properry is fundamental to the libertarian theory, 
and it determines both the role of the state and 
the rules of individual conduct. When a person 
finds or "mixes labour with" an unowned item, 
there is initial acquisition of property. The owner 
of the property may sell it on the free market or 
give it away as the owner pleases. 
Rawls (1952, 1972) is a defender of justice as 
jairness. l11is theory contains three principles: 
Each person is to have an equal right to liberty 
(greatest equal liberty), persons with similar abil­
ities and skills are to have equal access to offices 
and positions (equality of fair opportunity), and 
social economic institutions are to be arranged so 
as to benefit maximally the least well off (fair 
diffen:nces). 
Inspired by the ethical theories of utilitaria­
nism. libertarianism. and justice as fairness. three 
Yalue premises may be identified: 
• 77.1e princr/>le oj benejicence states the moral
obligation to henefit others, especially not
to harm them (utilitarianism).
• 77.Je principle oj autonomy states the moral
obligation to respect each other's right to
self-determination (libertarianism).
• 77.1e jJrinciple oj justice states the moral
obligation to act fairly in the distribution of
burdens and benefits, especially not to dis­
criminate against anyone (justice).
These principles, which are commonly accepted 
in medica! ethics (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994; 
Gillon, 1994; lnternational Guidelines jor Bio­
medical Research, 1993; lnternational Guide­
linesjor Etbical Reuiew, 1991; Stanley, 1989), are 
rather vague and do not themselves proYide a 
method for balancing them against each other 
when making moral decisions. They do provide, 
however, a potentially international and inter­
cultural basis for a common moral commitment 
that requires that transgression of any one of 
them can be justified only by pointing to the over­
riding application of one or more of the others 
(Gillon, 1993). 
cHA.PTER 11 • PATERNALISM AND HEALTH BEHAVlOR 207 
IDENTIFICATION AND-ANALYSIS 
OF ETHICAL CONFLICTS 
An ethical con.flict is a situation where there 
is at the same tirne, a moral obligation to adopt 
each of two alternatives, and the agent cannot 
adopt both alternatives together (Gowan, 1987; 
Sinnott-Armstrong, 1988). When paternalism and 
smoking behavior modification is the issue, the 
ethical conflicts often (but not always) arise be­
cause princip le of beneficence and the princip le 
of autonomy cannot be satisfied at the same tirne. 
Examples of measures suggested (and often 
implemented) to change smoking behavior are 
(1) health education in schools, via the mass me­
dia. for people using health services, and by vol­
untary organizations (Flynn et al., 1992, 1994;
Gregorio, 1994); (2) price policy. such as regular
price revisions and differential taxation (Towns­
end. Roderick & Cooper, 199-L Yach, 199-t); (3)
premarket licensing. such as quality control,
health warning on packages, ban on brands ex­
ceeding the upper limits of hazardous substances,
and classification of products as "harmful" and
"very harmful" (Benhamou, Benhamou, Auquier, 
& Flamant. 199-t): (4) tora! ban on advertisement
and sales promotion-so far only on the national
leve! (British Airways· response. 199-L Fulop. &
Mckee, 1994)-or at least on campaigns with
special appeal to teenagers (Hastings, Ryan, Teer,
& MacKintosh, 199-4): (5) sale restriction (Leppo
& Verio, 1986): (6) restriction on smoking in
schools, nurseries, puhlic tr.tnsport, and other
puhlic locales (:Vloore. Wolfe, Lindes, & Douglas,
1994); (7) restriction on portr.tyal in films and
television of smokers as successful and attmctive
(Hazan, Lipt<>n. & Glantz, 199-t); and (8) research,
planning, and evaluation of consumption levels
and trends and their distribution and of the
health effects of smoking (Gritz, 1994; Wynder &
Hoffmann, 1994). It has also been suggested that
smokers (as a group) should be held accountable.
Revenues from cigarette taxation should be
placed in a specific trust to pay for heart disease
costs (Kaesemeyer, 1994).
A model that combines ideas from Herme­
ren (1986) and Francoeur (1983) facilitates the 
identi.fication and analysis of ethical conflicts 
raised by such measures. The model-which is 
more fully discussed in Nilstrun (1990), Haglund, 
Nilstun, Westrin, and Smedby (1991), Westrin, 
Nilstun, Smedby, and Haglund (1992), and Nil­
stun and Westrin (1994)-has two dimensions. 
The first dimension specifies the relevant ethical 
principles (in this chapter, the three princip les of 
beneficence, autonomy, and justice are used) and 
the second dimension specifies the different 
groups of individuals involved in or affected by 
the attempts to modify smoking behavior. 
Each group should consist of persons who, 
in relation to antismoking policies, have similar 
interests. The groups should be exhaustive: i.e„ 
all those \vho are involved in or affected hv the 
policy should belong to at kast one group. But 
the groups are not necessarily exclusive: i.e .. one 
individual may belong to more than one group. 
The groups involved in or affected by antismok­
ing policies are: 
• Smokers (many of whom \Vant to go on
using tobacco).
• Adult nonsmokers (most of \Vhom Jon ·r
wanr to be exposed to tohacco smoke).
• Children (who should be protected from
passive smoking and preventeu from using
tobacco).
• Fetuses (all of whom should be protected
from materna! smoking).
• Pets (which should be protected from being
exposed to tobacco smoke).
• Tobacco industries and tr.tdes (which \Vant
to manufacture and sel! their products).
• Employees in tobacco industries and trade
(who don't want to lose their jobs).
• Employers (who want to reduce their costs
due to smoking).
• The state (which gets revenue by taxing to­
bacco products but pays for health care).
• Health care professionals (who want to re­
duce the use of tobacco).
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The task, when applying the model to assess 
attempts to modify health behavior, is to identify 
ethical costs and benefits to those involved or 
affected. Since the words "costs" and "benefits" 
here are used in a rather wide sense. some clari­
fication is needed. To identify and assess the 
rightness or wrongness of attempts to modify 
health behavior with reference to the principle 
of beneficence is to determine their tendency to 
produce good or bad consequences. Within the 
utilitarian tradition, it is natura! to call fulfillments 
of the principle of beneficence (i.e., the good 
consequences) ethical benefits and ,·iolations of 
the principle (i.e. the bad consequences) ethical 
costs. 
In the literature on medica) ethics, the words 
·costs" and "benefits" are not used in connection
with the principle of autonomy. To assess a
health behavior modification policy with refer­
ence to this principle is not to determine any
good consequences. The rightness or wrongness
of the policy is assessed by reference to the oblig­
ation to respect the right to self-determination of
the persons involved (no matter what its conse­
quences might be). Though less common, in order
to facilitate comparison, the expression "ethical
costs'' is used to denote violations of the princi­
ple of autonomy and the expression ·ethical ben­
efits" to denote fulfillments.
In the same way, violations of the principle 
of justice are called "ethical costs· and fulfill­
ments "ethical benefits." 
The official smoking policy in the 1960s (in 
this chapter called the "liberal smoking policy") 
is used as a baseline, which means that this policy 
is treated as though it has no ethical costs and no 
ethical benefits. Given this simplifying assump­
tion, the question to be answered is: What are the 
differences, in terms of ethical costs and ethical 
benefits, to the groups involved in or affected by 
an antismoking policy (as suggested by the differ­
ent measures identified to reduce smoking) com­
pared to a liberal smoking policy? 
Ethical benefits related to the principle of 
beneficence consist of prevention of harm to 
smokers (who are induced to quit smoking or 
reduce their consumption), adult nonsmokers 
(who don't start smoking or are less exposed to 
tobacco smoke), children, fetuses, and pets. Re­
duced tobacco-related health care costs and ab­
sence due to illness are ethical benefits to the 
state and employers, respectively. The joy felt by 
many health care professionals when smoking is 
reduced might also be considered an ethical ben­
efit. Not only ethical benefits, however, but also 
ethical costs fall upon smokers. Most of them 
really enjoy smoking and many are not harmed. 
Nevertheless, they are forced to abstain, e.g .. at 
work, due to antismoking policies. (Many health 
care workers seem to take for granted that the 
benefits always outweigh the costs to smokers. 
But is this assumption correct?) In addition, there 
are costs to the tobacco industry, both employers 
and employees. The costs and benefits related to 
the princip le of beneficence are indicated in the 
first column of Table 2. 
Ethical costs related to the principle of au­
tonomy consist of interferences with the right to 
self-determination. Smokers' freedom to act on 
their desire to smoke is limited by the antismok­
ing policy. There are also autonomy costs to the 
tobacco industry and the employees in these 
industries. As to autonomy benefits, the prohibi­
tion of smoking in public premises favors the 
freedom of those individuals who want to avoid 
health risks posed by exposure to tobacco smoke. 
The costs and benefits related to the principle of 
autonomy are indicated in the second column of 
Table 2. 
There are also ethical benefits and costs re­
lated to the principle of justice. A liberal smoking 
policy is to the advantage of smokers at the ex­
pense of non-smokers. But antismoking policies 
reverse the situation. Smokers, at least in Swe­
den, are now frequently treated in ways that can 
only be described as discrimination. A change 
from liberal to antismoking policy implies justice 
costs to smokers and justice benefits to non­
smokers. The costs and benefits related to the 
principle of justice are indicated in the third 
column of Table 2. 
To make a complete ethical analysis of anti-
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Table 2. Ethical Benefits and Ethical Costs 
of an Antismoking Policy Compared to a Liberal Smoking Policy" 
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"The liberal smoking policy (prcmised on the principle of autonomy) is the basdine for com­
parison. 
smoking policies (compared to a liberal smoking 
policy), all the costs and benefits in Table 2 
should be taken into consideration. In this chap­
ter, however, the purpose is only to discuss the 
two ethical conflicts raised by paternalism. For 
both of these conflicts, the requirement of the 
principle of beneficence (in relation to smokers 
and nonsmokers) comes into conflict with the 
requirement of the principle of autonomy (in 
relation to smokers). 
Antismoking measures, the purpose ofwhich 
is to benefit not only smokers but also non­
smokers, give rise to the first ethical conflict. This 
conflict arises because it is not always possible to 
satisfy both the obligation to respect smokers' 
right to self-determination and the obligation to 
prevent them from harming others (social pater­
nalism). Antismoking measures that aim at bene­
fiting smokers give rise to the second conflict 
because it is not always possible to satisfy both 
the obligation to respect smokers' right to self­
determination and the obligation to prevent 
them from harming themselves (individual pater­
nalism). The two most important benefits and the 
most important cost relevant to the assessment 
of paternalism that accrue to smokers and non­
smokers are indicated in Table 3. 
BAIANCING ETHICAL COSTS 
AND BENEFITS 
So far. this approach has been descriptive 
and analytical and the objective has been to meet 
a minimal standard of intersubjectivity; i.e., com­
petent persons, asking the same questions and 
using similar methods, should also reach similar 
conclusions (Hermeren, 1972, p. 121). The choice 
of value premises and the identification of ethical 
costs and benefits to those involved and affected 
are intersubjective in this sense. But when the 
ethical costs and ethical benefits are to be bal-
Table 3. Most Important Ethical Cost and Two 
Most Important Benefits Relevant to the 
Assessment of Paternalism of an Antismoklng 
Policy Compared to a Liberal Smoking Policya 
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anced, it is difficult to satisfy the requirement of 
intersubjectivity. 
The harm principle, as formulated by Mili 
(1859), justifies different solutions to the two 
ethical conflicts raised by paternalism: 
... the sok end for which mankind are warranted, 
individually or collectively, in interfering with the Iib­
erty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. 
That the only purpose for which power can be right­
fully exercised over any member of a civilized commu­
nity, against hi!i will. is to prevent harm to others. His 
own good. either physical or moral, is not a sufficient 
warr.mt. 
According to Mili, individual paternalism should 
be avoided; i.e .. priority should in this situation 
be given to the principle of autonomy at the 
expense of the principle of beneficence. But 
social paternalism is sometimes ethically justi­
fied; i.e., prioriry should in such situations some­
times be given to the princip le of beneficence at 
the expense of the principle of autonomy. 
A similar position is defended by VanDeVeer 
(1986) and Feinberg (1986). According to Van­
DeVeer, individual paternalism is never justified 
when it is incompatible with respecting compe­
tent persons' right to direct their own lives 
within the sphere of acts that do not wrong 
others. According to Feinberg, the right to self­
determination always takes precedence in the 
rare cases in which there is a conflict between 
promoting a person's good and respecting the 
personal right of self-determination. 
If the harm principle is accepted, antismok­
ing policies are justified only when they are aimed 
at protecting nonsmokers from being exposed to 
tobacco smoke. Consistent application of the 
harm principle implies that ali public premises 
(including restaurants and other eating places) 
should have nonsmoking areas even if their hav­
ing them may be inconvenient to smokers. 
But antismoking policies cannot be justified 
by reference to the good of the person being 
coerced. At least some of the many restrictions 
placed on adult smoking in the workplace and in 
hospitals are hard to justify with reference to the 
harm principle. Pleasant smoking rooms, conve-
niently located and with adequate ventilation, 
would protect nonsmokers from the danger of 
passive smoking. 
There are severa! problems, however, with 
the harm principle. The most important is that 
few if any find the principle acceptable without 
exceptions. AJso, there is no consensus as to
what particular antismoking policies should be 
considered as such exceptions. This Jack of 
agreement makes the harm principle lose much 
of its force when ethical conflicts are to be 
solved. It also explains the popularity of "com­
monsense moralit)•." According to this moralit)·. 
to solve an ethical conflict raised by paternalism 
requires a determination, in any particular case. 
of which principle-beneficence or autonomy­
is more important (Brock. 1994): 
The cost to the subject's well-heing from respecting a 
particular choice of the suhject can vary gn.:atly in 
degree-from the loss of the suhjec:t·s life at on<.: end 
of a continuum to the most tri,·ial of ac.h-erse effec:ts at 
the other end. Likewise, the importance of respecting 
the individual's autonomy can vary suhstantially from 
case to case depending on such fac:tors as how centr.il 
and far-reaching the choice is within the particular 
individual's plan of life, how strongly the individual 
wants to make the choice in question for him- or 
hersdf, and so forth. 
Ross (1940), an important source of inspira­
tion for the theory of bioethics that emanated 
from the Kennedy Center in Georgetown in the 
late 1970s (Beauchamp & Childress, 1994), makes 
this problem with ethical conflicts explicit. Ac­
cording to Ross's theory, one enters into a 
decision-making situation equipped with a set of 
basic ethical principles that are used to identify 
and examine the problems at hand (Ross, 1940, 
p. 41):
. . . right acts can be distinguished from wrong acts
only as being those which, of ali those possible for the
agent in the circumstances, have the greatest balance
of prima Jacie rightness . . . over their prima Jacie
wrongness, ... For the estimation of the comparative
stringency of these prima Jacie obligations no general
rules can, as far as I can see. be Jaid down.
By "prima facie rightness or obligation" is meant 
that the act is right or obligatory unless it con-
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f1icts with an equal or stronger right or obliga­
tion. A prima facie right is binding unless over­
ridden or outweighed by competing moral rights 
(Ross, 1940, pp. 18-22; cf. also Beauchamp & 
Childress, 1994, p. 33). 
One can agree with Ross that no such gen­
eral rules can be laid down. That they cannot be 
does not imply, however, that ethical principles 
are useless. On the contrary, the effort to formu­
late such principles and identify the ethical costs 
and benefits to those involved or affected not 
only improves knowledge about the alternatives 
and their probable consequences, but also coun­
teracts the human tendency to "forget" ethical 
costs and benefits. When it is believed that the 
right solution to an ethical conflict has been 
found, the capaciry for unbiased assessment of 
counterargument is easily !ost. 
The use of princip les to identify ethical costs 
an<l ethical benefits is therefore essential to ethi­
cal analysis. But when one has to <leci<le how to 
solve an ethical conflict, the use of analogy is 
often more convincing (Winkler, 1993, 1994). 
That it is can be illustrated by comparing the 
ethics of <lata utilization in epi<lemiology an<l in 
journalism (Westrin & Nilstun, 1994). 
Much of the available knowledge about the 
harmful effects of smoking <lerives from epidemi­
ology, often using case registers and recor<l Iink­
age. The purpose of such stu<lies is to prevent 
harm to unidentified individuals. But the large 
number of individuals investigated often makes it 
practically impossible to obtain individually in­
formed consent, and without such consent there 
is infringement on personal autonomy. This 
means that epidemiology is almost inconceivable 
without some element of social paternalism. 
In the European countries, there ,is at pre­
sent a strong antipaternalistic trend. Legal con­
trols over data collection have adversely affected 
the prospects for epidemiology, especially in 
countries with previously favorable conditions 
for epidemiological research, such as Sweden. 
Far greater damage to environmental epidemiol­
ogy is likely if a recent proposal by the European 
Commission is implemented. Its key paragr-.1ph 
states that "member states shall prohibit the auto­
matic processing of sensitive data-for exam ple, 
regarding health-without the expressed and 
written consent freely given of the data subjects." 
This restriction reflects a desire to give prioriry to 
respect for individual autonomy at the expense 
of benefits to the whole population. According 
to this paragraph, paternalism is not justified in 
epidemiology. 
By contrast, journalists have been allowed 
far greater freedoms. One reason is that the aims 
and tasks of journalism-with its emphasis on an 
open sociery-are not compatible with strict ad­
herence to the principles of respect for individ­
ual autonomy and of doing no harm. Hence, in­
fringements on both the principle of beneficence 
and the principle of autonomy by journalism are 
unavoidable ethical costs in an open sociery. This 
means that paternalistic acts sometimes are justi­
fied with reference to journalism. 
But is this difference between journalism 
and epidemiology justifiable? One can argue that 
it is not. In epidemiology, which also aims at 
benefits to the open sociery, there is no need to 
harm research subjects. But it is not possible to 
carry out case-register research and record link­
age without some infringement on individual au­
tonomy. Compare<l with the ethical costs of jour­
nalism, however, the ethical costs of epi<lemiology 
are very modest. So if social paternalism is justi­
fied with reference to journalism (and in my opin­
ion it is), it should also be accepted with refer­
ence to epidemiology. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Any attempt to resolve the ethical conflicts 
related to paternalism in the context of health 
maintenance, health restoration, and health im­
provement is dependent not only on personal 
values and factual assumptions but also on the 
choice of analogy. Since people differ over values, 
many assumptions about health behavior mod­
ification are questionable; further, since the force 
of reasoning by analogy is highly dependent on 
212 PART II • HEALTII MANAGEMENT AND HEALTII POUCY
cultural affiliation, different conclusions as to pa­
ternalism may be equally rational or irrational. 
Competent persons, facing the same ethical con­
flicts and using similar methods, do not always 
reach similar conclusions; i.e., the requirement 
of intersubjectiviry is not always satisfied. 
If the authority of science ends where inter­
subjectivity ends (which seems reasonable), 
medica} ethicists do not have any special man­
date to solve these ethical conflicts. 11rns, the 
task of setting limits on the use of paternalism in 
health behavior modification falls outside the 
scope of medica} ethics and into the realm of 
politics. 
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The ethical challenge of genetic testing 
f or breast cancer 
Antone/la Surbone* 
The identification of BRCA 11 and BRCA22 as the genes associated 
with some hereditary breast and ovarian cancers has major scientific 
value, but also raises many dilemmas.3 Genetic testing for BRCA mu­
tations has no ·value in general screening, and it is most often 
uninformative even in women with high-risk families.4 Its ability to 
predict the development of cancer in mutation carriers is still under 
evaluation,5 and available treatment options - such as lifestyle chan­
ges, close follow-up, chemoprevention, and even prophylactic sur­
gery - do not yield complete protection against breast and ovarian 
cancer.6 Despite these major limitations,7 the test is now commer-
* Breast Cancer Medicine Service, Department of Medicine, Memorial Sloan-Kettering,
Cancer Center, New York.
MIKI Y., SwENSEN J., SHATTUCK-EIDENS D. ET AL., A strong candidatc for the breast and 
ovarian concer sltsceptibifity gene BRCAJ, Science 1994, 266: 66-71.
2 WoosTER R., NEUHAUSEN S.L., MANGION J. ET AL., Localizatio11 of a breast cancer Sll­
sceptibility ge11e, BRCA2. to chromosome 13q 12-13. Science 1994, 266: 2088-2090.
3 COLLINS F.S., BRCA 1-Lots oj lllllfations, lots of dilemmas. N. Eng. J. Med. 1996, 334:
186-188.
4 C0UCH F.J., DESHAN0 M.L., BLACKWOOD M.A. ET AL., BRCAJ mutations in \'v'OJ/lell atten­
ding clinics that evalllate the risk of breast cancer. N. Eng. J. Med. 1997, 336: 1409-1415.
5 SHATTUCK-EIDENS D., McCLURE M., SIMARD J. ET AL., A collaborative Sllrvey of 80 mu­
tations in the BRCA 1 breast and ovarian cancer susceptibility gene. lmpfications for pre­
symptomatic testing and screening. JAMA 1995, 273: 535-541; WEBER B., Breast cancer su­
sceptibiliry genes: Cllrrenr challenges and flltllre promise. Ann. Intern. Med. 1996, 124:
1088-1090; SHATTUCK-EIDENS D., OLIPHANT A., McCLURE M. ET AL., BRCA 1 Sequence 
analysis i11 women at high ris k for susceptibility 111utatio11s. Risk factor analysis and impli­
cations for genetic resting. JAMA 1997, 278: 1242-1250.
6 BURKE W., DALY M., GARBER J. ET AL., Reco111111e11datio11s for follmv-llp care of i11divi­
dL1als 1vith w1 inherited predisposition to ca11ce1: II. BRCAJ and BRCA2. JAMA 1997, 277:
997-1003; SCHRAG D., KUNTZ K.M., GARBER J.E. ET AL., Decision analysis - e.ffects Oj
prophylactic 11wstecto111y and oophorectomy on l(fe expectancy among 1vo111en with BRCAJ
or BRCA2 llllltations, N. Eng. J. Med. 1997, 336: 1465-1471.
7 NowAK R., Genetic: testing ser for taker�ff. Science 1994, 65: 464-467; WEBER B.L., Giu­
STI R.M., LIU E.T., Developing strategies for inrervenrion c11zd prevenrion in heredirary
breast cance1: J. Natl. Cancer Inst. Monogr. 1995, 17: 99-102; GARBER J .E., SCHRAG D., Te-
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cially available. Most often the public is mislead by the press raising 
false hopes for effective prevention, and thus tends to perceive gene­
tic testing for breast cancer as a reliable screening tool. Therefore, 
major educational efforts are needed for lay people as well as for 
heal th-care workers. 
As part of the Human Genome Project, extensive debate has sur­
rounded the social and ethical ramifications of geneticss and these 
have been acknowledged in recently published guidelines for health 
care workers.9 The most pressing issues presently are: information 
and informed consent; 10 rights in access to genetic information II -
including rights of the person tested (and whether or not testing 
should be limited to high-risk populations only), rights to know the 
results of someone else's test, rights to have a fetus or a child te­
sted, 12 rights of the research community to use archived material 
from deceased patients or to process samples for anonymous resear­
ch; 13 privacy14 and confidentiality - including the privacy interests 
of the deceased - risk of discrimination in health insurance, at the 
work place, in adoption and possibly in access to education; 1 5 pre-
sfing for inherited ca11cer susceptibility. JAMA 1996, 275: 1928-1929; HOLTZMAN N .A., Are
we ready to screen for inherited susceptibility to cancer?. Oncology 1996, 1 O: 57-64. 
8 KNOPPERS B.M., CHADWICK R., The human genome project: Under an intematimzal ethi­
cal microscope, Science 1994, 265: 2035-2036; MURRAY T.H., LIVNY E., The human geno­
me project: Ethica/ and social implications, Buli. Med. Libr. Assoc. 1995, 83: 14-21. 
9 THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CLINICAL ONCOLOGY, Statement oj the American Society oj 
Clinical Oncology: Genetic Testing for Cancer Susceptibility, J. Ciin. Oncol. 1996, 14: 
1730-1736. 
10 GELLER G., BOTKIN J.R., GREEN M.J. ET AL., Genetic testing for susceptibi/ity to adult­
onset cancer: the process a11d conte11t of informed consent. JAMA 1997, 277: 1467-1474. 
11 OPINION FROM NATURE, Whose right to ge11etic knowledge ?, Nature 1996, 379: 379. 
12 WERTZ D., FANOS J., REILLY P., Genetic testing for children and adolescents. Who deci­
des?. JAMA 1994, 272: 875-881. 
13 REILLY P.R., Panel Comment: The impact oj the genetic privacy act on medicine. J. Law 
Med. & Ethics 1995, 23: 378-381. 
14 GOSTIN L.O., Genetic Privacy. J. Law Med. & Ethics 1995, 23: 320-330. 
15 BILLINGS P.R., KoHN M.A., DECUEVAS M. ET AL., Discri111i11atio11 as a consequence oj 
genetic testing. Am. J. Hum. Genet. 1992, 40: 476-482; MURRAY T., Genetics cmd the moral
mission oj health insurance. Hastings Cent. Rep. 1992, 22: 12-17; HUDSON K.L., RoTHEN­
BERG K.H., ANDREWS LB. ET AL., Genetic discriminatirm a11d health insura11ce: a11 urge11t 
need for reform. Science 1995, 270: 391-393; THE AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON GENETIC TE­
STING/INSURANCE lssuEs, Background stateme11t on Ge11etic testing and insurance. Am. J. 
Hum. Genet. 1995, 56: 327-331; LAPHAM E.Y., K0ZMA C., WEISS J.O., Genetic discrimina­
tirm: perspectives rl con.rnmers. Science 1996, 274: 621-624. 
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natal susceptibility testing 16 - including counseling, abortion, em­
bryo selection 17 and eugenics;l8 and justice in the allocation of re­
sources - both in the Western context and in a worldwide perspecti­
ve that includes less affluent areas. Despite ample debate in the me­
dica! and ethical literature,19 most of these issues are still unresol­
ved: this illustrates the complexity of the subject, and leaves us 
with the unsettling conclusion that, as the secrets of our genome un­
ravel, something more fundamental is at stake, which we have not 
yet fully explored. In analyzing many dilemmas of women who 
consider genetic testing for breast and ovarian cancer, it clearly 
emerges how medicine, culture, normativity and philosophy are 
complexed. It is such connection which needs our attention. The 
scope of this paper is to illustrate this thesis, by exploring some re­
current themes of the discussions with my patients who consulted 
me not as a genetic expert, but rather as their treating oncologist. In 
those conversations patients were openly expressing their concerns 
for themselves and their female relatives in the context of a well­
establ ished patient-doctor relationship. Fascinated by the com­
plexity of the issues raised by my patients, I took notes and later or­
ganized them in five recurrent main themes, which I present here in 
the format of open questions. Can genetic knowledge affect our 
concepts of diversity and responsibility? Is the risk of discrimina­
tion increased by gender biases? Does genetics affect our views on 
autonomy and trust? Does genetic knowledge increase control? 
Rather than pretending to give an answer to such questions, this pa­
per wishes to stimulate the moral debate which is central to solving 
16 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS0CIATI0N, THE C0UNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, Ethi­
ca/ Jssues related to prenatal genetic test ing. Arch. Fam. Med. 1994, 3: 633-642.
17 WERTZ O.C., FLETCHER J.C., Feminist Criticism oj Prenatal Diagnosis: A response. Ciin. 
Obstet. Gynecol. 1993, 36: 541-567; K0RENBERG J.R., RIM0IN 0.L., Medica! genetics. JAMA 
1995, 273: 1692-1693; LANCASTER J.M., WISEMAN R.W., 8ERCHUK A., An inevitab!e di!em­
ma: prenatal testing jor mutations in the BRCAJ breast-ovarian cancer susceptibility gene. 
Obstet. Gynecol. 1996, 87: 306-309.
18 H0LTZMAN N.A., R0THSTEIN M.A., Invited editoria/: Eugenics and genetic discrimi11a­
ti011. Am. J. Hum. Genet. 1992, 50: 457-549; PAUL D.B., SPENCER H.G., The hidden science 
oj eugenics. Nature 1995, 374: 302-304.
19 EVEQUES DE FRANCE: C0NSEIL PERMANENT DE LA C0NFERENCE, Essor de la genetique er 
dignite humaine. Medicina e Morale 1998, 2: 382-401.
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the dilemmas of genetics, in Rilke's spirit of 'loving the questions 
first'. 
Can. gen.etic kn.owledge affect our con.cepts oj diversity an.d respon­
sibility? 
Philosophers have long considered the nature of knowledge: 
knowledge is never neutral, never abstract from the 'knower' and 
from the context. Knowledge is rather always 'situated', for it is 
produced by an individual in a specific context.20 In addition, 
knowledge is instrumenta!: a means to enhance our ability to con­
trol the world. Knowledge has an epistemic, a pragmatic and an 
ethical dimension, which are always intertwined since it is not pos­
sible to think profitably about cognition without thinking about 
practice.21 This applies particularly to science, which is not only the 
abstract pursuit of 'truth', but primarily a social enterprise ne ver in­
dependent of its applications and their consequences, nor of the 
context. 
Genetic knowledge differs from other types of knowledge, inso­
far as it is predictive, probabilistic and individuaJ.22 Thus, in genetic 
knowledge the practical and contextual aspects assume a unique and 
peculiar relevance. 
The interplay of scientific and social issues is particularly mani­
fest in the heated debate on genetic manipulation, where the social 
and political consequences and the moral implications are strikingly 
apparent. Yet the more subtle dilemmas of genetic testing are equal­
ly important to uncover and to analyze. When women ask: 'Is testing 
worthwhile if there is no guarantee of effective prevention?' they 
raise complex epistemic and ethical questions. The more traditional 
medica! view holds that a test should be performed when some 
'.20 WALKER M.U., Moral understandings. A feminist study in ethics, New York: Routledge, 
1998. 
'.21 ALLEN B., Truth in philosophy, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995. 
22 BAYERTZ K., What's special about molecular genetic diagnostics?, J. Med. Philos. 1998, 
23: 247-254. 
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forms of therapeutic intervention is available; otherwise a medica} 
test is not offered outside of research purposes. With respect to ge­
netic testing, however, there is no consensus now on whether or not 
should genetic testing be limited to pathologic entities for which 
preventive or therapeutic measures exist. This is due to our lack of a 
proper definition of what is 'therapeutic' vis-a-vis the novelty of ge­
netic knowledge. In the case of genetic testing for BRCA 1 and BRCA2 
mutations, for instance, sensitivity, specificity and reproducibility 
are sufficiently high to provide accurate information regarding what 
the test purports to measure -the presence or absence of certain mu­
tations. However, the ability to predict the future development of 
breast and ovarian cancer is still uncertain, particularly when consi­
dering the impact of allele-specific penetrance.23 In other words, ge­
netic testing for breast and ovarian cancer predisposition provides us 
with an accurate, yet only probabilistic information. Bence, the de­
termination of the worth of the test stems primarily from a social 
agreement between test subjects, the research community and so­
ciety at large on 'what is worth', and this may be found outside the 
limitations of immediate therapeutic results. For the research com­
munity, for instance, the test is worthwhile even in the absence of di­
rect therapeutic benefits because, through the study of BRCA-asso­
ciated cases, the biology of breast and ovarian cancers can be stu­
died and better understood.24 Also among test subjects, some per­
sons value the possibility to make more informed choices about their 
health so highly, that the test appears worth even in the absence of 
definite prevention strategies. This illustrates how genetic informa-
23 STRUEWING J .P., H ARTAGE P., W ACHOLDER S. ET AL., The risk oj cancer associated with
specific mutations oj BRCA 1 and BRCA2 among Ashkenazi Jews, N. Eng. J. Med. 1997, 336: 
1401-1408. 
24 K INZLER K.W., VOGEL S TEIN B., Gatekeepers and caretakers, Nature 1997, 386: 761-763; 
M ILNER J., PoNDER B., HUGHES-DAVIES L. ET AL., Transcriptional activation junctions in 
BRCA2 (letter), Nature 1997, 386: 772-773; SHA R AN S.K., MORIM ATSU M., ALBRECHTU. ET 
AL., Embryonic lethality and radiation hypersensitivity mediated by Ras5! in mice lacking 
BRCA2, Nature 1997, 386: 804-810; G A RCI A-P ATINO E., GOMENDIO B., P ROYENCIO M. ET AL., 
Germ line BRCAJ mutations in women with sporadic breast cancer: clinical corre!ations. J. 
Ciin. Oncol. 1998, l 6: 115-120; JOHANN S SON o., RAN S TAM J ., BORG A. ET AL., Survival oj 
BRCAi breast and ovarian cancer patients: a population-based studyjrom southem Sweden. 
J. Ciin. Oncol. 1998, 16: 397-404; LYNCH H.T., W ATSON P., BRCAJ, Pathology. mul Survival
(editorial), J. Ciin. Oncol. 1998, 16: 395-396.
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tion may carry benefits to the individual and to society, which go 
beyond those contemplated in traditional medica) dogmas. To face 
genetic knowledge and its dilemmas, a new conceptualization of the 
world is required, which challenges our traditional epistemic approa­
ch to science and medicine. 
Genetic knowledge relates to genetic diversity, and carries the ri­
sk that people will be identified with their genes, if misleading and 
excessive weight is given to the predictive value of genetic infor­
mation. This process of identification of human being with their ge­
nome is know as "geneticization", whereby genetic models are in­
creasingly used to explain disease and thus influence drastically the 
medica) practice as well as individual and societal attitudes towards 
a broad spectrum of issues (from reproduction, to prevention, to di­
sease control to exquisitely moral issues).25 Here again the scienti­
fic and the social levels overlap. In fact, it is through the research 
community that we know our genome and face genetic diversity, 
but it is through society that we attribute values. Society colors the 
meaning of normalcy and diversity. Society at large - hence all of 
us - often attaches a negative connotation to diversity and determi­
nes the acceptability of sickness and disability. Disease has both an 
objective and a subjective dimension, and has both a 'meaning' and 
a 'value', which are established through social agreement. Disease 
is not only a pathologic entity: disease is also a social construct, at 
times accompanied by a change in the "ontological status" of the ill 
person.26 Suffice to consider what happens when the symptom ex­
perienced (fatigue, for instance) is labeled as a disease (the flu ver­
sus a form of leukemia). In the genetic era, this ontological change 
may happen on the basis of genetic information alone. When our 
genome is known, will we be 'healthy' if we have no organ dy­
sfunction or only if we do not carry a predisposition to a disease? If 
we do carry such a predisposition are we going to be called 'sick'? 
Will we rather have to fit into a new category of the 'asymptomatic 
ill' and what would this exactly entail? (May we be reminded that 
25 HOEDEMAEKERS R., TEN HAVE H., Geneticiwtion: The Cyprus paradigm, J. Med. Philos. 
1998, 23: 274-287. 
26 ROLLIN B., On the nature ofillness. Man and Medicine 1979, 4: 157-172. 
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certain groups of people such as H1v positive persons are already 
part of such category). How will genetic diversity affect the lives of 
those who carry a genetic predisposition to cancer and those of their 
relatives? Clearly, how genetic risk is perceived depends both on 
how society faces diversity and on how the scientific community 
will deliberate as to whether genotypic or phenotypic information 
should be privileged. If society accepts diversity as an objective 
element of life, and hence 'normal', there will be 'little incentive to 
misuse genetic data' .27 However, there is something that distingui­
shes genetic from other types of diversity: its apparent inevitability, 
as both the personal and the social consequences of it seem to esca­
pe from our control. Mystery surrounds genetics in our collective 
imagination, and makes us perceive genetic risk as more drastic 
than others in life. Recognizing that genes never act alone is the fir­
st step to put genetics into proper perspective. Cancer is a polygenic 
genetic disorder involving the interaction of many genetic muta­
tions and multiple - largely stili unknown - environmental cofac­
tors. BRCA 1 and BRcA2 mutations are only two factors for the popu­
lation at risk for breast cancer, and they may turn out to be among 
the least important. This is already the case in the general female 
population (the role of BRCA 1, and BRCA2 mutations being proven 
only in high-risk families, where pedigrees show a high incidence 
of first and second-degree female relatives affected at early ages by 
both breast and ovarian cancers). Thus the recommendation for ge­
netic testing for breast cancer as a screening tool in the general fe­
male population is misleading if not fraudulent at present; while 
even its recommendation in high-risk families outside of research 
studies may stili be premature (and pedigree analysis may remain 
more meaningful). The whole scientific community - including ba­
sic scientists, health care workers, pharmaceutical industries, scien­
tific and medical press - thus has the primary responsibility to 
study the interactions of genetic and environmental factors and to 
clarify the proper role of BRCA testing.28 Media also play a major 
27 REILLY P., ASHG statement on genetics and privacy: Testimony to United States C on­
gress. Am. J. Hum. Genet. 1992, 50: 640-642. 
28 PYERITZ R.E., Family history and genetic riskfactors. Forward to the future (editorial), 
JAMA 1997, 278: 1284-1285. 
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role in the education of the public, and the public itself has a re­
sponsibility to seek accurate information. Because of the profound 
resonance that misleading information in the field of genetics can 
have on ali our lives, we are reminded of how much humility and 
sense of proportions is required in medica} research as well as in 
the dissemination of medica! information. 
The various but limited roles of genes in disease causation sugge­
st that responsibility towards our genes does not differ from health­
related responsibility as we presently see it. In fact, it is from the ba­
lance - or lack of - in attributing the proper place to genetic and en­
vironmental factors that the answer to a major question can be 
found. The question is: do we - as members of society have any 
special responsibility because of genetics? There is no additional re­
sponsibility that we owe to society because of our genome, since ge­
netic diversity in no way changes our positions in society. Hence, 
any form of eugenic pressure should be strongly opposed. Moreover, 
we remain responsible to care for ourselves, our community and our 
environment. A test for intelligence, or susceptibility to heavy me­
tals, or predisposition to breast cancer is not to be used for discrimi­
natory purposes or as a shortcut in our responsibility to further edu­
cation, keep a safe environment, and research the cofactors involved 
in disease causation. 
/s the risk oj discrimination increased by gender biases? 
If we fail to understand properly the meaning of genetic diversity, 
discrimination will easily arise from genetic knowledge. Cases of di­
scrimination based solely on genetic predisposition have been repor­
ted in the medical literature. Legislative efforts to protect against ge­
netic discrimination have been made in the United States and 
worldwide,29 often to go beyond the mere litigation of particular ca­
ses. The issue of discrimination, in fact, can not only be addressed 
29 NATOWICZ M.R., ALPER J .K., ALPER J .S., Genetic discrimination and the law, Am. J.
Hum. Genet. 1992, 50: 465-475; MASOOD E., Gene tests: who benefits from risk?, Nature 
1996, 379: 389-392. 
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on the leve! of indi vidual cases in legal proceedings and the fight 
against discrimination should address the discriminatory process it­
self.30 If we consider the possibility of discrimination against wo­
men who test positive for BRCA 1 and BRCA2 mutations, it is clear 
that the successful strategy is to foster trne equality at a societal -
not only legal - level. 
Women are still often exposed to gender discrimination. As can­
cers associated with germline BRCA 1 and 2 mutations are predomi­
nant (though not exclusively) in women, there is justified concern 
that discrimination against a female heterozygote carrier will be 
enhanced by gender biases. It is noteworthy that men can also be 
carriers of BRCA 1 and BRCA2 mutations and transmit them to their 
offsprings, but somehow this is rarely the subject of public discus­
sion and awareness. This contributes to enhance the gender bias as­
sociated with such mutations. 
In considering genetic testing, therefore, women 's attitudes differ 
with respect to the relevance that they place on the risk of discrimi­
nation. Members of high-risk families may see a way to possibly al­
leviate their concerns, if the test is negative, or to render them more 
active with respect to preventive measures, if the test is positive. 
Although informed and aware of the risk of discrimination, they 
may consider it almost trivial in comparison with the suffering of 
breast or ovarian cancer. 
On the contrary, other women perceive the risk of discrimination 
as too high, and its potential consequences as too disruptive for their 
lives, to be ignored. For them genetic biases would only compound 
already existing gender biases in employment, heal th care31 and 
other aspects of life. Social biases with serious consequences have 
already appeared in the disguise of health concerns: unfortunate 
examples include sexual discrimination with respect to H1v testing 
and racial discrimination with respect to sickle cell testing. Women 's 
concerns are therefore justified in view of the past, and many pa-
30 WOLF S.M., Beyond "Generic Discri111i11atio11 ": Toward rhe Broader Hann oj Generici­
sm, J. Law Med. & Ethics 1995, 23: 345-353. 
31 MILES S., PARKER K., Soundini board: men. wm11en. and healrh insurance. N. Eng. J. 
Med. 1997, 336: 218-221. 
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tients already feel that not only they can vertically transmit the di­
sease to their daughters, but they may also be vertically transmitting 
an increased risk of discrimination. Thus, some women feel forced 
to choose between knowledge as the power that they could acquire, 
and knowledge as the power that could be used against them by so­
ciety. Clearly, this is a major unresolved issue, awaiting the active 
participation of ali women in defense of their equal rights. 
Does genetics affect our views on autonomy and trust? 
Concern for one's children and family, as well as debate over ri­
ghts, imply that we consider ourselves both as autonomous indepen­
dent individuals and as relational individuals connected to one 
another. One of the main reasons for persons to request genetic te­
sting is a concern for their offspring and relati ves. Genetic testing 
for breast and ovarian cancers has been demonstrated to have a 
profound psychological impact on the entire family, including those 
members who do not carry a mutation.32 
Large debate in the ethical literature has surrounded issues of 
personal autonomy versus community goods. Occasionally, extreme 
positions have absolutized autonomy, but this scarcely reflects the 
reality of our existence, where from birth we are connected to one 
another. This connectedness at times conflicts with our desire to be 
completely autonomous and infringes on our personal rights. Reco­
gnition and respect for human rights founded on personal liberty is 
the foundation of our democratic societies, and medicine accordin-
32 BREO D.L., Alte red jates-Counseling jamilies with inherited breast cancer, JAMA 1993, 
269: 2017-2022; HOSKINS E.F., STOPFER J.E., CALZONE K.A. ET AL., Assessment and coun­
seling jor women with a history oj breast cancer. JAMA 1995, 7: 577-585; LERMAN C., NA­
ROD S., SCHULMAN K. ET AL., BRCA f testing in jamilies with hereditary breast-ovarian can­
cer. A prospective study oj patient decision making and outcomes, JAMA 1996, 275: 1886-
1892; BOTKIN J.R., CROYLE R.T., SMITH K.R. ET AL., A model protocol jor evaluating the 
behavorial and psychosocial effects oj BRCAJ testing, J. Natl. Cancer Inst. 1996, 88: 872-
882; STJEFEL F., LEHMANN A., GUEX P., Genetic detec ti on: the need jor psychosocial sup­
port in modem cancer prevention, Support. Care Cancer 1997, 5: 461-465; GENERAL As­
SEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Universal Declaration oj Human Rights, Geneva: UN, 
1948. 
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gly must place a particular emphasis on autonomy to protect pa­
tients' dignity and their right to self-determination. Emphasis on 
personal rights does not, however, change the relational essence of 
our being human, and genetics now, by increasingly revealing the 
l inks that unite mankind,33 comes as a reminder of our connected­
ness.34 There is, in fact, a rediscovered sense of belonging together,
if only through our genes, which is one of the most positive and
promising messages of genetics. The protagonists of today - the pa­
tients - say that when they enter the difficult path of genetic testing
they are not alone nor do they wish to be so, and that their being a
part of a community does not mean abdicating their autonomy, but
merely redefining it.
This process of redefinition of autonomy involves also the rap­
port between patient and doctor, where relational aspects have 
always been essential. In the patient-doctor relationship genetics 
makes these aspects even more important as patients facing genetic 
testing rely on "trust". Trust is an essential ingredient in the patient­
doctor relationship, an important ethical principle35 and the basis for 
certain modern ethical theories.36 Trust is increasingly important as 
one moves from the isolation of the autonomous moral agent (where 
the individual is alone) to the connectedness of a more relationally 
understood moral agency (where the individual is part of a society). 
In one realm responsibility arises out of contracts, most often among 
peers, and is limited to symmetrical relationships, where power is 
equally distributed.37 There the language is that of autonomy, self­
determination and contractual obligations. In the other realm, re­
sponsibility often arises from asymmetrical relationships, where re-
33 LEN0IR N., UNESCO, genetics and human rights, Kennedy Inst. of Ethics J. 1997, 7: 31-
42. 
34 BYK C., A map to a new treasure island: The human genome and the concept oj common 
heritage, J. Med. Philos. 1998, 23: 234-246. 
35 PELLEGRIN0 E.D., TH0MASMA O.C., For the patient'.r good. The restoration oj beneficen­
ce in hea/th care. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988: 235-250. 
36 BAJER A., Moral Prejudice. Essays on Ethics, Massachussetts: Harvard University Press, 
1994. 
37 KANT I., Critique oj practical reason and other writings in moral philosophy in Jnuna­
nuel Kant, (Translated by Lewis White Beck), Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1949. 
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ciprocity exists in asymmetry-38 Here the language is that of vulnera­
bility, dependability and caring. The patient-doctor relationship is at 
the same tirne a contractual relation based on mutual obligations and 
an asymmetrical relation based on the particular needs created by di­
sease itself; thereby trust is an essential element of both. 
As the responsibility of the scientific community with regard to 
issues in genetics is extremely high, the public needs and wishes to 
trust, for instance, that genetic knowledge will never be misused, 
whether for eugenic purposes (subtle eugenics can stem from increa­
sing economical pressure in health care), or for more or less overt 
discrimination. In prenatal counseling, for instance, trust is especial­
ly needed for a woman who may have witnessed many of her relati­
ves dying of breast and ovarian cancer, and may also feel pressured 
by a society with low acceptance of sickness. Trust is essential when 
facing decisions about prevention. An example would be the choice 
to perform a prophylactic mastectomy in a 25 year old woman 
carrying a BRCA 1 mutation: is surgery at that age less expensive than 
long-term measures, such as strict follow-up, or prevention trials or 
possible treatment for a later breast cancer? Women need to trust 
that their doctors will stand against economical pressure if neces­
sary; and never make treatment decisions dictated by costs only. 
Whether it is the preliminary counseling about undergoing genetic 
testing, or subsequent personal and family counseling, or counseling 
about prevention and treatment options, trust is paramount for the 
person facing any decision-making based on genetic risk asses­
sment. In this perspective, genetics itself is a potent reminder of how 
the connectedness of our moral agencies reflects also in the patient­
doctor relationship and calls for a reappraisal of trust as an indispen­
sable tool. 
38 LOWENSTEIN J., The midniiht meal mul other essays about doctors. patients. and medici­
ne, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996; SURBONE A., The plltient-doctor-family rela­
tionship: at the core of medirnl ethics in BAIDER L., COOPER C.L., DE-NOUR A.K. (Eds.), 
Cllncer mul the fc1111ily, Sussex (England): John Wiley & Sons Ltd., 1996: 389-405. 
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Does genetic knowledge increase control? 
The fundamental philosophical issue in genetic testing - and ge­
netics at large - is whether genetic knowledge expands or restricts 
the control that we have on our lives. Clearly, we are not our geno­
me, and only in part is genetics helping us predicting our future; yet 
we seem to see genetic data as more fundamental and more inaltera­
ble than any other in the equation of life and to rely excessively on 
predictions based on genetic knowledge. Thus, for some women the 
knowledge of a very high-risk to develop breast cancer has a 
profound and Iimiting effect on their personal choices: the haunting 
specter of cancer appears as the fina! negation of freedom, and their 
life is determined by the expectation of a dire future. On the con­
trary, some women who have already been breast cancer patients 
feel that the quality of their life in terms of its intensity and depth 
has improved after they have confronted the disease, and they consi­
der genetic ris k as no different from any other ris k in l ife - so­
mething to be dealt with and to possibly overcome. Finally, other 
women hold a more abstract belief that knowledge in itself always 
contributes to control and freedom. 
Philosophers have long debated the meaning of freedom, and ha­
ve either stressed the importance of free will or followed more deter­
ministic views of causation of life events. The case of genetic testing 
does not differ philosophically from any other type of predestina­
tion. However, traditional philosophical thinking has been centered 
around principles that tend to underestimate relational aspects, espe­
cially in regard to what is perceived as controllable not only by 
'me', but also by a common "us". The repercussions of testing posi­
tive for a genetic cancer predisposition, for instance, do not depend 
only on individual reactions, but also on society's attitudes towards 
disease, and on our collective perception of genetic abnormality. 
Control is thus more than a personal issue, since the normative stan­
dards for what can be controlled presuppose a shared understanding, 
which is in turn supported by various social practices. The concept 
of genetic predisposition to cancers or to other major diseases is in­
deed one in which scientific and philosophical understandings inter­
sect, as statistical distributions and projections intersect with norma-
Medicina e Morale 1999/3 481 
A. SURBONE
tive standards of acceptability, health and well-being. We will likely 
never find a common agreement as to whether genetic information 
increases or limits our control, for the answer involves our deepest 
personal selves. However, as a society, we can strive to create and 
share social practices that support a non-discriminatory approach to 
the advancement of human genetics. 
Conclusive remarks 
Major economical interests support the development of human 
genetics and interfere with the choices of both health-care providers 
and patients. Genetic testing is an area particularly exposed to the 
interference of economical interests, as even the professional moti­
vation for offering such tests is often based on the monetary interests 
of physicians, laboratories and pharmaceutical industries. Thus the 
ethical implications of genetic testing can go unnoticed or can be 
clouded by an indiscriminate use founded on less than ethical rea­
sons. Is genetics with its moral and social ramifications only an is­
sue for the elite or can a deeper understanding of the philosophical 
and social implications of genetics really contribute to the progress 
of mankind? Genetics and its dilemmas are clearly exclusive of cer­
tain privileged societies and groups, while other major health con­
cerns such as poverty, malnutrition, infant and childhood mortality, 
infectious disease epidemics and Iack of basic medica! support stili 
remain the dominant reality in some parts of the West and in far too 
many other parts of the world. Yet the philosophical issues surroun­
ding genetic testing may be general izable, and the interest and the 
debate over genetics, far from clouding other important issues in 
science and in medicine, may stimulate a better understanding of the 
concept of di versi ty and foster a higher level of connectedness 
among ali human beings. By so doing, the contribution of genetics 
to human progress may go beyond its limited medica! aspects by 
deeply challenging our medical, moral and social engagement.39 Yet, 
39 SASS, H.M., Introduction: Why protect the human ienome?, J. Med. Philos. 1998, 23: 
227-233.
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thousand of years ago the Chorus in Antigone sang: 'Future things: 
not our domain. But in this today which unravels in front of us, what 
shall we do?'40 To this question genetics still provides no answers. 
Acknowledgement: I am deeply indebted to Mrs. Kristine Saler­
no for her assistance in the preparation of this manuscript and to Dr. 
Hiroaki Mitsuya for his critical comments. 
RIASSUNTO 
La recente scoperta di un test genetico, che permette di verificare una 
predisposizione ereditaria ai carcinomi mammari e ovarici, e di grande im­
portanza scientifica e di eguale rilievo sul piano sociale ed etico. Molti di­
lemmi etici caratterizzano i tests genetici, ed assumono particolari sfumature 
in questo caso. Infatti, per la sua natura aggressiva e perche l' incidenza e in 
aumento, il carcinoma mammario e diventato un problema centrale nella sa­
lute delle donne. Le pazienti affette dal cancro al seno, e le donne in genera­
le, sono spesso profondamente interessate a capirne I' eziopatologia e i pos­
sibili trattamenti, cos1 come a discuterne le ramificazioni psicologiche, so­
ciali e morali. 
Questo articolo offre una riflessione sugli aspetti qualitativi del dibattito, 
cos1 come sono emersi negli incontri con le pazienti prima della loro decisio­
ne finale di sottoporsi al test genetico. Benche i cinque temi ricorrenti nella 
pratica clinica non siano necessariamente rappresentativi di altre situazioni 
cliniche, essi illustrano alcuni fondamentali aspetti filosofici, etici e morali 
che sono al centro della nostra essenza umana e del nostro essere agenti mo­
rali, e che riflettono l'inestricabile connessione di medicina, cultura, normati­
vita e filosofia di fronte alle questioni di genetica. 
Neli' esposizione sono stati evitati i casi clinici particolari, per mantenere 
la confidenzialita, e non si e fatto uso di questionari, in quanto possono appa­
rire riduttivi rispetto all'entita e complessita del problema. 
La conclusione e che le sole risposte corrette ai dilemmi posti dai tests 
genetici per il carcinoma mammario sono quelle che nascono da una analisi 
insieme medica, sociale e filosofica. 
40 SOPHOCLES, Anriione, in Greek tragedy, Torino: Einaudi, 1980.
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SUMMARY 
The ethical challenge oj genetic testing for breast cance,: 
The scientific importance of our recently acquired ability to test for here­
dity predisposition to breast and ovarian cancers is paralleled only by its so­
cial and ethical relevance. Dilemmas are common in ali genetic testing, but 
they assume particular nuances in the setting of breast cancer. Due to its de­
vastating nature and to its increasing incidence, breast cancer is a central is-
� � 
sue in women's health. Breast cancer patients and women in general are often 
deeply involved in understanding the disease process and the treatment op­
tions, as they are in discussing the psychological, social and moral ramifica­
tions. This paper is a reflection upon some qualitative aspects of the debate 
that surrounds genetic testing for breast and ovarian cancer, as they have 
ernerged in my encounters with breast cancer patients prior to their decision 
to consider genetic testing. The five recurrent themes identified in those con­
versations may or may not be representative of other practice situations, but 
they illustrate some fundamental philosophical, ethical and moral questions 
which exist at the core of our human essence and of our moral agency, and 
which point to the unavoidable intertwinement of medicine, culture, normati­
vity and philosophy, vis-a-vis the many questions raised by genetics. The 
Author has intentionally refrained from questionnaires, which could betray 
the complexity of our thinking process, and from the vignettes, as they could 
betray confidentiality. The paper concludes that the correct answers to the di­
lemrnas posed by genetic testing for breast cancer predisposition can only 
arise frorn a blend of medica], social and philosophical analysis. 
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Most of the decisions of the surgeon's everyday professional life are related simply to the indication for a 
diagnostic procedure or a treatment option. The nature of cancer is however very complex. Therefore, un­
less a surgeon has a good knowledge of oncology, even simple decisions might become "difficult". Never­
theless, very often the surgeon is confronted with a patient whose situation is particular and cannot simply 
be solved by following the written guidelines. Reasons for this can be numerous, e.g. extent of disease, age, 
general condition, patient's beliefs, religion, family situation and many others. This is when really difficult 
and responsible decisions have to be taken with all the consequences far both the patient and the surgeon. 
Most of the "strictly surgical" decisions are related to the technical planning of the procedure, or need to be 
taken during the surgical procedure itself. AII the other decisions are related to the diagnostic procedure, 
adjuvant treatment, rehabilitation and many other factors. Decisions which have to be taken along with all 
these steps might also carry significant ethical implications. Today a surgeon is very active in clinical re­
search and is often leading it. 
Far all these reasons we can conclude that the role of a surgeon in treating a cancer patient goes far 
beyond simple surgical skill. In the decisions a surgeon makes, as a member of a multidisciplinary team, a 
broad spectrum of different factors has to be considered, and he is often put into a position when a clear 
border between "yes" and "no" is blurred. Three case reports will be presented for further discussion. 
• Institute of Oncology, Zaloška 2, Ljubljana, Slovenija
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DIFFICULT DECISIONS IN MEDICAl ONCOLOGY 
Branko Zakotnik* 
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More and more patients with malignant diseases are being treated with drugs (cytostatic agents, hormo­
na! agents, immunotherapy), either in the adjuvant setting or for metastatic disease. The treatment is usu­
ally of longer duration, most often about six months, and most of the drugs have side effects that the pa­
tients have to cope with. In view of all these, it is essential that the patient understands and agrees with the 
treatment procedure and is informed of possible side effects. 
The aim of my presentation is not to talk about difficult decisions a medical oncologist has to make when 
choosing appropriate drugs or drug schedules. 1 would like to point out some situations (in form of case 
reports) 1 have encountered in my practical work and that stili seem to me difficult to deal with. 1 would like 
to discuss them with you and with your help possibly find the best solutions to these problems. 
Case No. 1. 
Male, 33-year-old, father of three children, presenting with a large, deeply infiltrating painful tumour in 
the iliac-femoral reg ion on his left side; aspiration cytology - high grade liposarcoma. Treatment options: 
hemipelvectomy (refused), radiotherapy or chemotherapy before definite surgery. lnstead, he decided to 
starve the tumour (40 days starvation). Because of excruciating pain, he needed intensive analgesic sup­
port in order to continue with his "therapy". 
Q: Do we support him in his "therapy"? We know it is ineffective (he wants to be cured!)? 
After 32 days he stopped starving, a hemipelvectomy was performed, some months later, he developed 
multiple pulmonary metastases; at first, they were unsuccessfully resected, later, a complete remission was 
achieved by chemotherapy. He also developed a cerebral (parietal) metastasis which was removed. At the 
moment, he is asymptomatic. 
Q: Would starting the treatment with chemotherapy give him the possibility for a better qual­
ity of life? Should we be more aggressive with our proposal at the beginning of treatment? How 
could we do that? 
Q1: DO WE SUPPORT THE PATIENTWHO DECIDES TO START 
ALTERNATIVE TREATMENT, WHILE STANDARD TREATMENT 
OPTIONS ARE STIL AVAILABLE? 
* Institute of Oncology, Zaloška 2, Ljubljana, Slovenia
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Case No. 2. 
Female patient, aged 50 years, with inflammatory breast cancer of her left breast. She has been living in 
an asylum because she is mentally retarded (mentally developed as a six years old child) and has no rela­
tives. Treatment in this case: chemotherapy, surgery, radiotherapy, treatment duration app. 8 months - five 
year survival 30-40%. She could not understand the treatment and side effects. When we were trying to 
explain the treatment procedure to her, she started crying. We started treatment (O: Agreement of official 
guardian?), but after a couple of cycles, she absolutely refused to continue (aggressive behaviour). She died 
later with locoregional and disseminated disease. 
Q2: DO WE START TREATING ADULT PATIENTS, WHO CANNOT UNDERSTAND 
THE TREATMENT PROCEDURE THAT IS COMPLICATED AND LONG AND WHERE 
COOPERATION OF THE PATIENT IS ESSENTIAL? 
Case No. 3. 
Female patient, aged 35 years, with metastatic breast cancer (the bones, lung, pleura, neck lymph nodes, 
liver, retroperitoneal lymph nodes, in the pelvis). She has received ali standard therapy and has been irradi­
ated at multiple sides. Her life expectancy is short. She has developed bilateral hydronephrosis (more on the 
right side) due to the compression of the ureters with elevated serum creatinine (600 mmol/1) and potas­
sium (6,4 mmol/1). She has pain mainly in her right flank, spreading also to her left flank. Morphine is 
effective for her pain, she is a little drowsy but otherwise she does not seem very ill. She is informed of her 
disease. 
Q: lnsertion of nephrostomal cateters (Right?, Left?, Both?)? 
Continue with morphine only (her creatitine is rising constantly}? 
Let her choose the two options? 
Q3: HOW AGRESSIVE SHOULD WE BE WITH PROCEDURES AND 
INFORMATION IN THE TERMINAL STAGE OF MALIGNANT 
DISEASE? 
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ETHICAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE USE OF QUALITY OF UFE 
QUESTIONNAIRES IN CLINICAL TRIALS 
Jacqui Horne and Rachel Jackson* 
Churchill Hospital, Oxford, UK 
There is growing international consensus towards the use of quality of life (QOL) questionnaires in clini­
cal trials. The UK Medical Research Council (MRC), European Organisation for Research and Treatment of 
Cancer (EORTC) and the National Cancer Institute of Canada (NCIC) all recommend assessment of QOL or 
justification for not doing so (Lancet 1995). 
The whole ethos of research is based on the theoretical principles of beneficence and non-maleficence 
(Ford & Reutter 1990). Subsequently, ethical dilemmas arise with the use of QOL questionnaires in clinical 




• Publication of Results
• Treatment Management
We hope to raise awareness of the factors that are involved in the use of QOL questionnaires. For the 
protection of patients, we intenci to make recommendations, which will encourage ethical exploration at an 
every stage of the research process. 
- Editorial (1995) Quality of life and clinical trials The LancetJuly 1 Vol. 346 (8966) pp1-2
- Ford JS and Reutter LI ( 1990) Ethical dilemmas associated with small sam ples
Journa! of Advanced Nursing 15 pp187-191
* lmperial Cancer Research Fund Medica! Oncology Unit, Churchill Hospital, Headington, Oxford, OX3 7 LJ, UK
.., 
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THE PROBLEM OF AUTONOMY IN MODERN MEDICAl ETHICS 
Vojko Flis* 
Department of Vascular Surgery,Teaching Hospital Maribor, Slovenia 
Modern medica! ethics is based primarily on four basic principles: on autonomy, on non-maleficence, on 
beneficence and on justice. In modern medica! ethics, they arouse very strongly only after NOrnberg codex. 
Before the era of the mentioned codex, the medicine was leaded by paternalism. However in modern world, 
where more and more population is getting older and older and where we are dependent from each other, 
the concept of autonomy as a leading right in traditional liberal theories must be at least questioned. In our 
hospital, at the Department of Vascular Surgery, a study was performed which statistically compared two 
groups of elderly patients. There were 43 patients in the first group (25 men, 17 women, age 63-78) and 
56 patients in the second group (28men, 28 women, age 59). In the first group were patients who stood 
only day or two before an amputation of leg. In the second group were patients without serious problems 
with leg s. Both were asked if they could decide alone for operation. There was not a single patient that was 
willing to undergo operation without talking with his or hers relatives. Patients with a forestaying amputa­
tion of the leg were included into study with only one reason: this particular operation puts them into devas­
tating social position. This raises again the question of the role of mutual interdependence in relationship 
between physician, patient, his famility and society. And on this point, a women philosopher Annette Baier 
must be introduced. She claims that in contemporary philosophy she hears a little bit different voices as 
others. She deplores the near exclusive emphasis in modern moral philosophy on universal rules and princi­
ples, and she sternly rejects Kantian contractarian models with their emphasis on justice, rights, law and 
particulary autonomous choice among free and equal agents. The conditions of social cooperation, espe­
cially in families and communal decision-making are, as Baier observes, typically unchosen and intimate, 
and they involve unequals in relations. Her thesis is not that traditional ethical theories are false or even, but 
that they capture only a piece of the larger moral world. Baier strongly envisions smaller scale system that 
pulls together few strands (she proposes "appropriate trust'') to make them a bridging concept. She does 
not recommend that we should discard categories of obligation, but that we make a room for an ethics of 
love and trust, including an account of human bonds and friendship. Although Baier's philosophy was mostly 
criticized, because she is a woman and was called a woman philosopher, it has a great impact on relation­
ship and emotions. Mutual interdependence and relationship ethics is basically the ethics of medica! care 
which maintains that many human relationships - for example in health care and research - involve persons 
who are vulnerable, dependently, ill and frail and that the desirable moral response is attached attentive­
ness to the needs, not detached respect for the rights. Accordingly, this approach features responsibility 
that the right-based account could be ignored in the attempt to protect persons from bring invaded by 
others. Four basic principles of the modem medica! ethics -autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and 
justice - strongly need the fifth companion: be it named appropriate trust or mutual interdependence. Al­
though both concepts were many times criticized by communitarians, as Alysdair Mclean, or philosophers, 
as Gilligan, who recommend coherent view, both concepts as we would say, simply give up too much in the 
moral life in hospital. 
*Teaching  Hospital Maribor, Ljubljanska 5, 2000 Maribor, Slovenia
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DO WE STlll NEED ETHICS 
IN THE AGE OF NEO-CANNIBAUSM? 
Leo Kronberger* 
Klinische Abteilung tor Allgemeinchirurgie und Abteilung tor Chirurgische Forschung, Graz, Austria 
General Surgery, University Surgical Clinic Auenbruggerplatz 29 A-8036 Graz, Austria 
One of Nietzsche's postulates was "God is dead". And it would seem that it was Nietzsche himself who 
was most afraid of the ultimate consequences of his own postulate. 
The present-day individual is in the same situation as Nietzsche, asking him- or herself the question, 
"Who or what can take the place of the dead God?" and dreads the inevitable reality that nothing but the 
deified or idolized human can take the place of the dead God. 
In the last thirty years individual resisted regimentation and fought against dog mas and absolute truths 
but modem man or woman now assumes the infallibility that he or she used to oppose and demands im­
mortality of the "dead God". 
The demand of "nil nocere - to do no harm" stands or falls with the idolized human being and the question 
of the value of life. This leads to the question: "How can the individual demand solidarity from others of his/ 
her kind with the sick, weak and handicapped, if he/she is not willing to protect life?" 
We who enjoy the "advantage of late birth" accuse our parents and grandparents of inactivity vis-f-vis the 
Nazi regi me. But are we not likely to have the same blind spot when we vehemently defend those things that 
are done in the name of "freedom for science and research"? 
lf we enter the question "Where can I purchase fetal tissue" in a search engine like www.ask.com we will 
receive something like a million links in reply. ls life - born or unborn - worth so little that we accept manufac­
ture of vaccines from the products of abortions? In a welfare state where medica! treatment is supposed to 
be cost free for the individual, is there not a danger due to the economic pressure produced by lack of 
resources and subsequent rationing, of removing seriously ill patients earlier from life-support systems? 
This is ali the more important in view of the fact that just before Christmas 1999 the media were full of the 
story of a woman who awoke from a coma after 16 years. In The Netherlands, a law is being prepared that 
would reduce the age for euthanasia to 12 years and relieve the parents of the right to object or act on 
behalf of their children. 
Even in this immoderateness of demanding man the claims for ethics in medicine, politics, environment 
etc. are based and demand the correction and renewal of medica! curricula. When Virchow reformed the 
medica! curriculum in Germany in the second half of the 19th century, the obligatory philosophical studies 
were deleted. But under the contemporary situation probably he will hinder and resist with all his reputation 
and efforts to do so. 
Ethics is concerned with the demand to do good and avoid evil while economics determines what can or 
may be done. But economy must subordinate themselves to ethics, which is not subject to trial and error. 
Ethical decisions must be applied appropriately but application does not change the truth of ethical norms. 
* l<linische Abteilung fur Allgemeinchirurgie und Abteilung fur Chirurgische Forschung, Universitats Klinik fur Chirurgie,
Auenbruggerplatz 29, 8036 Graz, Austria
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Ethical issues in healthcare prioritization: a medical viewpoint 
K. ASPLUND
Deparlment of Mcdici11e, U11iPersil!J Hospital. Umea, S1vedc11 
Introduction 
To a clinician. prioritization in medicine is not a new 
issue; we have always been forced to make difficult 
choices when resources (money, manpower, technical 
facilities, etc.) have been limited. What is ner· is that the 
discussion and the decisions have become more open, to 
which this series of articles testifies. This paper is partly 
based on the author's personal clinical experience as an 
internist. In addition, the author has been involved, 
together with politicians, health administrators, other 
physicians and healthcare personnel. in work on guide­
lines for priorities in healthcare. both at local and national 
leve! in Sweden, work that has compelled the author to 
reflect on issues of prioritization more than before. 
Clinical decision making that is not based on a solid 
ethical platform is likely to be difficult, inconsistent and 
erratic. However, the four ethical principles stemming 
from ancient Greece and stili used by clinicians (do good. 
do no harm. be fair, respect the patient's autonomy) are 
not very helpful when making decisions that concern 
priorities. The first two of these principles are too general 
to act as guidelines; fairness may be an important goal 
but needs to be defined more precisely; and, as discussed 
below, priority decisions sometimes violate the autonomy 
of the individual. 
In Sweden. a government commission, including poli­
ticians and professionals in medicine, ethics and 
healthcare administration, has presented guidelines for 
priorities in healthcare [l]. By analyses and discussions, 
it was surprisingly easy to reach ,a consensus on an 
ethical platform that could be applied both on the 
political/administrative and the clinical leve!. This paper 
presents the three components of the ethical platform 
and discusses the possible implications for clinical 
decision making. 
The princip le of human dignity 
When discussing the issues of fairness and the distri­
bution of healthcare resources, it is natura! to link them 
to ideas of human dignity and universal human equality. 
This view is deeply rooted in Western humanism and is 
expressed in the United Nations Declaration of Human 
Rights and. in some form or another, in the constitutions 
of many countries. 
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According to the principle of human dignity. each 
human being has a unique value and ali individuals are 
valued equally. Human dignity is not geared to any 
personal qualities or functions in the community, but to 
the individual's very existence. 
The principle of human dignity may not be contro­
versial as such, but its implementation in clinical medi­
cine is often complicated. For instance, it implies the 
following. 
1 Age cannot be the determining factor when a choice 
between patients must be made (provided that 'medica! 
factors' are equal). If. for instance, resources for dialysis 
are limited. it is not self-evident that a 25-year-old man 
should be given priority over a 7 5-year-old man. Due to 
their very existence, they are valued equally. 
2 Social values cannot be used as a basis for choosing 
among patients. For example, a woman with young 
children has no priority over a mentally retarded patient 
with no children. 
3 The patient's ability cannot be used as a basis for 
setting priorities. Thus, an inability to understand 
instructions or follow a prescribed lifestyle does not, in 
itself, constitute a reason for giving the patient a low 
priority when choices are made. 
These are examples of how one basic ethical principle 
is applied. When a decision is made in clinical practice, 
it must be weighed against other ethical principles. The 
principle of human dignity is most easy to apply in 
priority decisions when 'medica! factors' are equa!. 
The principle of need and solidarity 
The first principle, that of human dignity, does not 
provide enough guidance on prioritization when 
resources are limited; it rather defines the grounds on 
which decisions should not be based. The additional 
basic principle of need and solidarity is much more useful 
when setting priorities. It can be worded very simply: 
Resources should be channelled to those fields ( activities. individ­
uals) where the needs are greatest. 
How can medica! resources be distributed justifiably? . 
It could be that everyone is entitled to the same share 
of the common resources. This is illustrated on the left 
in Fig. 1. The paradox here is that equal distribution of 
















Fig. l. Justice in altocation of resources may be based on equal 
distribution to everyone (left, individuals A-C) or a larger share to 
those who have greater need (right. individual A) involving a 
sacrifice by those with lesser need (individual C). 
fundamentally different from a situation when most is 
given to those who have the greatest need (Fig. l. right), 
which is what the principle of need and solidarity implies. 
Those who are in less need will have to forego some 
possible improvement in health to provide for those in 
greater need. This principle is closely related to the 
fundamental reason for medica! care at large, i.e. to 
assist those who are in severe distress and need help. 
The crucial question here is: what is need? This is 
discussed below. 
An alternative to the principle of need and solidarity 
would be a principle of demand. It would imply that, 
when choices are made in medica! care, one should opt 
for those fields (activities, individuals) where demands 
are the greatest. It would be in line with the basic ethical 
rule of respect for the patient's autonomy. Care is usually 
demanded when it is needed, so often there is no conflict 
with the principle of need and solidarity. But not ali 
needs are explicit and, in many clinical situations, there 
is a demand for medica! care with no real need for it. 
When allocating public resources, the principle of need 
and solidarity will occasionally be in conflict with the 
principle of autonomy; the patient cannot always define 
what the need is. 
The principle of efficiency 
In an orthodox form, this principle has been expressed as: 
When choosing between different lields of activity or different 
measures, one should opt for that which, ali other things being 
equal, has the greatest cost-efficiency. 
This principle is most useful when choosing among 
different possible diagnostic and therapeutic procedures 
in the same patient. Then it is not controversial and 
provides little additional guidance when making 
priorities. The principle is difficult to apply in clinical 
practice when choosing among individual patients or 
groups of patients. because 'ali other things' are never 
equal: patients always differ. Attempts to compare the 
cost-effectiveness of procedures from different medica! 
domains, e.g. haemodialysis with coronary by-pass sur­
gery by estimation of quality-adjusted lile years (QALY), 
are subject to severe criticism on both ethical and 
theoretical grounds [2]. 
On the other hand, priority-setting that does not take 
costs and effectiveness into consideration is detached 
from the realities of the world. To solve this dilemma, 
this principle is perhaps best expre.ssed in more relative 
terms: 
When choosing between different fields of activity or different 
measures, one should opt for a reasonable relationship between 
costs and effects. measured as improved health and quality of life. 
Thus, cost-efficiency considerations have a funda­
mental role to play in priority-making. They are. how­
ever, subordinated to the first two basic ethical principles. 
those of human dignity and need-solidarity. 
What is need?
Need, like disease, has both a subjective and an objective 
side. The seriousness of a disease can be rated according 
to various dimensions; the suffering experienced by the 
patient, the extent of functional impairment caused by 
the disease, and the medica! prognosis in terms of 
survival or risk of permanent disability. Each of these 
dimensions is difficult to assess in the individual patient, 
and comparisons between patients are even more 
difficult. 
Needs do not always have to be conscious or ver­
balized. When setting priorities, the whole population 
must be taken into account, not only those spon­
taneously seeking medica! treatment. In a priority system 
based on solidarity. special attention must be paid to 
people who are less able to express their needs, for 
instance young children, confused or senile patients, and 
those with severe mental disorders. 
What is benefit? 
Benefit is closely related to need. Therefore, it has the 
same dimensions as need; it invol:ves reduced suffering, 
less functional impairment caused by the disease and 
better medica! prognosis in terrns of improved survival 
or reduced risk of permanent disability. 
For medica! care to be beneficial it must have both 
purpose and meaning. Prolonging life in a terminally ill 
patient who has renal cancer, by total 'parenteral 
nutrition or intensive treatment of an infection, achieves 
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its purpose. life is prolonged. but it is hardly meaningful 
and. thus. it is of no benefit to the patient. In such a 
patient. palliative care would instead be both purposeful 
and meaningful. 
Advanced age 
The use of medica! resources increases rapidly with age. 
It has been estimated that. in Sweden. an 85-year-old 
person consumes on average 40 times as many hospital 
bed-days as a person below the age of 65 years. The 
proportion of all healthcare costs that goes to dying 
patients is reported to be 10-12% in the USA [3] and 
16% in Sweden [4]. Many elderly persons fear that, as 
resources of the healthcare system become more limited, 
their access to healthcare may be jeopardized. Daniel 
Callahan. Director of The Hastings Center (devoted to 
studies in medica! ethics) has discussed the goals of 
medicine in an ageing society [5,6]. He has suggested 
that public resources should not be spent on prolonging 
life in people who have reached 'the natura! life-span', 
which he seems to set at around 7 5 years. 
This does not, in the present author's opinion, agree 
with the principle of human dignity discussed above. 
where the individual's value is connected to his or her 
very existence; the value is the same whether the patient 
is 10, 40 or. 80 years old. Chronological age is not an 
issue that can be used when choosing among patients. 
Advances in biomedicine have improved the possibilities 
to help elderly people with disease, e.g. cataract, frac­
tures, severe arthritis, urinary incontinence and prob­
lems of prostatism. Strategies for geriatric rehabilitation 
have greatly improved in recent years. 
The distinction between chronological and biological 
age is important. Reduced physiological reserves in eld­
erly people limit their possibility to tolerate advanced 
diagnostic or therapeutic interventions. Therefore, a 
more comprehensive medica! evaluation often results; 
the focus of medica! management differs between elderly 
and young patients. In younger patients, the emphasis 
is on prolongation of life, whereas in many elderly 
patients with reduced physiological reserves it is on 
i.mproving the quality of life. It does not mean that the 
elderly person's access to medica! care is more limited 
compared with that of the young, and strict age limits 
are not compatible with the basic principle of human 
dignity. 
Financial and social position 
When the two basic principles of human dignity, and 
need and solidarity are applied, there is clearly no reason 
for giving higher priority to a person just because he or 
she is i.mportant to the society from an economic or 
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social point of view. Slraighlforward as this slandpoint 
may seem. it is not without complications. 
Loss of income and production when an injury or a 
disease affects a pcrson during thcir working ycars would 
perhaps be a rcason for giving high priority to carly 
treatmcnt and rehabilitation. In fact. it is common that 
private or public insurance agcncies pay for healthcare 
scrvices to spced up thc return to activc work. Howcver. 
if this is done at the expcnsc of other paticnts' access to 
medica! care, it does not comply with the priority 
principle of need and solidarity. If, on the other hand, it 
is achieved by adding new resources into the public 
healthcare system and no-one is set aside, it is less 
challenging to basic ethical principlcs (although it may 
stili increase health inequalities). The same applies if the 
treatment is entirely financed and provided outside the 
public healthcare system. 
In many European countrics, it is generally accepted 
that position in society should not be a basis for choosing 
among patients. It is less self-evident that social function 
should be disregarded. A commonly used exampte is that 
of a mother with severa! young children: is it not 
reasonable that she should have a high priority? 
However, this question can be rephrascd: is it fair that 
anyone who has not succeedcd in getting children should 
be further stigmatized by not having the same access to 
medica! care? The priority principle of need does not 
refer to social value but to the severity of disease. with 
special attention paid to individuals who cannot speak 
for themselves. Therefore. a mother with severa! children 
does not take precedence over a childless man or woman. 
Self-inflicted disease 
Many disorders are caused by, or aggravated by, lifestyle 
factors such as smoking. excessive alcohol drinking. 
over-eating and dangerous leisure-time activities. Among 
healthcare personnel and laymen, a common opinion is 
that patients with self-inflicted disease should somehow 
have a lower priority than those who are not responsible 
for their disease. When the Federation of County Councils 
in Sweden, a co-ordinating agency for public healthcare 
in the country, made an inquiry among politicians, 
health administrators and physicians, it became evident 
that physicians were more reluctant than politicians and 
administrators to reject a patient because of lifestyle 
factors. An example is given in Table l. 
There are many reasons why lifestyle cannot be 
accepted as a rule on which to base prioritization. There 
is presently a very rapid increase in our understanding 
of the genetic basis for disease, including alcoholism, 
severe overweight and lung cancer. In an individual 
patient, it is often impossible to decide to what extent 
genetic rather than lifestyle factors have contributed to 
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Table l Responses to Lhe queslion: 'lf an unequivocal conneclion 
betwecn smoking and a certain type of lung canccr bas been 
established, then he who quits smoking should have priority to 
trealment before he who does not make a corresponding promise. 























the disease. Many detrimental lifestyles (smoking, alcohol 
abuse, low physical activity. etc.) are closely associated 
with low education, economic deprivation and low social 
status. If low priority is given to people with unhealthy 
lifestyles. there is an obvious risk that inequalities in 
health distribution in the community will increase. This 
would be in contradiction to the basic principle of needs 
and solidarity. Furthermore. the definition of a harmful 
lifestyle and self-inflicted disease is liable to be arbitrary. 
Smoking and alcohol abuse for obvious reasons come 
under this definition. But what about lack of leisure­
time physical activity? And. if physical exercise is ben­
eficial, how does one judge injuries related to excessive 
physical activities? 
Whereas the concept of self-inflicted disease is reputed 
to influence prioritization, it does not mean that lifestyle 
factors cannot be taken into consideration in clinical 
decision-making. The result of a medica! or surgical 
treatment may be jeopardized if a detrimental lifestyle 
continues. Obvious examples are persistent smoking after 
vascular surgery for peripheral artery disease, continued 
excessive drinking after a liver transplant. or heavy 
physical exercise too soon after an operation for a sports 
injury. In selected cases, it is in accordance with basic 
priority principles to insist on lifestyle changes for the 
intervehtion to be appropriate and meaningful. 
Positive selection? 
There are many groups of patients who have acquired 
a disease and an injury under conditions that seem 
particularly tragic. It has been advocated that these 
patients deserve special attention and thereby get a 
particularly high priority; it may be a person who has 
been infected with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 
within the healthcare system, a patient with a severe 
drug-induced injury, innocent victims of traffic accidents 
caused by drunken drivers, military staff wounded in 
United Nation peace-keeping assignments, etc. 
However pitiable these patients are, they do not. a 
priori. have a greater need than anyone else with the 
same disease but incurred under different circumstances. 
The conclusion is that there is no ethical basis for 
'positive discrimination' in clinical practice. Admittedly. 
politicai decisions may sometimes overrule this stand­
point. In Sweden. persons infected by HIV during medica! 
treatment have recently been entitled to special favours. 
including free medica! treatment. 
Case history: a series of choices 
A 74-year-old man who is a smoker, slightly demented 
and had a myocardial infarction 2 years ago, undergoes 
prostatectomy. On the same evening, he complains about 
slight chest pain. This is aggravated on the following 
morning, and an electrocardiogram shows an anterior 
wall infarction. The coronary care unit of the hospital 
has no empty beds; it is a six-bed unit and this is the 
seventh patient. A 43-year-old woman, mother of three 
teenagers. who has been under observation for 6 hours 
with only moderate suspicion of a myocardial infarction 
is transferred to a general medica! ward to make room 
for the 74-year-old man. 
Was this a right choice? If the principle of human 
dignity is applied. prioritization must not be swayed by 
age or social value, i.e. the fact that the woman is a 
mother of three teenagers. The medica! benefit from care 
in a coronary unit is as great for a 74-year-old patient 
as for a 43-year-old, so the principle of efficacy does not 
favour the younger patient. From the standpoints of 
'need' as well as 'efficacy' the patient with a definite 
myocardial infarction has a higher priority than the 
patient with an unconfirmed possible diagnosis of infarc­
tion free of complications over 6 hours of observation. 
Should the patient have thrombolytic treatment? 
When he arrives at the coronary care unit, the infarction 
is at least 9 hours old. He cannot be treated with 
streptokinase because it was used 2 years ago and there 
is a risk of an anaphylactic reaction; therefore, the 
expensiv_e alternative, t-PA. has to be used. 
To what extent should the doctor consider cost­
effectiveness when deciding on whether to use throm­
bolytic treatment or not? Should his or her obligations 
be confined to the patient lying in front of him or her at 
that very moment, or does the physician also have an 
obligation to future patients who cannot receive 
adequate . treatment if the department's financial 
resources are depleted? 
The use of an expensive therapy may be restricted by 
regulations imposed by the hospital and depart!llent 
management. Within such a framework, however, the 
individual physician should not provide suboptimal treat­
ment for the individual patient. This would, in the 
present author's opinion. represent an undue form of 
prioritization. If. on the other hand, severa! methods of 
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similar efficacy are available. it is more ethical to use 
the least cxpensive one. 
The patient survives. and the question of coronary 
by-pass surgery is raised. He says that giving up smoking 
is beyond him. Should lhe fact lhat he bas a disorder 
that is at least partly self-inllicled be an issue when 
deciding on whelher to opcrate or not and when pulting 
him on the waiting-list for operation? Continuing an 
unhealthy lifestyle should not, in itself, discriminate 
against the patient. However, persistent smoking is 
expected to jeopardize the result of the operation and, if 
this elderly man is judged to have reduced physiological 
r'eserves, surgery may be declined · for medica] reasons 
unrelated to the issue of prioritization. 
Priority grouping 
On the national leve!. models of prioritization have been 
presented in Norway (7]. the Netherlands [8], New 
Zealand [9] and Sweden [l]. The Norwegian and Swedish 
models rate a number of priority groups with examples 
given. whereas the Dutch and New Zealand models 
define a core of health and medica! care to be publicly 
funded. Among more local models, the Oregon list has 
attracted the most attention [10.11] and comprises a 
detailed ranking of 688 diagnostic/therapeutic pairs and 
is meant to be applied to the minority of patients covered 
by the public Medicaid programme. 
The Swedish model is the only one that includes lists 
both on the political/administrative leve] and the clinical 
leve!. The priority groups to be used in clinical work are 
presented in Table 2. 
This list is similar but not identical to the list suggested 
for political/administrative purposes. An important 
difference is that population-based prevention is excluded 
from the clinical priority list, because decisions on such 
Table 2 Priority groups in clinical practice as presented by the 
Swedish Health Care and Medica! Priorities Commission 
Priority 
group Content 
IA Treatment of life-threatening acute diseases which, if 
left untreated. will lead to disability or premature death 
IB Treatment of severe chronic diseases 
Palliative terminal care 
Care of diseases that have caused reduced autonomy 
II Habilitation/rehabilitation 
Individual-based prevention 
III Treatment of less severe acute and chronic diseases 
IV Care for reasons other than disease 
v Self-care sufficient 
Minor ailments 
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prevention strategies are seldom taken by an individual 
clinician. 
Diagnostic procedures are not covered by the priority 
list. The Swedish Commission emphasizes that a diag­
nosis is a prerequisite for assigning a patient to a priority 
group. Therefore. everyone who feels ill is entitled to a 
basic clinical examination. 
To illustrate how various disorders may be grouped 
according to the clinical priority list, some examples are 
given in Table 3. The examples are the author's own 
interpretation of the priority grouping, with an emphasis 
on urological disorders. 
In the opinion of the Cornrnission, the main financing 
of treatment of disorders in groups I-III should be from 
public sources. In practice, c;1ese three groups differ in 
that patients in group I should have immediate access 
to care. of the highest standards. It is acceptable that 
those in lower priority groups have more limited access, 
if resources are limited. They may have to wait for an 
elective surgical procedure, their hospital stay may be 
shortened, .etc. 
Public resources should not be allotted to treatment 
of disorders in group V, whereas group IV constitutes 










Acute myocardial infarction 
Stroke 
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borderline cases that could be publicly funded if economic 
resources are sufficient but omitted if they are limited. 
This priority grouping agrees reasonably well with 
attitudes expressed by politicians. health administrators 
and physicians in general in Sweden [12]. Figure 2 
shows priorities 11clmong these categories relative to how 
resources are allocated today. The attitudes were similar 
in the three groups of respondents (politicians. health 
administrators and physicians). 
One of the most controversial points concerned the 
issue of assisted conception. Most respondents feel that 
less public resources should be allocated to this area. 
v:h ich agrees with the low priority given to assisted 
conception b)' the Medica! Priorities Commission 
(Taule 2). Fierce criticism against this standpoint bas 
been raised by obstetricians and lay organizations sup­
porting infertile couples. One line of argument has been 
that infertility most often is caused by defined medica! 
disorders, and should be regarded as a handicap often 
leading to severe psychological suffering. A counter-view 
is that childlessness is not. in itself, a disease and that 
the criticism against the proposal of the Commission is 
an example of how strong groups of patients can express 
their claims very clearly. whereas others, perhaps in 
greater need ( abused children, demented people. stroke 
patients, etc.) are less able to make their voices heard in 
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Fig. 2. Responses by 481 politicians, health administrators and 
physicians in Sweden to the question 'What areas should receive 
increased and reduced allocation of resources?' (adapted from 
ref. 12]. 
The Swedish priority grouping agrees well with guide­
lines presented by the government committees in Nonvay 
[7]. the Netherlands [8] and New Zealand [9]. a reflection 
of the common values in medica! ethics. based on 
Western humanitarian traditions. 
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Longevity is the greatest risk factor for developing cancer. However, despite the increasing focus placed on cancer in the elderly, 
a prominent discrepancy relating to the age of the patient persists, with elderly people often receiving Iess than optimal treatment 
and care. There is no doubt that ageism has a profound impact on health care received by elderly people. Incorporating ethical 
principles into their clinical practice could facilitate health professionals in the provision of optimal treatment and care for elderly 
patients with cancer. This article explores some basic ethical assumptions regarding the needs of this patient group in relation to 
the ethical dilemmas of truth telling, consent and relationships, and power. © 2000 Elsevier Science Ireland Ltd. Ali rights 
reserved. 
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l. Introduction
The elderly population of the developed nations is
currently growing at 2.5% per year with a doubling of 
* Presented at the IVth International Congress of Geriatric Oncol­
ogy, Rome, Italy, October 1998. 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: + 44-141-3303642; fax: + 44-141-
3303539. 
the number of elderly expected in many countries by 
the year 2025. In western Europe a quarter of the 
population is over 70 years of age [l] and in the USA 
and Australia approximately 12% of the population are 
elderly [2]. Such dramatic changes in life expectancy 
mean that while people over sixty currently constitute a 
fifth of the British population, by 2030 they will consti­
tute a third and those aged over eighty are the fastest 
1040-8428/00/$ - see front matter © 2000 Elsevier Science Ireland Ltd. Ali rights reserved. 
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growing section ofthe population [3]. There are a number 
of factors responsible for this ageing population includ­
ing high birth-rates, an increase in public health pro­
grammes, improved nutrition, improved scientific 
knowledge and new drug development [4]. As a conse­
quence of longevity it is certain that in the next 20 years 
the number of people with cancer will increase. There is 
now little doubt that cancer is a disease of the elderly 
albeit the indicative factors are yet to be determined [5]. 
Consequently, if cancer incidence rates remain as they 
are, and there are no significant prevention or therapy 
breakthroughs by the year 2030, a notable increase in the 
number of people alive with cancer and in the total 
number ofnew diagnoses is expected [6]. Given then that 
Government bodies and health care professionals alike 
are aware of this situation can one expect a rational 
approach to the care ofthis growing cohort ofindividuals 
with cancer? It is clear, from an ethical perspective, that 
it is important to ensure adequate provision of care for 
this population therefore one assumes that in readiness 
for this so called 'oncologic timebomb' health care 
professionals are prepared to provide optimal care to 
elderly patients with cancer. 
2. Delivery of cancer care
The ethical debate surrounding the delivery of health­
care is not new and adding an aged population into the 
equation will only serve to further complicate the argu­
ment. There is no doubt that ageism, the stigmatising 
effects of society's negative attitudes towards the elderly, 
does have a profound effect on the health care the elderly 
receive. Rationing of health care is a dominant feature 
in health care delivery as we approach the new millen­
nium. In this cost conscious era one could question 
whether treatment for the elderly person with cancer is 
a priority, given that their contribution to society is 
perceived as limited, whilst the death of a young person 
reputedly represents !ost potential for society. 
It would seem therefore that contemporary society 
presents us with a paradox whereby longevity is some­
thing we strive for yet simultaneously old age is not 
glamorous and is often disregarded. Even though old age 
is something most of us will experience, ageism is much 
less discussed than racism or sexism [7]. In relation to 
cancer care there is evidence that age is a real factor in 
determining access to services with health care profes­
sionals entering, perhaps unknowingly, into the ethical 
dilemma of ageism in cancer care. 
3. Ethical dilemmas of providing cancer care
Ethics is a strange and ambiguous word with a number
of connotations and it is utilised extensively in the field
of cancer care perhaps as a means of deluding ourselves 
into believing that we are providing appropriate care to 
patients. The practice of nursing demands that we are 
familiar with and competent in the use ofnumerous tools 
and without many of the tools we use in daily practice 
such as thermometers, infusion pumps, nursing records, 
our care would be sub-optimal. Yet not many nurses 
consider ethics to be a vita! tool used in the delivery of 
patient care. This is despite the fact that in clinical 
practice we face a variety of ethical dilemmas every day. 
That ethics are not considered integral to care delivery 
may explain current practices of health care for elderly 
patients. 
This article will consider from an ethical perspective, 
the delivery of cancer care to the elderly and question if 
nurses are behaving in an unethical manner towards this 
patient population. Structuring this paper around three 
common ethica! dilemmas commonly faced by nurses 
and indeed most health care professionals will contextu­
alise the discussion within the practice of caring for 
elderly patients with cancer. These ethical dilemmas are: 
truth telling, consent and relationships and power. 
4. Truth telling
Nursing is imbued with a sense of duty, a notion which
was much proclaimed by Florence Nightingale and 
perpetuated through subsequent generations of nurses. 
Part of this duty is to teli the truth when caring for 
patients and one could contend that the suggestion of 
lying to individuals would be abhorrent to us ali. 
Truth telling is a central theme in ali human relation­
ships and, it could be argued, finds particular relevance 
in the complex situation of caring for people with cancer. 
For centuries people have used a variety of ethical 
methods when seeking to clarify issues which have a 
moral dimension. Two ofthe most common are deontol­
ogy and utilitarianism. 
Based on Kantian theory, Deontology c!aims that 
being moral and truthful involves acting from a sense of 
moral duty, respecting others rights and honouring 
obligations. Whilst Utilitarianism argues that actions are 
morally right when they result in happiness for the 
majority of people. . . . . 
Within each of these is the sense of duty wh1ch IlJ¼��� < 
feel towards patients. How can it be then tha�with� 
to the elderly we can somehow disreg�r?,; 
duty and deli ver care that is far fro11:.be1P.�! 
or reality and in fact compron::1�� 
survival? This discrepancy c<:nlld, pe 
attitude of health care pi-ofessi 
There is no.question,tll,, 
much ofmodern soc!�fy.�y1 
ally. revere th�ir,�'M:�i:Iy,j� 
away from th�ir sensft.qf:, 
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members of the family. Unfortunately ageist attitudes 
are not just a factor of a changing society world-wide 
but they also appear to be evident in the majority of 
healthcare providers. Severa! researchers have high­
lighted the effect negative attitudes of health care 
professionals has on the care and treatment afforded 
elderly people. However not only does wide spread 
discrimination against older people exist in the provi­
sion of healthcare, they are also the victims of re­
stricted assumptions about the quality of healthcare 
expected in old age. The series of targets set in the 
UK Governmental White Paper, The Health of the 
Nation [7], provide little comfort for older people as 
they emphasise reducing premature death and specify 
upper age limits, for example, reduction of heart dis­
ease and_ stroke among those aged under seventy-four 
despite these being major causes of death among peo­
ple over seventy-five [8]. Indeed in seeking to achieve 
these targets, one could question whether an already 
under-resourced health service would give even less 
attention to older people. 
Rational decision making regarding resource alloca­
tion is fraught with difficulty. Approaches based on 
quality adjusted life years (QALY s) are inherently 
discriminatory for the elderly. Counting extra years as 
benefit of medica] procedures risks shifting resources 
away from older to younger age groups Similarly, 
those judged to have a low quality of life, predomi­
nantly elderly people, will be disadvantaged [8]. 
Moreover, the Jack of medica! knowledge resulting 
from the elderly's exclusion from clinical trials [9], 
results in inappropriate clinical decision making and 
is especially concerning as the elderly stand to gain 
more from technological advances than their juniors 
[8]. 
In relation to truth telling then it would seem that 
current delivery of cancer care to the elderly is not 
based on sound ethical judgement. Rather, truth 
seems to be somewhat distorted to suit policy makers 
and the attitudes of health care professionals. 
5. Consent
There are ways in which ageist attitudes are seen in 
everyday practice and in many ways cancer care epit­
omises these through the various stages of the dis­
ease. If negative attitudes towards the elderly are 
institutionalised as part of our cultural beliefs, it is 
unlikely that our ways of caring for older people will 
have satisfactory outcomes [l O]. That elderly patients 
with cancer are refused an opportunity to participate 
in appropriate health care demonstrates a clear lack 
of an informed consent process that is such a domi­
nant feature in contemporary cancer care. Consent to 
treatment underpins the delivery of care and con-
forms to the Declaration of Helsinki. It can be 
asserted then that by not informing elderly patients 
of all the opportunities available to them that we 
are indeed practising unethically. In terms of treat­
ment for elderly patients there is substantial evid­
ence to demonstrate that age alone is the factor 
that determines what treatment individuals will re­
ceive. 
Despite the magnitude of cancer in the elderly, a 
concentrated approach to overcome barriers to 
screening and early detection in this population is, to 
a large extent, non-existent world-wide with the el­
derly singularly underrepresented in most studies of 
cancer screening and early detection [2]. When recom­
mendations for screening are placed alongside epi­
demiol<?gical data, screening policies seem at best 
illogical and at worst a misplaced opportunity to en­
courage long-term health awareness. 
In recent years there has been a growing realisation 
that the management of older individuals with cancer 
was not organised on a rational basis applying sound 
scientific information from clinical studies but rather 
treatment was decided on the whim of the treating 
clinician. As a consequence there is an increasing rep­
resentation in professional journals citing evidence of 
poor referrals, inadequate diagnosis and under treat­
ment of elderly patients. 
Fentiman and et al. [l] were among the first to 
draw attention to severa! important areas where it 
was felt care to this group of patients fell short of the 
optimum: 
• indiff erence on the part of oncologists,
• Jack of attention to treatment of the elderly in major
oncology conferences,
• exclusion of subjects over 70 years of age from
clinical trials,
• Jack of pharmacokinetic studies in elderly subjects,
• underestimation of life expectancy,
• misconceptions that the elderly are always poorly
tolerant of cheino/radiotherapy,
• cancer is more indolent in the elderly,
• lack of criteria for elderly specific treatments,
• lack of attention to attitudes of the elderly with
cancer,
• Jack of opportunity for elderly to express their own
opinion about cancer therapy.
In addition to this Monfardini and Yanick [12] have
also identified a number of problems: 
• misinterpretation of signs and symptoms because of
concomitant conditions,
• masking of symptoms,
• delay in seeking medica! attention,
• patients' Jack of awareness of cancer signs and
symptoms.
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The rigours of therapeutic intervention for the el­
derly have been debated and authors such as Fenti­
man et al. [1] note that many physicians arbitrarily 
decrease the dosage of conventional chemotherapy 
regimes, use single agent chemotherapy or withhold 
chemotherapy on the dubious ground of unsuitability. 
Burklow [13], following a large study involving 5400 
patients, reported that older patients receive appropri­
ate treatment less often and are less likely to be re­
ferred to specialist cancer centres than younger people 
are. These findings were further supported by Bain et 
al. [5] and are especially concerning when one consid­
ers them in conjunction with the report, 'A Policy 
Framework for Commissioning Cancer Services' [14] 
which advocates both population wide equality of 
treatment and care and specialist referral. In their re­
view of 699 patients with an array of different can­
cers, Goodwin et al. [15] concluded that the 
percentage of elderly people receiving definitive treat­
ment declined with age. When age was considered in 
conjunction with other extraneous determining factors 
such as access to transport, performance status and 
mental state, it transpired that ali of these factors 
predicted for non-receipt of radiation therapy but not 
surgery. In breast cancer care there is similar evidence 
of lack of appropriate delivery of cancer treatment. 
Despite the widely held view that breast cancers in 
elderly women are less aggressive there is little evi­
dence to support this [16] however, elderly women 
have often been excluded from breast cancer clinical 
trials [17]. Bergman et al. [18] found that women over 
the age of 75 were less likely to receive adjuvant 
radiation therapy following surgery, receiving hor­
mone therapy as their sole treatment more often than 
their younger counterparts. However, as elderly pa­
tients with breast cancer should receive treatment that 
effectively controls disease long term, the unselected 
use of hormone therapy alone is clearly no longer 
acceptable [17]. Additionally, addressing the issue of 
screening for breast cancer in elderly women, Haigney 
et al. [19] highlighted that although older female pa­
tients have a positive attitude towards breast exami­
nations, this is not reflected by the attitudes and 
practice of hospital doctors. This indicates the need 
for change in attitudes and training to ensure older 
women do not miss out on diagnosis and treatment 
In terms of consent then, is this the sort of treat­
ment patients with cancer wish to receive? Whilst em­
pirical research in this area is limited there is evidence 
to refute the suggestion supported by clinicians that 
older patients would not want to be treated as ag­
gressively as younger patients. Results of a study by 
Yellen et al. [20] involving patients of varying ages 
indicated that older adults were as likely as their 
younger counterparts to agree to chemotherapy for 
both curative and control of disease purposes. There 
was neither an effect of disease stage on treatment 
decisions nor an interaction between disease stage and 
age. Such data supports the assertion of Newcomb 
and Carbone [21] that physician's attitudes rather 
than patients preferences influence treatment deci­
sions. When one compares these results with those of 
Slevin et al. [22] who found that patients with cancer 
tend to unconditionally accept the physician's recom­
mendations for treatment, one could question whether 
physicians' attitudes influence the way they explain 
the risks and benefits of treatment to older patients. 
Indeed, it is concerning that there is also growing 
evidence that nurses are equally paternalistic towards 
elderly patients with regard to treatment with some 
nurses believing that elderly patients should not be 
considered for aggressive cancer therapy [23]. If in­
formed consent is a fundamental ethical right of ali 
individuals, why are older individuals who require 
treatment for their life threatening illness not receiv­
ing it? 
6. Relationships and power
The three key individuals most often portrayed as
central to the health care equation are the doctor, nurse 
and patient. However the power which is held by each 
of these differs considerably. Chadwick and Tadd [24] 
discuss this in relation to the doctor-nurse-patient 
relationship and state 
Characteristically the doctor has been portrayed as 
'ali knowing' the nurse as caring, unselfish, obedient 
and obeying and the patient as helpless and utterly 
trusting. 
That patients are perceived as passive recipients of 
health care is perhaps changing in some cultures but 
it remains that most treatment related decisions are 
taken by medica! doctors. In doing so, they exercise 
the ethical principles of beneficence and non-malefi­
cence. That is they have a duty to do good and a 
duty to do no harm. It is clear however that elderly 
patients with cancer receive sub-optimal care and as a 
consequence their life expectancy is compromised. As 
the average life expectancy for 65 and 85 year olds is 
longer than the survival for most untreated malignan­
cies, failing to provide adequate antineoplastic treat­
ment can be seen as denying the older individual the 
opportunity to fulfil his or her life expectancy [25]. 
Even when patients have the same stage of disease, 
performance status and treatment tolerance, age in­
equalities are apparent. Such paternalism averts sur­
vival and questions the ethical reasoning of health car� 
professionals. If the rationale for .sm::h beh�vi9pf:i,�
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non-maleficence then one can argue that health care 
professionals responsible for the majority of patients 
with cancer are somewhat misguided and are practising 
unethically. Surely open and informed discussion with 
elderly patients would go some way to ensuring equity 
of treatment and address the misguided approach to 
treatment decision making which guides current 
practice. 
In many ways the power imbalance which exists in 
cancer care is perpetuated by nurses as they fail to act 
as advocates for patients in their care. From an ethical 
standpoint one can question whether nurses can in 
reality function as an advocate for individuals for 
whom they already hold preconceived ideas. Lookin­
land and Anson [26] clearly illustrated the existence of 
negative attitudes of qualified nurses towards elderly 
people highlighting nurses' strong feelings of discomfort 
and ill-ease in the presence of old people. Yet in failing 
to fully inform elderly patients of treatment options 
available to them nurses are failing in their duty to do 
no harm to individuals in their care. 
If nurses are really to act as advocates for elderly 
patients then they first have to have respect for older 
people. So it is concerning that negative attitudes to­
wards the elderly are not only evident in qualified 
nurses but also in young people generally [11,26]. In­
deed, one could suggest that it is one's experience as a 
member of society rather than as a professional that 
moulds one's beliefs about ageing and the elderly. 
Nevertheless, professional socialisation appears to neg­
atively influence attitudes further. These results give 
cause for concern when considered in relation to the 
expected rise in future need for geriatric care providers 
and also when considered from a socio-political con­
text, for these young people represent future voters who 
will establish policies that affect older people. The 
principle of 'respect for persons' is central to Kantian 
ethical theory. By this Kant claims that duty demands 
that persons be treated as ends in themselves and never 
merely as means to an end. As health professionals then 
we need to consider the respect we have for the individ­
ual patients in our care and question the motives for 
treatment employed for the elderly in contemporary 
cancer care. 
Traditionally the training of nurses and doctors con­
tains large elements of apprentice-like training and 
nurses are quickly socialised into a particular role 
which is subservient to doctors. If we consider Aristote­
Iian principles then we can see how such socialisation is 
detrimental to ethical patient care. In terms of becom­
ing morally good or virtuous, Aristotle stresses that it is 
by learning the habits of the virtuous that is important 
yet there is a general failure in nursing and medica! 
education to identify role models in clinical practice 
who are ethically competent [27]. An Aristotelian ap­
proach to health care ethics could help focus the mind 
of the nursing profession and the professions educators 
to the need to identify ethically sensitive role models so 
that desirable habits of practice are encouraged. In so 
doing we may begin to see a shift in attitudes which 
would positively impact patient care. 
7. Conclusion
Consideration of ethics in health care practice raises 
our awareness of some of the most fundamental ques­
tions surrounding human interaction. Knowledge of 
ethics would make us more aware of issues concerning 
the appropriate balance between respect for persons 
and individual autonomy and the beneficent paternal­
ism which is enshrined in not only health care provision 
but also mirrored in normal human existence with 
regard to the elderly. 
If we are to improve the care elderly people with 
cancer receive we must begin to explore some of our 
basic assumptions regarding the needs of this patient 
group. Ensuring that we provide an equitable service to 
older people with cancer is indeed an ethical challenge 
and the justice of providing optimal care to these 
patients should not be considered a dilemma. 
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THE MEANING OF EUTHANASIA 
AND PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE 
Lars Johan Materstvedt* 
University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Sweden 
lntroduction 
It is not uncommon that ethical debates over the controversial issue of help in dying are marked by peo­
ple talking at cross purposes as well as misunderstanding each other's statements. This, 1 think, is mainly 
due to unclearity at the conceptual level. In this abstract, 1 propose what I take to be precise, definite, clear 
and unambigious definitions (or interpretations) of the terms «euthanasia» and «physician-assisted suicide» 
- definitions it should be possible to agree upon by all or most people, regardless of their ethical stance on
the two practices.
Euthanasia 
The word "euthanasia" originates from the Greek eu; good, and thanatos; death. As has often been pointed 
out, literally speaking, euthanasia means a good or gentle death. From two Dutch national surveys carried 
out in the years 1990-91 (the Remmelink Report) and 1995, there is available a wealth of information about 
the Dutch euthanasia practice, data and findings that are unique in the world. It has been pointed out in the 
literature that, euthanasia in the strict - and in the Dutch context the only proper - sense refers 'to the 
situation in which a doctor kills a person who is suffering 'unbearably' and 'hopelessly' at the latter's explicit 
request (usually by administering a lethal injection). There can be no doubt that the intention of the doctor 
who performs euthanasia is to kili. This is also seen clearly in the use of medication, which most often 
involves an intravenous injection of a barbiturate to induce coma, followed by an injection of a neuromuscu­
lar relaxant to stop respiration. Thus the physician, in taking these steps, aims for a speedy death in the 
person having requested euthanasia. It should be underlined that the person's explicit request must be 
voluntary for the killing to count as an instance of euthanasia. One should add the standard Dutch substan­
tive requirement that the voluntary request be made repeatedly; no doctor may, it would seem, act upon just 
one request for euthanasia. 
Euthanasia - definition (interpretation) of 
• A doctor's intentionally killing a person who is suffering "unbearably" and "hopelessly" at the latter's
voluntary, explicit, and repeated request usually (but not exclusively) by administering intravenously
a lethal dose of (different) quick-acting drugs/medication.
Note that this definition does not entail that the person be terminally ill, nor that he or she has a somatic 
disorder. Hence it would cover cases of medicalized killing of both chronically and nonsomatic, mentally ill 
persons - cf. recent developments within medical and legal practice in the Netherlands. It also would cover 
a situation in which a doctor kills a person who is tired of living due to old age, physical detoriation, loneli­
ness and dependency. Such a person is not a patient in any traditional sense. 
Physician-assisted suicide 
The Dutch State Committee on Euthanasia of 1985 defined physician-assisted suicide as a doctor's «help­
ing someone to take his life after an explicit request.» With physician-assisted suicide, too, the request must 
be made repeatedly. The element of voluntariness should be underlined since a person might request such 
help under coercion or duress. It is required that the person voluntarily expresses his or her wish to die and 
• The Norwegian Cancer Society & Unit for Applied Clinical Research. Faculty of Medicine, NTNU, Norwegian University of
Science and Technology, Trondheim, Sweden,
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makes a (preferably but, in the Netherlands, not necessarily written) request for medication for the purpose 
of ending his or her life. Physician-assisted suicide thus involves a person's self-administration of deadly 
drugs that is supplied by a doctor. Most often the prescription is for a barbiturate that suppresses respiration 
when taken in large doses. 
Physician-assisted suicide - definition (interpretation) of 
• A doctor's intentionally helping/assisting/co-operating in the suicide of a person who is suffering
"unbearably" and "hopelessly" at the latter's voluntary, explicit, and repeated request for the doctor's
participation - usually (but not exclusively) by prescribing, preparing and giving a lethal dose of (differ­
ent) drugs/medication to the person for self-administration.
Like with the above definition of euthanasia, this definition (or interpretation) of physician-assisted sui­
cide does not preclude cases of nonterminal, nonsomatic or even existential suffering (cf. the famous Chabot 
case in the Netherlands). Also notice that the definition allows for the use of so-called "suicide machines" by 
which a person releases the deadly dose, which is then given intraveneosly in a mechanical way, thereby 
killing himself (dr Jack Kevorkian; dr Philip Nitschke). 
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Editorial 
End-of-life decisions 
Raanan Gillon lmperial Col!ege School oj lv[edicine, University oj London
Severa] pape�s 'in this is.sue of the !ourpal 2.nd an 
important, though to some· contruver-sml, se.t of 
guidelines from the British Medica! Associatiori 
(BMA)1warrant a return to the issue of withhold­
ing and withdrawing life-prolonging treatment -
including artificial nutnt1on and hydration 
(ANH) - in contexts where though they may pro­
Iong life they are judged incapable or highly 
unlikely to provide any health benefit to the 
patient concerned; or, in contexts where the 
patient has previously and competently refused 
such treatment. The Greek case described in this 
issue by Drs Garanis-Papadatos and Katsas tells 
of an 82-year-old woman in semi coma after a 
severe cerebrovascular accident (CVA) who in her 
first six weeks of hospitalisation repeatedly 
expressed her wish to die both by signs and a few 
uttered words, and by trying to remove the 
nasogastric feeding tube. 1 Her children, aware of 
her lifelong aversion to hospitals asked the doctor 
about the possibility of withdrawing treatment. He 
was totally opposed, but after the patient's further 
deterioration into complete and irreversible coma 
the physician agreed to withdraw artificial nutri­
tion while insisting on maintaining intravenous 
hydration. It was the most fundamental form of 
care and he as a doctor was obliged to provide it -
and his personal stant;e was supported by both 
medica! and religious tradition. The patient 
survived two more weeks and died from a further 
CVA. The authors tel1 us that this doctor's views 
accord with those of the majority of Greek 
doctors. They also add that were a Greek prisoner 
undertaking a hunger strike to refuse artificial 
nutrition and hydration the prisoner's refusal 
would be honoured. (In this context the paper by 
Dr Brockman about hunger strikes by prisoners 
provides fascinating insights. 2) 
Although they do not specifically address the 
issue of ANH Dr McHaffie and colleagues report 
on the considerable variation that exists across 
Europe in legislation and practice relating to 
withholding and withdrawal of life-prolonging 
treatment in the case of neonates who are either 
highly likely to die whatever treatmenr is given, or, 
(the source of more conrroversy) are likely to have 
severely impaired lives if they do survive. Among 
thei.r im�oc-tant if unsurprising findings is that 
whether or not li{a-prolonging tr�itment is to be 
continued, all the COI.Jntr-ies .studis:l a:gr�ed abou-1:, 
the importance of maimaining high-qualicy com­
passionate care for the patient.3 Well is ANH to 
preserve life as long as possible a caring and com­
passionate thing to provide, regardless of whether 
or not any bene:fit to the patient's health will 
result, regardless of the patienr's views or, where 
these are unclear, regardless of the views of those 
who know the patient well enough to be able to say 
what the patient is likely to have thought? The 
Greek doctor referred to by Drs Garanis­
Papadotos and Katsas clearly thought so in 
relation to artificial hydration, while somewhat 
inconsistently allQgwing withdrawal of artificial 
nutrition. 
The EMA guidelines, at one with UK law, are at 
pains to reject this point of view. Keeping 
someone alive by ANH is not "basic care" it is 
r11edical treatment for patients who one way or 
another are unable to swallow. Furthermore the 
primary goal of medicine is not to keep patients 
alive as long as possible but rather "to benefit the 
patient by restoring or maintaining the patient's 
health as far as possible, maximising benefit and 
minimising harm". Usually, but not always, 
prolonging a patient's life who would otherwise 
die is a benefit for that patient . But if treatment, 
including life-prolonging treatment (LPT), would 
fail, or ceases, "to give a net benefit to the patient 
( or if the patient has competently refused the 
treatment) that goal cannot be realised and the 
justification for providing the treatment is 
removed". � 
The EMA emphasises that such an approach 
has nothing to do with euthanasia in the sense of 
intentionally killing a oatient. Instead the inten­
tion of such withhL :i.g or withdrawing is to 
refrain from provid .• 5 treatment that is not 
benefiting the patient. In this the EMA explicitly 
accepts that foreseeing the almost inevitable death 
of the patient if LPT is withheld or withdrawn 
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does not entail intending that death. Instead it 
involve„ acceptance (by doctors, relatives and 
society more broadly) that we are all mortal and 
that in some fatal conditions no treatments -
including ANH - are of any benefit to the patient. 
And the BMA also emphasises this does not 
involve any judgments about the value of a 
patient's life - but does involve judgments about 
the value to a patient of a proposed or current 
treatment. 
Opponents argue that nutrition and hydration, 
no matter how they are supplied to a patient, are 
never medica! "treatments" - they are basic care 
and basic rights. The BMA, in line with UK law, 
rejects this clajm. Some forms of p:rcvidmg food 
an.d water to those who are for :.vu.c medica! rea­
son unable to swallow req'.:.:rc medica! techniques 
and skills for their implementation and/or provi­
sion and are properly classified as medica! 
treatment. \'X7hile the offering of food and water is 
basic care and should not be denied to those who 
can swallow food, for those who can't (or for 
whom normal feeding is unpleasant, for example 
because of choking) the issue should properly be: 
is the provision of ANH appropriate? And the 
answer should then properly turn on the question: 
will such ANH be beneficial to the patient's 
health? 
Recognising the emotive and for some conten­
tious nature of decisions to withhold - and 
particularly to withdraw - ANH, the BMA guide­
lines recommend additional precautions over and 
above those it recommends generally for decisions 
to withhold and withdraw LPT. These additional 
precautions include forma! clinical review by a 
senior clinician who has experience of the 
condition from which the patient is suffering and· 
who is not part of the treatment team; careful 
recording of the case, to be retained for further 
clinical review, and mechanisms for ensuring that 
ali cases where the patient's wishes were not 
known are locally reviewed to check that appropri­
ate procedures and guidelines have been followed. 
And for all cases of withholding or withdrawing 
LPT - whether or not ANH is involved - the BlvIA 
guidelines recommend careful assessment of each 
individual case to ascertain whether the treatment 
in question will benefit the patient. In such assess­
ment the patient's own views, preferably contem­
poraneous but when these are not available, previ­
ously established when competent, are preferable. 
When these are not available parents' views are 
especially relevant for children. For adults who 
have previously been competent to make their 
own decisions the role of family members and 
close friends is seen as providing evidence about 
what the patient is likely to have considered to be 
beneficial. For those who have never had capacity 
to make their own decisions "the primary factor 
will be the clinical benefits and burdens of the 
treatment" assessed as far as possible from the 
patient's point of view (as distinct from the prefer­
ences for themselves of the health care team or the 
family). "The views ·of those responsible for the 
continuing care of the patient, which would 
iµclude those close to the patient, should form an 
important part of that assessment". 
In assessing whether provision of a LPT would 
benefit a patient who is unable to advise the doc­
tors either directly or indirectly, various factors 
should be taken into account by the doctors who 
are ultimately responsible for making the decision. 
These include, so far as can be ascertained: the 
patient's own wishes and values; clinical judgment 
about the effectiveness of the proposed treatment; 
the likelihood of unmanageable pain or suffering; 
the leve! of awareness the pa tient has of his or her 
existence and surroundings as demonstrated for 
example by the ability somehow to interact with 
others, and the capacity for self-directed action or 
the ability to take control of any aspect of his or 
her life; the likelihood and extent of anticipated 
improvement in the patient's condition if LPT is 
provided; the degree of invasiveness of the LPT; 
the views of i:he parents if the patient is a child, 
afl.d the views of people close to the patient, espe­
cially close relatives, partners and carers, about 
what the patient would consider to be beneficial. 
The medica! actions described by Drs Garanis­
Papadatos and Katsas would surely be inconsist­
ent with the BMA guidelines. It is diffi.cult for this 
writer to understand how they could benefit or 
"care for" or be in the interests of the patient. 
Should the tirne come for European guidelines, 
which approach should be recommended? Debate 
is invited. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
There is nothing more important in life than being born and dying. At birth we know nothing about the
world around us, while at the moment of death we start to know the unknown. To help patients at this 
ultimate phase of life, it is imperative that all health care doctors will "accompany" the dying not only with 
clinical care, but also with solidarity and compassion. 
Cecily Saunders, foundress of the Hospice in England, says to the dying: "We care deeply for you, be­
cause you are very dear till the last moment of your life. We will do everything possible not only to help you 
to die, but to live your life to the full till the very end. 
The sisters of the late Mother Theresa of Calcutta in her "Horne for the Dying" (formerly a hindu temple), 
receive daily the "Dying" from the streets and the slums. Mother Theresa used to say: "They have lived like 
animals, now they can die like angels". 
2. Today in ltaly, France and Spain about 75 to 80 percent die in hospitals. Very sadly many die alone and
at times are buried alone. 
3. In a study (Miles & Gomez 1999) in the Unites States 85 percent of deaths occur in health care
institutions (hospitals, nursing homes, etc.) and about 70 percent involve electivity withholding some form 
. . . 
. 
of life-sustammg treatment. 
A study in the Journal of American Medical Association ( 1990) claims that: 
- 85-90 percent of critical care professions state they are withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining
treatments from patients "who are deemed to have irreversible disease and are terminally ill". 
- it is estimated that 1.3 million American deaths a year follow decisions to withhold life support.
AII this is a very important stage of "bedside ethics", which calls for the accompanying of the dying with 
compassion. This is also part of the "humanization" of health care in hospitals. The aim of this presentation 
is not the discussion of euthanasia, but of the human caring of the sick facing death. 
4. The position in the U.S. as presented by Margaret P. Battin (Health Care Ethics 1994):
"In the United States, we have come to recognise that the maximal extension of life-prolonging treatment 
in these late-life degenerative conditions is often inappropriate. Although we could keep the machines and 
tu bes - the respirators, intravenous lines, feeding tu bes - hooked up for extended periods, we recognise that 
this is in humane, pointless, and financially impossible. lnstead, as a society we have developed a number of 
mechanisms for dealing with these hopeless situations, all of which involve withholding or withdrawing 
various forms of treatment. 
• Ethics Consultant and Responsible for Public Relations at the 'lstituto Scientifico Universitario Ospedale San Raffaele,
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Some mechanisms tor withholding or withdrawing treatments are exercised by the patient who is con­
fronted by such a situation or who anticipates it: these include refusal of treatment, the patient-executed 
DNR order, the living will, and the durable power of attorney. Others are about a patient who is no longer 
competent or never was competent. "Withholding and withdrawing treatment is the way we in the USA go 
about dealing with dying, and indeed "allowing to die" is the only legally protected alternative to maximal 
treatment recognised in the United States. We do not legally perm it ourselves to actively cause death". 
- "In our days the doctors affirm nearly as a sacred duty to remain passive near the bedside of the patient,
once there is no more hope but, in my opinion, if they do not want to fall short in their professional obliga­
tion, as also their sense of humanity, they should not only know the techniques, but also provide a service to 
render more easy and light the suffering of pain and of all who are dying". 
5. The situation today differs from country to country in Europe. In the Netherlands "voluntary active
euthanasia" is also an available response to end-of-life situations. Although active euthanasia remains pro­
hibited by statutory law, it is protected by a series of lower and supreme court decisions and is widely 
regarded as legal, or more precisely judged (legally "tolerated") as sick. This law is under heavy criticism. 
6. Another different situation exists in Germany (where the painful memories of Nazism is stili alive},
there is a vigorous opposition to the notion of active euthanasia. Euthanasia is viewed as always wrong and 
the Germans view the Dutch as stepping out on a dangerously slippery slope" (Battin). 
However, it is an artefact of German law that, whereas killing on request (including voluntary euthanasia) 
is prohibited, assisting "suicide" is not a violation of the law, provided the person is capable of exercising 
control over his/her actions, and also acting out of freely responsible choice. 
In France there has been a very controversial debate in Parliament to legalise "death with dignity". 
7. This is a brief overview of a rapidly changing transformation on dying and death, which will call tor
deeper empathy and compassion in our "bedside ethics". 
However, 1 can summarise our reflection by focusing on the three different historical positions, which 
interact between them. Ali three need clarification to reach some kind of ethical position: 
a) Francis Bacon (Advancement of Learning, published 1605) first developed his philosophical-medical
perspective. Bacon proposes the "good death" or "the external euthanasia" in the chapter dealing with the 
body. 
b) He underlines the deity of the doctor td':
- alleviate pain, anguish and suffering of the patient, when it is impossible to restore him to health. In this
case the doctor may only offer him a more serene and easy death.
"The way F.Bacon dealt with the problem is different from how it is presented today, as being pro-eutha­
nasia" (Manuel Cuyas S.J., Euthanasia, Piemme, 1989). 
Bacon's approach is best described in his own words:" Ma ai nostri giorni i medici ritengono quasi come 
un dovere sacro il rimanere inattivi di fronte al malato, una volta che questo sia stato dichiarato senza speranza; 
ma, a mio parere, se non vogliono mancar-e al loro obbligo professionale oltre che ad un senso d'umanitf, 
non salo dovrebbero conoscere le tecniche, ma anche prestare il proprio servizio per rendere piu leggere e 
facili da sopportare le pene e le sofferenze di coloro che spirano". 
Cuyas affirms "the dominating idea is the will to serve the person of the sick till death ... This is a positive 
conception of euthanasia, fully in agreement with the fundamentals of an individualistic and social ethics" 
(Cuyas p.101 ). 
c) The often common abuses of "futile treatmenf' (prolonging lite) has created a reaction of defence by
pressure groups and active associations pro-euthanasia, who demand legislation in favour of a free choice 
of when and how to die. This is considered a right of the individual, which surpasses the doctor's decision. 
This runs against the imperative ethical foundation which obliges doctors to provide every possible care. 
d) The politics of convenience is also now developing, based on "cost and benefif' and the supreme value
of not going against the sentiments of the citizens, who implore another person to end their suffering and 
life. It is ethics based on feelings and pity, the person who helps the patient to die should not be legally guilty 
of homicide or cooperation towards suicide. 
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Cuyas affirms "It is impossible to consider a decriminalised euthanasia, as it is impossible to extend it to 
cases which the minimum moral norms demand a condemnation to protect the rights of innocent life" {p. 
102). 
It appears on the level of personal rights that there is no substantial difference between: 
• being able for pity's sake to end the life of a terminally ill patient;
• and the inclusion of a yet more painful and sad case of a non-terminally ill patient in similar situations.
8. 1 think here it is worth remembering some of the ethical princi ples which are embraced in a personalistic
ethics: 
a) The right for freedom of conscience (art. 18 Declaration of Human Rights):
"AII people should be immune from cohesion ... this in religious matters none should be forced to act 
against conscience or hindered .... to act in conformity with his conscience privately or publicly" (Vatican 
Council Two). 
b) The right to know the truth, regarding all matters which concern a person and the rights to have infor­
mation about his/her condition. This is a right founded on the dignity of the human person, as a responsible 
"partner" in the doctor-patient relationship. 
c) The right of consent to decide personally on any treatment or research to which the person is submit­
ted. The patient is the chief actor in his health care, a right acknowledges by various codes and laws. 
d) The right for dialogue between the patient and doctor. This should also include a dialogue into the
family and ali those close to the patient, and likewise with the proper environment and community. 
9. The guidelines in the accompaniment of patients should aim at giving "the very best" (Don Verze) of all
health workers to the patient. This includes these norms: 
a) "Quando non c'č piu nulla da fare, c'č malto da fare" {Lega ltaliana contro i Tumori) "When there is
nothing to do be done, there is a lot to do". AII forms of palliative cares in a very honest way should be 
considered to alleviate suffering of 1000 patients in a Milan hospital none requested to end their life 
sustainment. 
b) To be close to the patient in ali the phases of his illness, those which Kubler-Ross describes as the
phases of shock, refusal, anger, depression, compromise, acceptance and hope. The patient need support 
through empathy, listening, communication (verbal and non-verbal), presence of family, psychological help 
1b 
Very often the patient, even if he/she does not affirm so, knows he has come to the end and even arrives 
through intuition of knowing when. 
c) Believers, whether Christian and non-christian, desire also spi ritual accompaniment. Dying, according
to ali anthropologists, in all cultures means giving a spi ritual value and a social value to life. Even those who 
do not believe in my experience desire some kind of spi ritual (not religious) comfort. 
d) A person has the right to die with his family around and in privacy (e.g. in a private room).
e) The family needs also counselling, comfort and help to cope with courage when their beloved one
passes away. The will of the dead need to be fully respected with regard to donation of organs, burial, etc. 
10. As an "icon" of this reflection I wish to read to you an extract of the book by Rosemary and Victor
Zorza (Un Modo per Morire, Ed. Paoline), which they wrote about the death in a hospice of their 25 year old 
daughter Jane. 
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Operational definitions: 
Advance Care Planning 
Since clinicians must frequently make difficult decisions about life sustaining or death delaying treat­
ments for patients about whom they know very little, advance care planning can protect patient choice even 
after the patient has lost decision making capacity. Central to this process is the clarification of values and 
the statement of general goals of care as well as specific treatment preferences that are the substance of 
advance care planning. 
Advance Directive 
More specific than advance care planning, advance directives are written or oral statements that de­
scribe patient preferences for care when patients cannot decide for themselves. An advance directive may 
include specific treatment preferences, a statement of general values, and or a designation of surrogate 
decision-makers. 
Decision-Making Capacity (DMC) 
Patients are generally believed to have DMC until proven otherwise. DMC includes the ability to under­
stand the nature of the proposed test or treatment, the accompanying risks and benefits, the probabilities 
for a given outcome, and lastly, the ability to communicate a preference. DMC is determined more on a 
sliding scale and not an al or none phenomen�n; patients with dementia or mental illness may stili retain 
DMC. 
Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care 
A legal means of documenting a surrogate. decision-maker in the event of lost DMC. 
Living Will 
A living will is a document that specifies treatment preferences to be activated when a patient loses 
DMC. Typically, living wills apply only specific scenarios, such as terminal illness or a persistent vegetative 
state. 
Surrogate 
A person designated to make decisions on the patient' s behalf when DMC is lost. So meti me s this person 
is appointed by the court. When chosen by the patient, he or she may be referred to as the health care proxy 
or the attorney in fact for health care. The surrogate's task is to render decisions based on the previously 
expressed wishes of the incapacitated patient whom he/she represents. This process of proxy decision­
making is termed substituted judgment. 
• Emergency Medicine Association of Pittsburgh, 13, Pride St., Pittsburgh, PA 15219, U.S.A. 
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(Perceived) Best lnterest Standard 
When there are no �dvance directives and no previously expressed patient preferences that can be re­
called by others, surrogates and health care providers decide together what they believe to be in the pa­
tient's best interest. Typically, this is not applied by physicians alone and if needed, a court-appointed guard­
ian is utilized to protect patient interests from unbridled professional autonomy. 
Advance Directives 
Background 
Historically, clinicians faced with treatment decisions tor incompetent patients made the decisions them­
selves or consulted with family members who did their best to make what they believed to l:ie the optimal 
decision. In an era of icon toppling and rampant distrust, this benign paternalism has given way to a new 
breed of doctor called a "provider" and a new breed of patient called a "consumer." Technology also has 
now been able to reverse and prolong chronic illnesses and the introduction of new and improved life­
sustaining therapies has resulted in fates worse than death (as the Bouvia, Quinlan, & Cruzan cases argue). 
Legal Cases 
To establish whether competent patients could refuse application of life-sustaining therapies: 
1 ). William Bartling, 70 years old with COPD and lung cancer; he developed a pneumothorax after a lung 
biopsy and became ventilator dependent. After two months he requested to be withdrawn from the ventila­
tor but his doctors refused. In 1994, the Calitornia court ruled that "if the right of the patient to self determi­
nation as to his own medica! treatment is to have any meaning at all, it must be paramount to the interests of 
the patient's hospital and doctors." 
2). Elizabeth Bouvia, 26 year old with severe cerebral palsy asked tor her tube feedings to be discontin­
ued and that she be provided with pain and symptom relief while she starved to death. On appeal, the court 
stated, "We find nothing in the law to suggest that the right to refuse medica! treatment may be exercised 
only if the patient's motives meet someone else's approval." Thus, idiosyncratic reasons tor a decision must 
be respected if the patient possesses DMC. 
The overwhelming majority (from 66-93 %) of Americans would like to discuss advance care planning 
with clinicians, but only 6-33% have actually done so. Other studies reveal that even when present on the 
medical record, advance directive torms are often unnoticed or ignored. 
Ethical Principles 
Respect tor patient autonomy and nonmalefic1mce are the substrate of good ethical advance care plan­
ning. Respect tor autonomy is manifest in advance directives since they empower patients to determine 
what is to happen to their body after they lose DMC. 
Making It Happen 
1. lntroduce the topic
2. lntormation exchange/ intelligible comn:iunication
3. Listen tor preferences
4. Proxies
5. Documentation
6. Provide Feedback, elicit questions, and recheck understanding/preferences over tirne
Resources tor Advance Care Planning 
Choice in Dying: http://www.choices.org 
American Association of Retired Persons: http://www.aarp.org 
Patient Decision Support: www.patientdecsions.com 
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EMERGENCY DETERMINATION 
Of DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY (DMC): 
BALANCING AUTONOMY AND BENEFICENCE 
IN THE EMERGENCY DEPARTMENT 
Gregory L. Larkin* 
Emergency Medicine Association of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, U.S.A. 
For the SAEM Ethics Committee 
In most clinical situations, emergency physicians {EPs) have little difficulty determining a patient's im­
plicit ability or competency to participate in the emergency medica! (EM) decision making process. Some­
times. however, the boundaries between competence and impairment are blurred, depending more per­
haps on toxicokinetics and less on 1.0. or baseline cognitive function. The assessment of medical decision­
making capacity {DMC) is an important and basic skill in the clinical EM armamentarium since it both in­
forms our diagnoses and is informed by our diagnoses. Thus, there is a bi-directional utility to mastering this 
clinically useful concept. 
Definition of DMC 
The multifaceted construct of DMC ultimately refers to a patient's ability to make an authentic choice. 
Genuine DMC reflects cognitive and affective functions. which are clinically manifest in intellect memory, 
judgment insight, language, attention, emotion, calculation, and expressive and receptive communication 
skills. DMC includes the ability to: 
1. Receive information
2. Process and understand informati(jn
3. Deliberate
4. Make and articulate choices
Unlike the more static entity of legal competency, capacity varies, as a function of host and environmen­
tal factors over tirne. Thus, DMC is a dynamic, task-specific, and changing talent in practice it may be 
assessed on a nondichotomous spectrum of capacity, pertaining to the particular healthcare decisions at 
hand. Often. impairment is situational; the same patient may be competent for one decision and not an­
other, depending on the gravity and consequences of the decision and the potential for harm. In emergency 
situations, physicians must promptly assess whether a patient is capable of making an often-complex deci­
sion. The objective of this document is to describe standards for the rapid determination of DMC in the ED 
setting without compromising either patient autonomy or safety. 
Bioethical Precepts of DMC 
Honouring DMC in Emergency Medicine has important ethical and moral significance. The Code of 
Ethics of the American College of Emergency Physicians states that "patients with decision-making capac-
* Emergency Medicine Association of Pittsburgh, 13. Pride St., Pittsburgh, PA 15219. U.S.A.
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ity must give their voluntary consent to treatment ... Emergency physicians should be able to determine 
whether a patient has decision-making capacity and who can act as a decision maker if the patient is unable 
to do so." The SAEM Code of Conduct also underscores a promise of "Respect, securing the safety, privacy, 
and personal welfare of patients, and offering informed choice whenever possible." 
Attention to bioethical principles can greatly inform a clinician's determination of optimal choice. Com­
panion issues of informed choice and presumed DMC are both supported under the ethical principle of 
respect for patient autonomy. The principle of respect for autonomy is manifest in the doctrine of informed 
consent. Under the doctrine of informed consent, patients with adequate DMC are allowed to make autono­
mous choices abut their own health and healthcare. We must avert the twin harms of presuming intact or 
impaired DMC when they are not in fact present. 
Respect for autonomy is not the only ordering principle, however, and to it clinicians must carefully add a 
blend of beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. Justice would have us respect the impact of a patient's 
decisions on identifiable others, and recognize that individuals have rights, to the extent that they do not 
materially harm others. The principle of beneficence dictates that the patient's welfare must be promoted 
while the principle of nonmaleficence exhorts us to avoid harm. These principles need not be seen as 
mutually exclusive. lndeed, it is optimal to both respect choice and protect from harmful choice, but some­
times this is not possible. When dealing with the mentally ill, for example, we may feel caught between the 
Scylla of abrogation of civil liberty and the Charybdis of allowing marginally competent patients to make 
potentially dangerous or unsafe choices. It is in these difficult situations that every effort should be made to 
carefully assess the DMC of the patient, much as one would do a neurological exam on any patient with an 
altered mental status. To assess DMC clinicians must be astute, using exemplary diagnostic, treatment, and 
communication skill to bridge the gaps in cognitive understanding whenever possible. 
DMC Determination 
Although a thorough discussion of ali medica! decisions in the ED is impossible, patients participate 
more fully in the therapeutic ED encounter and in the decisions that affect their health when they possess 
an adequate leve! of DMC. In most clinical scenarios, DMC is easily and implicitly ascertained. In others, the 
EP may utilize a more standardized approach to DMC determination, particularly when the decisions involve 
potentially grave or serious consequences. We suggest the use of the following steps: 
"8 Steps to Determine "D-E-C-I-S-I-0-N" Making Capacity" 
• Determine need to establish DMC.
• Ensure expressions of choice are possible.
• Correct reversible environmental, metabolic, mental & physical challenges to DMC.
• lnvestigate affect and cognition using standardized tests.
Affect: "Are you depressed or anxious?" Memory: 5 minute recall of 3 words Language: 
Receptive: "Cover your right eye with your right hand." 
Expressive: "Name ali the animals you can think of in one minute." 
4'1; .
Visuospatial: "Draw the face of the clock when it is 1 :30." 
Judgment: "What would you do if you found a stamped envelope on the ground?" 
Understanding: "What does it mean that ''A stitch in tirne saves nine.'?" 
Attention: "Speli your name backwards." 
Calculation: "Count down from 100 by seven; what is 100 minus 7?" 
• Survey patient goals and values using open-ended questions about the choices, alternatives, and con­
sequences at hand.
• lntegrate the information gathered and analyse the "DREAM" to determine DMC.
• Openly share the results with the patient and their health care advocates, if present.
• Note legibly the DMC determination on the ED chart.
Patients with lmpaired DMC: The "DREAM" Acronym 
Authorities variously characterize dream as "an illusory mental image." Moreover, the dreamer is defined 
by the Oxford English Dictionary as "A habitually impractical person." Similarly, a dream world is defined as 
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"the world of imagination or iliusion, rather than of objective reality." Those lacking DMC may be thought to 
be living in such a dream world in which illusion eclipses the reality of the immediate clinical situation. 
Those asleep or occupying a dream-like state with respect to present clinical decisions are unlikely to be 
decisionally competent. The foliowing mnemonic, "DREAM" may aid in assessing whether the patient's 
ability to exercise authentic choice is in fact, diminished. lf one or more of the fallowing five elements is 
present, then DMC may safely be said to be impaired at some leve!. This does not necessarily imply that the 
patient lacks competence far ali decisions, however, such patient's must be protected from making choices 
that would reasonably appear to be at odds with their deeply held values and goals. Thus, DMC is fore­
stalied by the fallowing conditions: 
• Decisions - that are Durable & Data-Driven cannot be made during ED visit.
• Reasoning - rational or otherwise is absent.
• Expressions - of choice are unrealisable far whatever reason.
ž • Alternatives - and their fareseeable consequences (including the consequences of no treatment)
cannot be appreciated. 
• Madness, Misunderstanding, Mental imbecility, Metabolic derangements, and other obstacles render
Meaningful Manipulation of infarmation impossible.
Threats and Barriers to DMC 
Numerous clinical settings provide challenges in the determination of DMC. Although an in-depth review 
of causes of altered mental status is beyond the scope of this document, some examples of challenging 
clinical settings may include minors, elderly patients, intoxicated patients, psychiatric patients, patients in 
extremis, patients of other cultures or languages, patients with physical communication impairments, se­
vere pain, organic disease states, research subjects, and numerous other clinical settings. Even in such 
circumstances, where some impairment of DMC may be suspected, a sliding scale approach should be 
used, remembering that most barriers are relative, rather than absolute. EPs must be aware of potential 
barriers to DMC, but must make an individual assessment of DMC relevant to the specific clinical setting 
and decision at hand. Even individuals who have some impairment of DMC may demonstrate adequate 
understanding of the decision at hand, and its ramifications, to make an appropriate informed choice. 
When DMC is lmpaired 
Although adults are generally presumed to be competent to make decisions, sometimes they are unable 
or unwilling to make certain medica! decisions in the ED. lf DMC is reversibly compromised, then ali efforts 
to restore DMC should take place before ultimate DMC is established. Once treatable conditions such as 
hypoxia, dehydration, hypoglycaemia, fear, or opiate intoxication are corrected, DMC may need to be reas­
sessed. lf DMC cannot restored in a timely manner, other attempts should be make to identify and protect 
the patient's perceived best interests. This may include consulting family, surrogates, advance directives, 
the courts, or another clinician expert, to assist in the determination of the most appropriate actions. Clini­
cian bias must give way to the primacy of r;i,atient' dignity and patient-centred values. Honouring these 
suggests that once the course that optimises patient safety and interests is identified, it should be initiated, 
despite possible objections from either the decisionally impaired patient or noncustodial others. However, 
even when clinicians must act in loco parentfs, th_ey should strive to share decision-making power by involv­
ing the patients and their representatives as much as possible. 
Conclusions 
While the stepwise approach may prave a helpful adjunct to the determination of DMC, it is not a substi­
tute far sound clinical judgment. When DMC determination is challenging, or the ramifications of a deci­
sion serious, the assistance of a third party (such as a surrogate, a consultant, another clinician, etc.) may be 
valuable in discerning the most appropriate action. 
In addition to the obvious clinical utility of DMC assessment, the steps taken in the very establishment of 
DMC provide an excellent opportunity to promote communication, dialogue, and interaction, which may 
nurture the physician-patient relationship. While DMC is conditional, the compassion and respect we have 
far our patients must be unconditional. Even those lacking a coherent rationale far their words and actions 
deserve to have their dignity protected, and to be granted a fair chance to share in the therapeutic decision 
making process. 
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Appendix 
Evolution Of The Concept Of Patient Autonomy 
By Gregory Luke Larkin, MD MSPH FACEP 
Autonomy = auto (self) + nomos (goveming) - persons should be able to make decisions based on their 
own beliefs, values, and prejudices. 
Synonyms: Self-determination - to consent to or refuse any form of medica! treatment.Respect for Au­
tonomy: a core tenet of Westem medica! ethics and one of the four princip les (Beauchamp).Belmont Re­
port: respect for persons; caveat: not all are capable of self-determination Modem notion in medica! ethics 
although concept is in Kant 
Contrasts with the old patemalism; i.e. "doc�r knows best'' 
Unknown in Ancient Codes of Ethics and thru Percival vs. other Principles, which have been around for 
millennia.E.g. Non-maleficence: primum non nocere (first, no harm) (Hippocrates in Epidemics)Beneficence: 
to do good (Hippocratic Oath, Pythagoreans)Justice:faimess (Plato's Republic)Ancient Codes were largely 
more etiquette than moral principles. 
Modem Codes: Gregory, Hume, Percival, in England; Rush, Hayes, Davis in US.Respect for Autonomy 
evolved outside of medicine (Kant, Mili, Emerson, Cordoza)Kant: see persons as ends in themselves, "never 
as a means only." 
Mili: On Liberty 
Emerson: rugged individualism 
Legal derivation of respect for autonomy came from the right of privacy under which adults of sound mind 
are considered to be in control of their own bodies, and by extension, their own fate. 
E.g. Schloendorff vs. Society of New York Hospital ( 1914), Judge Cordoza famously stated, "Every human
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body." 
E.g. Griswold vs. Connecticut 381 US 479, 1965. Right of privacy to use contraceptive devices.Modem
Westem Medica! Ethics in the 20th Century 
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Growing need for a new ethic 
WWII: Nazi Doctors-Nuremberg-hypothermia, etc. 
Tuskegee Syphilis Experiments 1932-1972 (28 died by 1969) 
Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital Studies (Sloan-Kettering)-cancer cells; 1963Willowbrook State School for 
retarded children with hepatitis 1965-71 Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense 
1947 -1974 ;Ur/Pt 
New Technology e.g. dialysis rationing by "God Committee" in Seattle 1962 
Bioethics Timeline 
parallels explosion in biotechnology & reaction to rampant distrust1954:Morals and Medicine by Joseph 
Fletcher 
Patient rights to use contraception, artificial insemination, eu�1anasia, and to have full disclosure of ali 
information and options to patients 
1964:World Medica! Association Declaration of Helsinki Research consent1966:Beecher HK. Ethics and 
Clinical Research, NEJM 274; 
1354-60 .Unethical studies. 
1969:Founding of the Hastings Center in by Willard Gaylin & Dan Callahan 1970 :The Patient as Person by 
Paul Ramsey 
1971 :Founding of the Kennedy I nstitute of Ethics, Georgetown Univ., Wash. DC; 
1976: Karen Ann Quinlan, not an auto accident 
1978-83:Presidents US Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and 
Behavioral Research 1978: Encyclopedia of Bioethics; 
1979:Principles of Biomedical Ethics; Beauchamp and Childress; Belmont Report, 1979-published in re­
sponse to Beechers work by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Research Sub­
jects; called for ethical guidelines for research and the establishment of lnstitutional review Boards to 
evaluate al I research in institutions that receive federal funding to guarantee protecttan of research 
subjects.1982: Baby Doe, Down's s>,rndrome case with esophageal atresia parents refused sur­
gery1983: Presidents Commission_calls for the establishment of hospital ethics committees to "pro­
mote effective decision making" for mentally incompetent patients and handicapped newborns.1984: 
Baby Doe Regs, 1984 . C Everett Koop, MD & DHHS 
1986:US Supreme Court overturns the DHHS "Baby Doe regs"; 
1988:Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals requires forma! DNR policies; 1990: Cruzan vs. Directot, 
Missouri Dept of Health, US Supreme Court. Persons have a constitutionally protected liberty to refuse 
unwanted medica! treatment including "lifesaving nutrition and hydration. " But it is up to the 
states.1990: Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA); solicit, inform and advance directives 1991: Helga 
Wanglie. Husband found to be right surrogate; no futility1991: Final Exit: The Practicalities of Self­
Deliverance and Assisted Suicide for the Dying. Hemlock Society's Derek Humphreys 1993: Baby KI: 
anencephalic futility case 1994: Measure 16 passes in Oregon permitting PAS 
1995: Gilgunn v Massachusetts General Hospital; futility and DNR placed in spite of daughter's wishes. 
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DETABOOING OF DEATH- AN ESSENTIAL CONDITION 
FOR A BETTER QUAUTY OF UFE OF THE DYING 
Metka Klevišar* 
Ljubljana, Slovenia 
Every person should have the right to decide where, how and with whom he would like to die. This is also 
comprised in the document on the rights of the dying passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
in 1975. Human rights in the period of dying are often grossly violated because ali too frequently others, the 
patienfs relations or his doctor, decide on where the patient will spend the last period of his life. The pa­
tienfs relations act in this way since they wish to do for him everything feasible, especially to prolong his life 
as much as possible. They are supported in these efforts by the doctor, who does not want to run the ris k of 
being accused by the relations that the patienfs death was his fault; besides, he may himself find it difficult 
to accept the fact that patients also die. Only too rarely anybody listens to the dying person and hears his 
wishes and does everything so that he might spend the last period of his life as he wants to, possibly quite 
differently from what the ideas of his environment are. 
The doctor's personal attitude to life, illness, handicap, old age and death is often of decisive importance. 
This personal attitude of his may also affect his professional decisions concerning diagnostic methods and 
therapy. When a doctor who is terrified of death and considers it just a failure is confronted with a patient 
who has already been taking leave of life for quite some tirne, he will continue working on him and ordering 
examinations and therapies that might not be of any use or even unnecessarily put a strain on the patient. 
On the other hand, a doctor accepting death as a natura! event will respect the life that is running out and 
will treat the patient only to make his life easier and to improve the quality thereof and at the same tirne he 
will also be able to reassure the patienfs relations. For behaving in such a manner the doctor needs a good 
professional knowledge on the subject, but also a great deal of human maturity and courage to accept 
responsibility. 
lf we want to improve the quality of life up to the last moment thereof, much work for the detabooing of 
death in ali strata of the population has to be done. Even the most modem medicine will not bring the 
desired results if we do not accept life as a whole, death included. 
Slovenian Hospice Association is a part of the internatio11al Hospice programme, which can be summed 
up as an integral care of a dying patient and his family. The Association places special emphasis on the 
following activities: caring dying patients and' their relations, the latter also after death in the period of 
grieving, detabooing death in ali strata of the population, endeavouring to create more favourable condi­
tions for the dying in medica! institutions (hospitals and nursing homes}, and assisting medica! staff. Every 
year the Association organizes numerous lectures, workshops, seminars and other events at ali levels: for 
medica! staff, for teachers in schools and nursery schools, for students, in parishes etc. In the last academic 
year we have also been present at the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Ljubljana with seminars at the 
department of family medicine and in the Medica! Students' Club with monthly discussions of topical is­
sues. We also appear in mass media and publish pertinent literature. 
• Neubergerjeva 4, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
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SICKNESS AND TIME IN A SEPIK COMMUNITY 
Borut Telban* 
Scientific Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Ljubljana, Slovenia 
ABSTRACT 
In this short article about the association between tirne, health and sickness in Ambonwari village, 
East Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea I examine people's practices and introduce their own con­
cepts as they are axpressed and thought about in their own Karawari vernacular. 1 argue that it is the 
relationship between kav (habit, manner, way of doing things) and wambung ('insideness', under­
standing) - both being extended to the past and the future, both involving many individual and collec­
tive dimensions - which with its processual multidimensional nature - every process includes tempo, 
rythm, temporal strategies, etc. - produces multidimensional tirne as it produces itself. The relation­
ship between "way of doing things" and "understanding" is the most important for Ambonwari 
conceptualization of their life-world, including health and sickness. 
In one of his most influential books a social phenomenologist Alfred Schutz wrote that "the problem of 
meaning is a tirne problem - not a problem of physical tirne, which is divisible and measurable, but a 
problem of historical tirne" ( 1972: 12; italics in original). Filled with physical events and having the nature of 
"interna! tirne consciousness" (Husserl 1964), historical,time is always related to one's own life. "It is within 
this duration that the meaning of a person's experience is constituted for him as he lives through the expe­
rience" (Schutz ibid.). 
In this short article about the relationship between tirne, health and sickness in Ambonwari village, East 
Sepik Province, Papua New Guinea, 1 would like to present my views as clearly as possible. First of ali 1 
would like to introduce people's own concepts as they are expressed and thought about in their own, Karawari 
vernacular. This concepts are not simply inherited but are continually reconstructed and comprehended 
anew. Once this is understood, Ambonwari conceptualization of life can be depicted and confirmed through 
the careful observation of their pr'actices. Only then I will be able to outline what do I mean by temporality, 
by sickness and by the relationship between health, sickness and tirne. 
Ambonwari village has just over 400 inhabitants. It is probably the largest of eight main villages in which 
about 2000 people speak Karawari. This language is a member of the Lower Sepik Family, belonging to the 
larger group of Papuan languages (Foley 1986; Telban n.d.). There are 12 totemic clans and 35 patrilineages, 
including six with no present members. Residence is patri-virilocal. lntroduced respiratory diseases - tuber­
culosis, pneumonia, influenza - along with malaria, take a heavy tool of Ambonwari people. Though there is 
an Aid Post in the village and though people visit hospitals in Angoram and Wewak when necessary, the 
practices of the two village healers reflect people's understanding of their world - that is their cosmology -
and their well-being. 
Many societies, including Ambonwari, do not even have a term which can adequately translate the Eng­
lish term "tirne" with its multiple and often measurement-oriented meanings. 1 have shown elsewhere (Telban 
1998) that their "tirne" is not an abstract idea but an integral part of their life: the ways activities are per­
formed, the manner in which people behave, the ways the village functions, as well as most significant 
rituals, are ali subsumed under the term kav which refers to "embodied" processes, both collective and 
individual, both past (kupambin kav, "the way of the ancestors/elders") and present (imnggan kav, "the way 
of the village"). The past as represented in kav is not just automatically reproduced, but requires an active 
• Scientific Research Centre of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Gosposka 13, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia
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process which is reflected upon and guided by people's understanding, i.e. wambung (lit. "insideness"; see 
Telban 1993, 1998). As a verb kay captures severa! meanings: to be, to exist, to remain, to stay. As a noun 
it is used for being, habit, way, manner, as weli as ritual, custom and law. As Ambonwari do not have a term 
for an abstract concept of "body", kay is not necessarily embodied in material flesh, in the case of spirits, for 
example (see Telban 1998a). 
In this paper about the temporality of sickness I would like to show that it is the relationship between kay 
(seen as habit, manner, way of doing things) and wambung (understanding, "insideness") which is the most 
important for Ambonwari conceptualization of health and sickness and which with its processual nature 
produces tirne as it produce itself. One could say that both health and sickness are intrinsically defined by 
their tempo (cf. Bourdieu 1977:8). 
The main sign that someone is sick is that her or his kay is not as it should be, as it is habitually expected. 
A person's breathing is different from usual, their skin is hot or cold, she or he sleeps more, or does not 
perform their usual activities. People say that a person is "with sickness" (min mari ngandikin), that is, she or 
he "has sickness" (in Karawari language - just like in many other languages - there is no verb "to have"). 
Sickness "has taken hold of a person" (min mariyan sarinyan). By holding and "using" a person, the sickness 
and person become one; they share the same body/being. To get better a person has to remove (cut off) 
"sickness" as a part of the body/being. Only in this way will she or he rehabilitate their previous kay (way of 
life). But to cut off the sickness one cannot just take medicines (if tablets, pills and so on work people say 
that they were not really sick) but has to look at one's past and address those issues which caused the 
sickness. People say that those healing practices which are part of medica! treatment in Hospitals and 
Health Centres are powerful. But they cannot help Ambonwari people when they are seriously sick, that is 
when they have so-called "custom sickness", because medica! doctors do not share and do not address the 
Ambonwari life-world of the living and spirits. Only by restoring the causes (wrongdoings; and here a pa­
tient's and his relatives' understanding comes into the play) the kayof a sick person wili return to normal and 
the sickness wili be cured. 
In healing ceremonies, the specialist tries to find the cause and remove the objects which are the em­
bodiment of sickness. A healer tries to restore the kay to its previous condition. As kay of an individual 
incorporates different coliective kay the sickness also becomes a collective issue (of household or lineage, 
for example), incorporates past and present relationships (ongoing, those who are producers and are pro­
duced by tirne), including with their own familiar spi,�its. What is apparent from the practices of the healers 
is that they are able to perform an intermediate role, creating a temporary link between people and spirits. 
To become a healer one has to come in contact not only with spirits of the dead, but also with bush spirits, 
in particular those of the patient's own elan and land. The spirits supervise the healers' practices and guide 
them on their healing paths. 1 asked one of the healers, Tobias, how he could hear the voice of the spi rit. He 
answered: "Just in the same way as you are talking to me now and I can hear you. The s pirit talks into my ear 
and I hear him." Still curious, 1 asked him whether in fact the voice simply occurs in his head? He answered: 
"No. The voice comes straight into my ears. When I chew ginger, my eyes turn around and my ears 
become blocked. 1 am unable to understand what people around me say. 1 hear only spirits. So I say to 
everyone: "Shut up, 1 want to hear what they have to say. Why are they angry? Their answer will come 
straight into my ear. 1 teli those around that I did not get these answers inside my own head but that I have 
heard the voice of the spi rit. Sb I would know the cause and would ask a child's father, or a husband if his 
wife is sick, or her, if her husband is sick. 1 would teli them when the spirit had asked for matters to be settled 
and teli them how this can be done. lf they do not listen, the sick person can die." 
The wrongdoers then have to "cut themselves off' from the practice which caused the sickness by fol­
lowing the practices such as payment of compensation, seelusion, washing, food presentation, and so on. 
Ambonwari people often say that they have to look after their skin properly, which ineludes their acts. In 
regard to sickness we can make some common observations: a healthy person is defined by visible healthy 
skin and her or his habitual activity; a sick person is defined by unhealthy skin and the aberrant activity. 
Thus, a healing ritual is concerned with the extraction of invisible stones, shells, teeth, bones and thorns 
from beneth the unhealthy skin, the restitution of kay by identifying the cause of sickness in wrongdoings, 
and finally by addressing the spirits of the household, lineage or elan who share coliective identity with the 
sick person. 
Godfried Yanggus from Eagle-1 elan and his wife boiled some ginger plants in a pot and sprayed and 
treated their sick daughter with the aromatic mixture. As Kambianma, who was approximately six years of 
age, did not recover that day Godfried asked Tobias Yangi, one of the two village healers, to visit them. Late 
that evening Tobias entered the house. He held six or seven ginger plants with leaves. He chewed ginger 
with betel nut and rubbed ginger over the forehead and chest of the sick child. He made sure to spray her 
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under her finger- and toe-nails, and inside her ears and nose. Every orfice is a place where spirits can enter 
the sick person and carry the spirit from the body. While doing this Tobias inquired about any wrongs in 
Godfried's family and lineage. Godfried confessed that he had been to a sago forest which was not part of 
his clan's land. A few years ago two children had died after their father, Godfried's classificatory brother, had 
cut some palms in the same forest. They had decided then to leave the bush unused for five years. Tobias 
said that it was Godfried's mistake to cut sago palms in this forest and that this was also the reason for his 
own previous sickness. Tobias also commented that the Eagles had arrived in the village following others 
and that the village spirits were angry. But the sickness was given to both of them by the spirits of the house 
because he had used land which was not his. After massaging her tor some ten minutes Tobias removed a 
stone from Kambianma's belly. Everyone chewed betel nut and Tobias was given sago pudding to eat. 
Kambianma went to bed and Tobias left after a couple of hours of chatting and chewing betel nut. 
The focus of healing ceremony as well as ritual in general is kay. either its transformation or its presenta­
tion. In either case what matters is that "embodied" kay is not something that on simply possesses (like 
knowledge), but something that one is (Bourdieu 1990:73). So one could say that temporality of sickness is 
indispensable for a healer who, in many different ways, explores the patient's or their relatives' past in his 
search of a possible cure. Therefore temporality should not be equated with a simple duration, but should 
be understood in terms of its many individual and collective dimensions, such as body-time, space-time, 
narrative-time (each of which as a process includes tempo, rhythm, temporal strategies, and so on), to men­
tion some of well known word compounds often used by those who wrote and stili write about time. Only in 
understanding temporality as a multidimensional, which achieves its wholeness and integrity in an indi­
vidual person and which both unites and differentiates individuals and groups, we can better understand 
people's experience of their existence. 
As I noticed that some of the papers in this section address children I would like to look at temporality of 
sickness in the case of Ambonwari children. In an article entitled Being and 'Non-Being' in Ambonwari Ritual 
{Telban 1997) 1 argued that healers in healing ceremonies treat uninitiated children as "non-beings". From 
the perspective of Ambonwari "selves" or "beings", children belong to this domain. They exists as exten­
sions of their parents or carers, from whom they cannot be separated conceptually. The wrongdoings of 
adults can bring sickness both on themselves and on others who share the houshold with them. In the case 
of children, however, the healer looks only at the wrongdoings of the parents. The healer has to "see" into 
the "insideness" of people, either with the help of spirits or through people's own confession. But, as 
Ambonwari say, children do not have "insideness" or understanding; they still lack Heart (wambung). Chil­
dren are not conscious beings as they do not understand their actions. They do not know how to do things, 
they do not mourn at funerals, they eat food by themselves and do not think about its distribution. Children 
do things wrong all the tirne. Their activities are not the shared habits of Ambonwari people. Their ways of 
doing things are often not in accordance with the dictates of village life (imnggan kay, "the way of the 
village"). Lacking the collective and ancestral kay, and not being able to reflect upon them, they have no 
properly formed kayeither. In other words, Ambonwari kay(being) is not simply given by birth, but has to be 
formed through the awareness of selfhood and by forcibly impressing "proper personhood" (Poole 1982: 103). 
Selfhood, however, goes beyond consciousness. It captures "the awareness of an individual as an indi­
vidual: as someone who can reflect on her or l;iis experience of and position in society, of 'being oneself" 
(Cohen 1994:65). In Ambonwari this means the awareness of oneself as an Ambonwari male or female 
who is not an extension of his or her parents anymore but a fully responsible individual. Lacking both selfhood 
and personhood children are not yet individual Ambonwari beings, and from this point of view, we could 
say, they are "non-beings" (Telban 1997). 
Children who have not passed through initiation or first menstruation rituals are not yet regarded as 
beings in their own right. At birth and while a mother is stili breastfeeding, it is the parents who observe 
certain prohibitions, not their children. By being conscious ("with understanding") a person can not only 
perform different activities but can understand them and can form, preserve and transform his or her dis­
tinctive habits. Children's "insideness", however, is not yet formed. Children's daily activities are an insepa­
rable part of the activities of their parents. Children are extensions of their parents' beings. Even when they 
play, they are watched by their parents, older siblings or other relatives. Children help their parents with 
their daily tasks. The tasks are those of the parents and not those of the children. When playing, they often 
imitate the practices of adults. By learning the "ways" (kay) through practices children construe their under­
standing; to have understanding then means that they know how to do things. Kay and wambung are united 
in their association (Telban 1993, 1997, 1998, 1998a). 
At the beginning of my paper I emphasized that it is the relationship between kay and wambung which is 
the most important tor Ambonwari conceptualization of health and sickness. Through their processual na­
ture they produce tirne as they produce themselves. Temporality of sickness in children (whose being and 
-,. 
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understanding are not yet formed) is temporality of their parents' wrongdoings. Their parents' aberrant kay 
(wrongdoings) is visible in their children's (who are their extensions) aberrant kay (sickness). Only by cor­
recting the former can te latter be restored. lf only the latter is restored people do not recognize the former 
as the cause but say that a child was 'sick nothing'. Another question which reminds to be answered is how 
can someone's wrongdoing become the cause of sick_ness in someone else. When people live in the same 
household they share their practices, habits, ways of doing things. Kay of a husband and a wife are inter­
twined and controled by the spirits of the house. Their social relationships are 'embodied' ('embeinged'), 
that is, they are inseparable from their kay. Kay is a concept which broadens the narrow concept of 'body' to 
a temporal, social and cultural life-world embeded in every individual person. That is how, then, the prob­
lems in social relationships disturb kay and the well being of a person who belongs to the closest group of 
those who share the wrongdoer's kay. One's aberrant kay affects the kay of the other. Of course one could 
lie and pretend, but the spirits of the house see even the most hidden activities. And that is where their role 
as the regulators of relationships comes into the forefront and where the temporality of sickness recog­
nizes most strongly not spirits as the beings of the past but the life-world in which both people and spirits 
dwell as consociates who share their intersubjective tirne. 
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The rapid development of science has opened new ways in which biology and medicine can interfere 
with human life and the human body. In many areas, this development is welcome, and has resulted in new 
possibilities to combat different diseases, prolong life expectancy, promote health, and improve the quality 
of life. 
At the same tirne, however, it has opened new possibilities of producing significant harm to both individu­
als and society, either accidentally, when the new knowledge is applied in good faith but with harmful 
results, or intentionally, when it is abused for the interests or benefit of others. In both instances, human 
rights of individuals are violated in an inadmissible way. 
The recent developments in biomedical sciences, in particular in human genetics, medically assisted 
procreation, organ transplantation, and in the rapidly expanding biomedical research on man in these and 
many other fields, have given rise to increasing public concern. It is this concern and fear of abuse of 
science and its achievements that prompted the Council of Europe nearly ten years ago to embark on one of 
its most ambitious projects ever: to produce what was initially known as the Convention on Bioethics. The 
task was entrusted to the Ad hoc Committee of Experts on Bioethics (CAHBI), and to its successor, the 
Steering Committee on Bioethics. At the beginning, the task appeared formidable, and, considering the 
vast, seemingly insurmountable, differences among the prevailing views and practices in the Member States, 
few of the experts believed that it could ever be accomplished. However, in contrast to the rather reserved 
expectations, the effort, which took nearly six years, finally resulted in a text which on the 4th of July 1996 
was adopted by the CDBI with only 3 abstentions and a single vote against. Later it was adopted with some 
mi nor changes also by the Parliamentary Assembly and the Council of Ministers. On the 4th of April 1997 it 
was opened for signature to the Council of Europe Member States and other States who participated as 
observers, in the Spanish town of Oviedo. 
The 1 st of December 1999 can be considered a landmark in bioethics in Europe, when the Convention 
finally entered into force, after having been ratified by the first five member States of the Council of Europe 
(among which was also Slovenia). This unique document is the first international convention of its kind, 
having the status of a legally binding instrument, and is thus of eminent importance, comparable to the 
Convention on Human Rights. It will have far reaching consequences for the further development and 
protection of human rights in the context of modem medicine and biology. 
The Convention represents not the smallest common denominator, but rather the highest possible com­
mon European standard for the protection of the human being in the field of biomedical sciences. It will fill 
a lot of the legal vacuum that stili surrounds bioethics. It touches on most major ethical problems in the field 
of human health, except abortion and euthanasia (these two topics were excluded in the very beginning, as 
it was not considered possible to reach a European consensus on the extremely sensitive and controversial 
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ethical questions involved). Among other things, the Convention should ensure that ethically bad medicine, 
e.g. ethically objectionable research, is not exported across boundaries between countries. lndeed, the
Convention with its protocols will not only establish limits of ethically acceptable behaviour in science and
medicine for the European countries, but will also set the rules for international cooperation in biomedical
research with other countries. lnside Europe, it will be particularly important for the so-called new democra­
cies, where bioethics often is not supported by any legislation or longstanding good practice, and is there­
fore particularly vulnerable to illegitimate pressure from various individuals and interest groups.
Specific ethical questions do appear in the individual branches of medicine, like oncology. However, 
most of the ethical problems are, at least at the principal leve!, shared by different medica! specialties. 
Among these are many buming questions in biomedical research. The focus of this contribution will be on 
one of those, which is particularly sensitive: 
Biomedical Research on Persons Unable to Consent 
An important change in medicine over the last decades is the increasing recognition of patient's right to 
autonomy„ lnformed consent to any medica! intervention or procedure, including even the use of personal 
medica! data, is at the heart of an ethically sound relationship between the doctor and the patient. A special 
kind of relationship develops when a patient or a healthy persons is recruited to serve as a subject in bio­
medical research. Respect for the rights and digntty of human beings involved represents the most impor­
tant limitation to freedom of research in biomedicine. It may be of interest to briefly refer to some of the 
landmarks in ethical thought regarding involvement of persons unable to consent. 
The Weimar law on medica! research, the Code of Nuremberg and the Helsinki Declaration 
In Germany, research on children and persons unable to consent was prohibited as early as 1900. Ger­
many, under the Weimar republic, was also the first country in the world to legislate on ethical rules in 
medica! research. The law of 1931 required consent of the "research subject'' and prohibited research on 
minors as well as dying persons and persons with no capacity of understanding. Unfortunately, already 
during the first few of the tragic 12 years that followed the coming of the National Socialist Party to power, 
the noble ethical tradition was pushed aside and many German physicians gradually stepped on a path 
leading towards the darkest period of medica! "science without a conscience" (Rogers and Durand de 
Bousingen, 1995). 
The Nuremberg Code of 1947, the first intemational code on biomedical research on man, permitted no 
experimentation on human subjects without their "voluntary consent". Thus it effectively ruled out any re­
search on minors, mentally handicapped or unconscious patients. Although the code with its ten basic 
principles laid down the basis of modem ethical attitude in medica! research, it has never gained wide 
acceptance and has certainly not been much observed in practice. Nevertheless, many stili agree with its 
first principle, i.e. that research on persons unable to give a valid, free and informed consent should be 
prohibited. 
The Declaration of Helsinki (Recommendations guiding physicians in biomedical research involving hu­
man subjects) with its four amended editions (World Medica! Association, 1964-1996) has actually set the 
modem ethical standards for biomedical research on man. Perhaps the most important principle in the 
Declaration is that "in research on man, the interest of science and society should never take precedence 
over considerations related to the wellbeing of the subject". 
In contrast to the Nuremberg code, the Declaration of Helsinki permits research on persons who are 
unable to consent for reasons of legal incompetence and physical or mental incapacity. In such cases, the 
informed consent is replaced by permission or authorisation from responsible relative or guardian. 
The 0viedo Convention and the Additional Protocol on Biomedical Research 
The !atest intemational set of ethical standards is the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being With Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, 
also known as the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, or the 0viedo Convention (Council of 
Europe, 1997). Biomedical research is one of the areas covered in this document, which has an unprec­
edented status of a legally binding set of ethical rules, to be imposed and sanctioned by the interna! law of 
the States who ratify the Convention. 
In the 0viedo Convention, the category of therapeutic research of the Helsinki Declaration is replaced by 
the concept of research that has the potential of producing real and significant benefit to the patient in-
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volved, as opposed to research which does not have that potential, and the Convention enshrines stricter 
protective provisions in case of the latter. 
Research on man is associated with a basic ethical dilemma: ls it right to subject a patient incapable of 
consent to research from which he or she cannot benefit, for the sake of benefit of others? 
In the view of the crimes committed in the Nazi concentration camps, it is not surprising that the greatest 
sensitivity to any impingement upon human rights and dignity of this kind nowadays exists in Germany. 
Germany's greatest concern regarding the Oviedo Convention was precisely the ethical doubt that research 
on persons unable to consent and not benefiting from it can ever be considered justified. In fact, this may be 
the main reason why Germany hesitates to sign the Convention. 
At one stage during drafting the Convention, the opinion prevailed that when no direct benefit for health 
of the person involved can be expected, research on persons unable to consent should not be allowed, 
unless the ris k incurred is negligible. lf such prohibition were enforced, this would put an end to much of the 
presently permissible research in paediatrlcs and in psychiatry. Children and psychiatric patients as groups 
would be deprived of many important advances in the diagnosis and treatment of serious diseases. In fact, 
ban on research involving anything in excess of negligible risk to such persons would in itself be unethical. 
It would render meaningful research, for example, in paediatric oncology, on Alzheimer's or on Creutzfeld­
Jacob's disease close to impossible. Research that has lead to successful treatment of childhood leukaemia 
in over 75 % of the cases would have been prohibited. In the light of this deliberation, the notion of negligi­
ble risk was replaced by that of minimal risk. 
The Oviedo Convention is to be supplemented with more detailed texts expanding on its basic provisions. 
One of those is the Protocol on Biomedical Research (Council of Europe, 2000). The Protocol, which is 
presently in the fina! drafting stage, will be a comprehensive, self-contained, legally binding set of rules, 
which is expected, in the years to come, to guide researchers in most European and possibly other coun­
tries. 
The Protocol further elaborates the principles of the Convention. One of these is that the risk and burden 
imposed should never be disproportionate to the expected benefit of the research. This general rule natu­
rally also applies to situations where the person involved cannot benefit. However, it is emphasised that, in 
case of research on persons unable to consent, the acceptability of the risk and burden involved should 
never be weighed against the benefit for others. Furthermore, research on such persons is only allowed if 
research of comparable effectiveness cannot be carried out on persons capable of giving consent. 
Another important principle is that research on a person without the capacity to consent may only be 
undertaken if he or she does not object. Furthermore, as has been said above, both the risk and the burden 
to which a person unable to consent may be exposed, may only be minimal. The notion of minimal risk, as 
defined in the Protocol, means that the intervention will be associated, in individual case, with very slightly 
detrimental and only temporary effects on the health of the person concerned. Examples serving for an 
orientation as to what the acceptable minimal risk might include the taking of an additional X-ray or MRI 
image, or drawing of a small sample of venous blood: A minimal burden produced by the intervention would 
be the equivalent of a temporary and very slight symptom or unpleasantness, such as caused by an electri­
cal stimulus while performing a nerve conduction study. Where appropriate, persons enjoying special con­
fidence being a close relation of the person concerned shall be called in to evaluate the burden. 
Additional rules apply in emergency situations where consent or authorisation cannot be obtained. When­
ever possible, the relatives of the patient or persons close to them shall be consulted, or other reasonable 
steps taken in order to ascertain the wishes of the patient. lf there are indications that the patient would 
object, the research shall not be undertaken. The patient shall be informed, when it becomes possible, of his 
or her participation in the research, and consent for its continuation should be sought. 
Conclusion 
AII ethical questions and dilemmas concerning the protection of persons without the capacity to consent 
have not yet been settled. It is probably unrealistic to expect an international consensus that would please 
everyone. It is also unlikely that a legal document alone can provide a guidance suitably covering ali possi­
ble situations. It is encouraging to see that the various documents containing ethical guidelines as official 
policies or legal instruments, both those in current use and those stili under development are increasingly 
comprehensive and show remarkable convergence. A lot however, stil! needs to be done. Great emphasis 
should be given to adequate teaching and training medica! students and doctors and nurture their sensitiv­
ity to the needs, rights and dignity of both sick and healthy persons under their care. A practice guideline 
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should be developed on how to obtain valid informed consent, and particularly, authorisation in case of 
persons unable to consent. Finally, independent ethics committees reviewing and supervising medical 
research should most carefully ponder on what represents limits of acceptable risk and burden to which 
persons unable to consent may be exposed in any individual research study. It is their responsibility to 
always keep in mind the basic guideline in both the Declaration of Helsinki and the 0viedo Convention 
protecting such persons: The interest of society or science should never take precedence over interests and 
welfare of the human being involved. Ensuring a proper balance between the one and the other may be a 
most difficult task and responsibility. 
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ABSTRACT 
Evidence-based medicine may influence our approach to clinical trials. When preparing a systematic 
review, the quality of individual trials is of far greater importance than their individual results. Unbi­
ased randomisation, attention to the treatment protocol and to the rules of good clinical practice and 
honest evaluation of experience are essential; less important are the power of an individual trial and 
statistically significant difference between the treatment arms. The recruitment period should be short 
and preferably not longer than three years, followed by timely publication of a report. Since system­
atic reviews and meta-analyses include and quote all available information, clinical researchers and 
editors should be less influenced by publication bias. These changes in methodology open clinical 
trials to new innovative ideas difficult to test in large multi-institutional trials, rend clinical investiga­
tors less dependent on commercial sponsors and might bring more patients into clinical research. 
Greater respect of the autonomy of individual physicians and less interference with the uncertainty 
principle could contribute to reduced ethical costs. 
Key words: evidence-based medicine, ethics, controlled clinical trials 
1. lntroduction
In resolving dilemmas about the mqst appropriate diagnostic or therapeutic procedures, evidence-based
medicine now occupies centre stage. lnstead of relying on experience from individual trials or on narrative 
reviews with unclear methodology [ 1-3]. evidence-based medicine seeks support from systematic reviews 
or from meta-analyses. Recommendations based on ali available published and unpublished information 
will have a strong influence on our clinical practice. 
Evidence-based medicine may change the role of individual randomised clinical trials. Whether a differ­
ence between the treatment arms is statistically significant or not, experience from any single study will be 
included in a systematic review or in meta-analysis and compared to other similar trials. Contribution of an 
individual study to new knowledge therefore depends more on a clear question and an appropriate ap­
proach to answer the dilemma, rather than on the power of the trial or on significant difference between the 
treatment arms. Such a shift in attention has important implications for the methodology of clinical research 
and also for the related ethical dilem mas. 
1 will start with a critical presentation of the current practice of randomised clinical trials. In an admittedly 
personal discussion, some weak points of the current practice will be presented. 1 will then offer some ideas 
where a change in methodology could lead to quicker generation of new knowledge and to lower ethical 
costs. 
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2. A critical look at the practice of randomised clinical trials
2.1. LARGE MULTI-INSTITUTIONAL TRIALS 
There is no doubt that randomised clinical trials bring important new knowledge into our daily practice of 
medicine. Hundreds of oncology cooperative groups worldwide are invaluable in the implementation of 
guidelines for good clinical practice and research and in promoting collaboration at individual and institu­
tional levels. In this way, randomised clinical trials enrol patients who would not participate in research if left 
to the experience and initiatives of their physicians, hospitals or institutions. Thus, the current practice of 
wide collaboration alleviates the problem of insufficient participation of patients in clinical research. 
We therefore need randomised clinical trials, we need oncology cooperative groups and we need large 
trials that only such groups can organise. However, we also need to recognise the limitations of performing 
research within such relatively cumbersome bodies. Since severa! hundred to a few thousand patients are 
needed for a definitive answer, adequate recruitment is the main problem of all concerned with the plan­
ning and conducting of a trial. Multi-institutional collaboration or cooperative groups are a logical response. 
The three weak aspects of large cooperative trials are: 1) the smallest common denominator as the basis 
for formulating the scientific question; 2) statistics as the main factor for determining trial methodology, 
rather than a tool to analyse the results; and 3) the increasing dependence of large cooperative groups on 
commercial sponsors. 
2.1.1. The scientific question 
The scientific question is not: "What is the most promising new approach which we wish to compare 
against the standard treatment?" Rather, the question for those planning a trial is: "What kind of a trial would 
be acceptable for our group, could recruit a sufficient number of patients and would be interesting for 
sponsors?" Due to the policy of seeking the smallest common denominator among members of a group, 
important controversial issues or new provocative ideas are often avoided. The central idea is not the inno­
vative potential of a trial but feasibility: in order to recruit a sufficient number of patients, a trial has to be 
acceptable for patients, clinicians and sponsors. 
2.1.2. Statistical considerations 
From the very beginning, a plan for a randomised clinical trial is governed by the need to recruit a sufficient 
number of patients. The investigators are required to specify the magnitude of the treatment effect with the 
related statistical significance and power of the study. The number of patients to satisfy these requirements is 
then determined. The role of statistics is therefore turned upside-down: instead of being a tool for analysis of 
the results, statistical considerations determine design of a trial. Eligibility criteria become inappropriately 
broad, pooling together heterogeneous groups of patients. Dilution of results is inevitable if the same treat­
ment approach, or the same dilemma is applied to a heterogeneous population of patients. 
Statistical considerations according to which only large trials are justified may be also the main reason 
for the virtual absence of controlled cllnical trials for a number of relatively rare tumours or rare clinical 
conditions. 
2.1.3. Dependence on commercial sponsors 
Coordination of a multi-institutional randomised trial is a demanding task. Preparations for a trial, quality 
assurance and monitoring during the period of actual recruitment of patients together with the collection and 
analysis of data require expertise and considerable financial support. An increasing proportion of multi-centric 
trials depend on support from commercial sponsors. It is clear that sponsors influence the formulation of the 
scientific question addressed by a trial. The other negative influence of commercial sponsorship is seen when 
experience from a trial is analysed for publication. On one hand, companies have a clear interest tor publishing 
positive experience in eminent journals; on the other hand, they have been found to suppress publication of 
negative experience [ 4]. Thus, commercial interests contribute towards publication bias. 
2.2. SINGLE-INSTITUTION TRIALS 
The advantages of single-institution trials are a relatively short tirne from design of a trial to its activation 
and the ability to test innovative ideas. While we need this type of pioneering research, we have to recog­
nise its weak points. 
The weak aspects of single-institution trials are: 1) their size; 2) vulnerability to systematic biases in pa­
tient registration, randomisation, eligibility for analysis and assessment of response; and 3) publication bias. 
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2.2.1. Trial size 
Single-institution trials are usually small, enrolling from a few dozen to a few hundred patients. Due to 
their low power and to the publication bias favouring publication of positive small trials, calculation of con­
fidence intervals and of statistical significance, they are of limited value. Each such trial by itself cannot 
prove anything; rather, it can show direction for further research and for confirmatory studies. 
2.2.2. Systematic biases 
In clinical research with little support in logistics and financing, the roles of the principal investigator, of 
the physician responsible for patient care and of the person responsible for registration and randomisation 
of patients often overlap. In such a situation, some investigators may succumb to a temptation to tailor the 
results by inappropriate randomisation procedure, by exclusion of some patients from analysis or by biased 
interpretation of the main outcome. This introduces a systematic bias and renders ali experience misleading 
or useless. 
2.2.3. Publication bias 
There is no doubt about a bias against the publication of low-power negative trials, with shared responsi­
bility of editors, reviewers and investigators [5-7]. Since most editors and reviewers share conventional 
views about the methodology of randomised clinical trials, the low power of such trials is a common reason 
for rejection of a manuscript. An additional responsibility for publication bias lies with the authors who have 
less interest in preparing a report if the results do not support the hypothesis [8]. 
3. Evidence-based medicine and the methodology
of randomised clinical trials
While evidence-based medicine will continue to depend upon experience from large randomised trials, it 
can extract new knowledge also from small trials. The key to the value of information is the quality of re­
search; the power of an individual trial is of lesser importance. 1 will list some practical ideas on the formu­
lation of the scientific question and on the methodology of small randomised clinical trials. 
3.1. THE SCIENTIFIC QUESTION 
We will here discuss two issues. First, whether a trial should always simply follow the conventional pat­
tern of changing a single parameter, or whether different treatment strategies could be also compared. 
Second, we will argue for phase II randomised clinical trials. 
3.1.1. What to compare: a single difference or different strategies 
Most randomised clinical trials compare two treatments that differ in a single parameter. However, due to 
the overlapping toxicity of anti-čancer treatments and to the fact that many optimal standard treatments are 
already at the edge of tolerance, it is rare that one could simply add another therapy to the best standard 
treatment. As an example, adding concurrent chemotherapy to radical radiotherapy with optimal fractionation 
and total dose is most likely to lead to excessive toxicity. Such a trial is often feasible only if patients in the 
standard treatment arm are under-treated. Therefore, what is actually compared is combined modality treat­
ment against sub-optimal standard treatment. As an example, a trial comparing radical radiotherapy versus 
radiotherapy plus a radiosensitiser may be designed in two ways: 
1. Standard radiotherapy alone vs. radiotherapy with the same fractionation and total dose and the addi­
tion of a radiosensitiser. In this case, patients in the standard-treatment arm will probably be under­
treated. Such a trial may show that a radiosensitiser has an effect. However, it cannot prove that
addition of a radiosensitiser is advantageous to optimal radiotherapy alone.
2. Radiotherapy in the optimal standard way vs. radiotherapy with a radiosensitiser and a modification of
fractionation and of the total dose, aiming at approximately equal level of toxicity. Since more than
one parameter has changed, experience from such a trial is open to interpretation. However, such a
trial can prove that the new strategy as a whole did, or did not influence the main outcome.
The first approach offers a clear answer to a relatively narrow question; the second one may indicate a 
new promising avenue of treatment. 
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3.1.2. Randomised phase II trials 
Phase II clinical trials usualiy serve as a basis for a randomised phase III trial. Phase II trials give an 
indication about the activity of a treatment for a certain clinical condition but are weak in providing quanti­
tative information about the treatment effect. Due to the selection of patients, the results are virtualiy in­
comparable to any experience outside a particular trial. For the same reason, the new knowledge is of 
limited usefulness for evidence-based medicine. 
When performing a phase II tria!, the clinical investigator is often not under a pressure of the need for 
large recruitment. Quite commonly, the limitations of recruitment are more linked to logistics (such as the 
number of patients who can be offered twice-daily irradiation in a busy radiotherapy department) than to 
the number of patients who fulfil the eligibility criteria. In such a case, a randomised phase II tria! may be an 
answer. As an example, 50 patients may be recruited to the new treatment and another 50 to the standard 
one within a period of 2 years. Although the power of such a study is low, it can be a valuable piece in meta­
analysis and wili contribute much more than a pure phase II tria! reporting only the experience on 50 se­
lected patients given the new treatment. 
3.2. METHODOLOGY 
3.2.1. Organisation of a tria! 
In comparison with large multicentric trials, smali randomised trials are certainly easier to manage. Even 
if these trials may run without additional staff or financial support, the foliowing steps are essential for 
preserving the scientific and ethical integrity of the research. 
1. The protocol with presentation of the clinical problem, hypothesis, primary and secondary objectives
of the trial, eligibility and ineligibility criteria, methods of treatment and foliow-up should be both
reviewed by an expert not involved in the research and approved by the lnstitutional Protocol Review
Board and Ethical Committee.
2. lnformation for patients and informed consent forms should be prepared.
3. For most trials without substantial financial support, on-site external monitoring for quality control of
research is not feasible. Stili, some degree of external monitoring is highly recommended. Registra­
tion of patients for a tria! and their randomisation should be done by an institution separate from the
principal investigator's department. This external institution would later review the raw research data
and issue a confirmatory statement that ali patients registered and randomised for the tria! are really
reported. The costs for such a procedure should not be prohibitive and might be covered by an inter­
national anti-cancer organisation or by an oncology journal(s) publisher. External monitoring would
diminish the risk of systematic bias in performing and reporting of clinical research.
3.2.2. Recruitment of patients 
Once a tria! is activated, it should remain open for new patients for a short period only. For trials in oncology, 
we recently proposed to limit the recruitment to three years [9]. This figure is based on the fact that one to two 
years usualiy elapse from the first draft of the protocol to its practical implementation; that due to new knowl­
edge, five years seems to be the upper limit for the best standard treatment to remain unchanged; that over a 
longer period, substantial changes in-diagnostics and staging, in detecting a relapse, and in supportive care 
introduce a bias for interpretation of the results; that conducting a tria! over many years becomes difficult due 
to the diminishing interests of ali participants and due to their mobility; and that ethical difficulties arise when 
interim results become available while the tria! is stili open for recruitment of new patients. 
This proposal of three years as the upper limit for the recruitment of patients is clearly arbitrary. For some rare 
tumours and for those characterised by a prolonged clinical course, four or five years might weli be acceptable. 
However, it is important that the plan for a tria! includes a clear tirne trame for the recruitment of patients. 
3.2.3. Presentation of results 
The honest and timely preparation of a report according to the CON SORT guidelines [ 1 OJ wili contribute to 
a positive balance between the ethical benefits and costs of clinical research. When comparing treatments, 
point estimates with the appropriate confidence interval are preferred to testing for significance and p values. 
Authors, editors and reviewers should understand that any individual smali randomised trial cannot pro­
vide a definitive answer to the question addressed. The discussion section of the paper should be kept short 
and avoid far-reaching conclusions. With these limitations, publication of experience from small trials is 
justified. 
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4. Ethical considerations
The rationale for small randomised trials not aiming at a definitive, statistically significant answer for a
particular clinical problem has been presented. From an ethical standpoint, a number of differences to the 
standard large multi-institutional trials can be seen. 
First and above ali, small trials are much more flexible in testing hypotheses for which a consensus within 
a large cooperative group would be difficult to achieve. Greater physicians' autonomy means that more 
ideas will be tested and, hopefully, new treatment approaches will be identified. 
Clinical investigators and physicians in small independent clinical trials may be less influenced by com­
mercial sponsors. lndependent academic research could be a practical response to a series of systematic 
biases linked to the commercial sponsoring of medica! research: a bias in formulating scientific questions, 
in tria! design, in reporting results, in promotion of publications and in influencing the dominant topics of 
medica! conferences. 
Allowing greater physicians' autonomy is a net ethical benefit, provided it is not accompanied by other 
ethical costs. In small clinical trials, the over-lapping roles of the principal investigator and of the physician 
responsible for patient care may lead to sub-standard procedures of patient's consent. Regardless of the 
size of a tria!, patients involved in clinical research should be given adequate information and should freely 
consent to participate. To protect the scientific and ethical integrity of the tria! and prevent a systematic bias 
in the procedures of registration and randomisation, external monitoring is recommended. 
One of the ethical concerns linked to large randomised trials is that interim results are not available to the 
participating physicians and to patients invited to join the tria!. To include a large number of patients, the 
recruitment period is often long. In my view, patients have the right to base their decision on ali available 
information, here including the information on what happened to previous patients in the same tria!; depriving 
them (and their physicians) of this information is non-respecting of their autonomy. Small trials with a short 
recruitment - three years according to my arbitrary proposal - will be less susceptible to this ethical problem. 
Finally, recognition of the value of small randomised clinical trials tor evidence-based medicine means 
that it is the quality of research, rather than the size of a tria! which is important for its inclusion in meta­
analyses and systematic reviews. As virtually ali published reports are cited, editors who strive to improve 
the journal's citation index will be less inclined to reject publication of a tria! on the basis of its low power. 
This will alleviate the problem of publication bias. 
5. Conclusions
Evidence-based medicine seeks information from ali sources. Large trials will continue to be an impor­
tant and reliable way of addressing common and relatively simple questions. However, we also need alter­
native, more flexible approaches. When properly conducted and monitored, small clinical trials can give a 
valuable clue to questions of greater originality. By combining experience from severa! similar small trials, 
evidence-based medicine can identify strategies worthy of further research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A discussion of communication with the patient in clinical research is 
often reduced to the practice and contents of informed consent. This is an 
unbearable oversimplification. There is no way to separate such a discus­
sion from a more general discussion on the relations between a doctor and 
a patient. The patient in clinical research is still, and first of all, a patient. 
Similarly, a commitment to clinical research should not influence the 
physician's primary role as a physician. As far as their communication is 
concerned, the fact that the physician is proposing a clinical trial should 
not influence his relation to the patient. A discussion of communication 
in clinical research is therefore just one chapter of a general discussion of 
communication between physician and patient. 
Starting any treatment is technically possible without much explana­
tion. The danger of treating an uninformed patient can be compared to 
that of administering chemotherapy without checking blood counts and 
providing adequate support measures. Instead of tailoring the treatment 
to the individual, average tolerance is presumed, and average doses of 
drugs are given. The result may be a suboptimal effect on the tumor; in 
addition, unforeseen complications may arise that further intervention 
cannot alleviate. The same is true for the treatment of an uninformed 
patient: after a while, both doctor and patient may realize that the results 
of the treatment are different from what was anticipated and may find 
their relationship blocked in an ,atmosphere of mistrust. 
The dangers and shortsightedness of concealing the proper informa­
tion during routine treatment increases to become an unsurmountable 
obstacle when clinical research is concemed. Few of us doubt the bene­
fits of clinical research not only for future patients but also for the actual 
patient enrolled in an exactly specified prospective trial and thence sub­
jected to most rigorous quality assurance and control.1 Nevertheless, the 
potential benefits of clinical research do not justify manipulating the 
patient for the purpose of obtaining his or her consent: no patient should 
ever enter a prospective trial without clear, thorough information, first on 
the disease and its implications, and then on the proposed research trial. 
Without much exaggeration, the practice of not informing the patient in a 
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trial about the diagnosis, and thence about the purpose, logic, and poten­
tial consequences of the procedures to which he or she is to be exposed, 
may easily be compared to experiments on laboratory animals, or to the 
sad experience with human experimentation in the not-too-distant past.2,3 
After such a clear position regarding the necessity that a patient in 
clinical research be fully informed, what issues remain to be discussed? I 
have deliberately omitted some of the more frequently discussed ques­
tions on the ethics of clinical research or on the individual physician's 
preference versus collective equipoise4,5 and have instead devoted more 
attention to those questions that profoundly influence communication. 
We will present the stage first, then the actors, and finally the play itself. 
The first section therefore presents the three phases of trials in clinical 
oncology, with special consideration of the issues of importance for the 
communication process. The second section presents the pressing dilem­
mas that the physician and the patient face when confronted with a 
research protocol. In the last section, an attempt will be made to describe 
the form and content of the communication process itself. 
THE STAGE: THREE PHASES OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 
IN ONCOLOGY 
Phase I Trials 
A key moment when introducing a novel drug into clinical use is its 
very first application to humans. This is a phase I trial, which aims at 
establishing the pharmacokinetic parameters of the drug, its main side 
effects, safe dose range, and an acceptable-though not yet necessarily 
optimal-application schedule. 
For most drugs, the research subjects in a phase I trial are healthy vol­
unteers. The initial doses of the drug are only a percentage of the effec­
tive dose,6 a:s predicted on the basis of animal testing. If no untoward side 
effects are noted, the dose is then gradually increased. However, anti­
cancer drugs are invariably linked to severe acute side effects and poten­
tial late consequences such as carcinogenicity and organ dysfunction, and 
so research subjects in phase I trials of anticancer drugs are not healthy 
volunteers but patients with cancer that is not amenable to standard cura­
tive treatment. 
If noted, an antitumor effect is recorded, but this is not among the 
main objectives of a phase I trial. Due to uncertain effectiveness of the 
drug, and especially due to the <lose escalation schedule, which starts 
with extremely small doses, an objective tumor response is seen in less 
than 5% of patients in a phase I trial.7,a The subjects in a phase I trial 
appear to be used not for their own benefit, but predominantly for the 
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benefit of medical knowledge and of other, future patients; phase I trials 
may thus be regarded as ethically the most problematic type of clinical 
research in oncology.9 
Phase '1 Trials 
The aim of phase II trials is to identify tumor types for which the treat­
ment appears promising. A phase II trial usually enrolls patients with a 
measurable tumor and in fair general condition for whom no effective 
anticancer treatment is known. The new drug is first tested as a single­
agent therapy and later, if it is considered at least moderately effective, in 
combinations with other effective drugs. 
Phase III Trials 
After an innovative treatment has been tested in a phase II trial, a com­
parison with the best standard treatment is needed. To minimize the risk 
of a bias, random choice of the treatments to be compared is the rule for 
phase III trials. 
The ethical issues linked to clinical trials with a random choice of treat­
ment have not yet been resolved. For some, randomized phase III trials 
are a proof that clinical research-previously often a mixture of observa­
tions, unproved postulates, and wishful thinking-has become a true sci­
ence. Other authors have expressed deep concern regarding this 
particular type of clinical research.2,10 Utilitarian argurnents about impor­
tant past or future advances in medical knowledge as a contribution of 
randornized trials do not justify manipulating the individual patient with 
regard to his or her true interests and consent-a topic that will be dis­
cussed later. In addition, proper attention to the physician's personal 
preferences seem justified, and the rnethodology of other types of clinical 
research should also be further developed.10,11 
THE ACTORS: THE PHYSICI AN AND THE PATIENT 
Dilemmas oj the Physician 
Am I Primarily a Physician, ar a Researcher? 
Although it is frequently discussed, 11,12 this dilernma seerns to me 
sornehow artificial. After the physician has corne to the end of questions 
about his readiness and cornpetence to participate in the trial, and about 
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the appropriateness of inviting the particular patient into the trial, then he 
clearly has to accept both roles simultaneously. It would be bad science if 
coercion were used in order to rigidly follow the research protocot with 
little respect for the patient' s interests: the reader of such a report would 
underestimate the side effects of the treatment that is being advocated. It 
is in the interest of the physician and of the researcher-of the medical 
profession and of medica! science-to produce a sincere report, including 
the difficulties in following the predetermined research protocol. 
A good clinical investigator should always also be an excellent physi­
cian. Clinical competence and devotion to the physical and emotional 
needs of a patient, honest sharing of experiences with colleagues, and 
seeking their advice when needed are among those personal characteris­
tics that are equally essential for the performance of good medical prac­
tice and of medical research. 
Every rule has its exceptions. Our opinion that the physician and the 
clinical investigator should best be one and the same person is easy to 
defend for phase I and phase II trials, which represent the majority of clin­
ical research; however, in some randomized trials, splitting the roles of the 
clinical investigator and the physician participating in the trial may be 
warranted. Por statistical reasons, randomized trials will frequently 
enroll several hundred or even several thousand patients. When dealing 
with a trial of such dimensions, the organizational and statistical tasks 
become very complex and demand specific skills and experience that 
most physicians do not possess. The other reason for separating their 
roles is the physicians' preference for one of the treatment options. It is 
desirable that a randomized trial address an important dilemma; yet, in 
such instances, many physicians will have a clear preference for one treat­
ment option or the other. In such a situation, splitting the roles of the clin­
ical investigator and the physician participating in the trial may, indeed, 
be desirable: after full informed consent and after randomization, the 
patient would be treated by the physician with a preference for that par­
ticular treatment option. Not only would the technical performance of the 
treatment be higher, but also communication with the patient would be 
much easier if a physician who believes in adjuvant chemotherapy for 
non-small-cell lung cancer treats patients with chemotherapy, and a non­
believer just gives good supportive treatment. 
Yes ar No far Participation in a Trial 
When a research protocol is being prepared and circulated among 
potential collaborators, the really important question is whether to join a 
research group and promise to encourage patients to enter a specific trial. 
This question should not be reduced to just the scientific validity of the 
question formulated in the protocol, to the physician's competence and 
'!III 
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technical experience with the proposed treahnents, or to a feeling of a 
strong personal preference for one of the treahnent options-questinns 
that are beyond the scope of the present discussion and that have been 
extensively discussed. 13•14 If the answers to all these questions go in favor 
of joining the trial, further questions arise, and these further questiqns are 
linked to comrnunication with the patient. 
Unfortunately, it seems that the doctor's decision to join a research 
team is often taken very lightly. As a consequence, many, if not the major­
ity, of trial protocols overestirnate by far the expected dynamics of patient 
accrual. Of more than 1300 active clinical trials for cancer listed with the 
Physician Data Query service at the National Cancer Institute, it is most 
likely that the majority may never accumulate enough patients to allow a 
meaningful interpretation of the results and reach publication.1 • 
The physician should know that a decision to participate in a trial 
means considerable additional tirne for explaining to the patients the pur­
pose of the trial with appropriate and comprehendible explanations of the 
technical details, the expected outcome(s), and the altematives. Although 
leaflets prepared in advance can be helpful, no written word can replace 
personal, customized, repeated explanation-and that is very tirne-con-
suming. 
I have no experience in programs specifically designed to improve 
communication skills for the medical profession. However, two decades 
of observing my colleagues and their behavior with patients perrnits me 
to conclude that some physicians are sirnply unable to respond to the 
basic requirements for proper communication with a patient in a clinical 
trial. The ability to adjust to the level of understanding of each particular 
patient, the ability to present the current dilemmas and the need for con­
tinuous research, a proper balance between the two unacceptable 
extremes--coercion on one side and "it is totally your choice" on the 
other-accessibility for and patience with the patient's frequent addi­
tional questions, and compassion are among those personal characteris­
tics that everyone discussing a trial with a patient should possess. 
Whether in research or not, the patient depends on the physician and can­
not be considered as absolutely autonomous;16 thence, he needs not only 
information but also help and friendly advice. 
To Propose ar Not Propose Entry into a Trial to a Particular Patient 
The criteria for eligibility of the patient for a trial include parameters 
such as age, diagnosis and stage of the disease, performance status, or 
kidney function. After these criteria are met and after a thorough general 
discussion of the disease and its perspectives with the patient, the physi­
cian should realistically assess whether the particular patient will be able 
to unders_tand the dilemmas that are to be resolved by the trial, together 
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with hls own role in medical research. It is neither a favor to the patient 
nor a pleasant task for the physician to start a lengthy, embarrassing, and 
possibly even hostile discussion if the chances for a relatively smooth res­
olution of these questions are slim. An experienced physician will antici­
pate such an outcome and will not start a discussion about a trial, but 
rather propose the best available standard treatment. Therefore, not only 
the criteria of eligibility listed previously, but also the physician's assess­
ment of the patient' s capacity to accept his role in medical research should 
be considered before the proposal is formally presented to the patient and 
hls consent is granted or refused. 
Dilemmas oj the Patient 
For the purpose of thls discussion, we will suppose that the patient has 
been properly informed about the diagnosis, natural history of the dis­
ease, and perspectives of the best available standard treatment. As we 
said above, no sincere discussion about the patient's participation in a 
clinical trial may start before these basic questions have been approached. 
Still, the scenario of the communication between doctor and patient is 
never written in advance: the patient will often come back to questions 
already discussed and seemingly resolved long ago-another reminder of 
the shortsightedness of the practice of concealing the truth. 
Am I a Patient ar a Research Subject? 
This question is rarely clearly formulated, yet it lies behind the 
patient's dilemmas and hesitation in consenting to enter a trial. However 
altruistic some patients may be and no matter how they respect medical 
science and the need for clear and scientifically valid answers to the 
dilemmas of modem medicine, the patient is always still the patient, with 
his or her unique individuality and interests. The patient then may be 
expected to consent to a trial only if he is convinced that thls offers hlm 
better chances, or at least no worse a chance than choosing one of the stan­
dard treatment options. 
THE PROCESS OF COMMUNICATION 
Thomton wrote that after the operation on her breast, she received a 
text prepared to explain her diagnosis, together with an invitation to en ter 
a randomized trial of postoperative radiotherapy.17 This report best illus 
-------. 
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trates what the communication process with the patient should not look 
like. Communication is a bidirectional process, is continuous rather than 
once-and-for-all, and is based primarily on personal contact. 
A message concerning a description of a health problem and the 
options for its management is never a simple process. The more compli­
cated the problem is, the greater is the need for building close relations 
based on mutual respect and confidence. After the initial, introductory 
discussion, the patient will certainly need additional explanations and 
will try to adapt the information to his personal understanding of the role 
that a disease, with its consequences, may play in his life. 
The patient's dilemmas will occasionally culminate in a crisis of adap­
tation to his or her changing position in relation to the social environment, 
and in relation to his or her ideal self-image. The physician should help 
the patient understand and overcome this often predictable, yet always 
unique, episodes. 
All that has been said so far on the process of communication applies 
to an even greater extent to a patient in research. Apart from his normal 
demands as a patient, he has accepted participation in a clinical trial, with 
all the additional dilemmas that that may involve. It is more than just, 
then, that the patient in clinical research is treated as a partner to the med­
ical profession. The practical implications of such a statement will be pre­
sented in the next section, in particular when discussing the patient's 
right to be informed about preliminary results of a study in which he is 
invited to participate. 
Informed Consent 
According to McKenna, 18 the elements of informed consent include: 
0 Adequate information about risks and benefits; 
0 An on-going process of communication between the doctor and the 
patient, rather than a one-tirne event; 
° Comprehension by the patient of detailed explanations provided in 
appropriate language and reading level; 
0 Voluntary and uncoerced consent; 
• Adequate documentation of the process used to obtain consent.
The process of informed consent should not only be specified in a 
research protocol, but should also be adhered to in clinical practice. A 
marked divergence between the declared policy and its practical imple­
menta tion, as revealed in our recent study,19 is a reason for serious concern 
and deserves more attention. 
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Oral ar Written Information 
Talking with the patient has always been the basis of our communica­
tion, and should remain so. Nothing can replace the physician's duty to 
repeatedly discuss with the patient the current knowledge about his or 
her disease, and future treatment options. A conversation can be only 
supplemented, never replaced, by written information such as leaflets 
describing a specific situation. I strongly believe that this is true not only 
for a patient in routine clinical practice, but also for a patient in clinical 
research: he also has the right to, and the need for, a caring physician with 
whom he can share his doubts, his fears, and his hopes. 
It seems, then, that the difference between oral and written communi­
cation is somehow artificial. While some differences between the patient 
in clinical practice and the patient in research cannot be denied, the basic 
process of informing the patient and of obtaining his consent is very sim­
ilar.20 Fair, open, repeated conversation with the patient is always the 
basis of our communication. Written information, which is becoming 
indispensable in clinical research, is the supplement to oral communica­
tion. 
The Patient's Signature 
Should the patient sign his approval to enter a prospective clinical 
trial? Before we answer this question, two circumstances need to be men­
tioned. The first is that the consent always includes a statement that at 
any tirne the patient may withdraw from the trial. The second is that the 
responsibility for all elements of clinical research, from planning a trial to 
its practical implementation, always remains with the physician. In a ran­
domized trial, it is the personal responsibility of the principal researcher 
that the trial really compare treatment options considered optirnal for the 
entire tirne, until the last patient enters the trial. In the same way, it is also 
the personal responsibility of each participating physician that the treat­
ment be delivered according to the highest standards of quality of patient 
care. Even if the patient lends his signature, he will never share the 
responsibility for the trial with the principal investigator or with his 
physician. 
Ali this implies that signing a consent form is not to be compared to 
signing a contract between equal parties. The need for the patient's sig­
nature depends on cultural and legal circumstances, which may vary con­
siderably from one country to another, and indeed even within the same 
community when patients with quite different educational and spiritual 
backgrounds are involved. The meaning of the signature can be only that 
he or she was informed about the research and does not disagree to par­
ticipate in it. Never can the patient's signature be used against him or her 
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and interpreted as the patient's sharing the responsibility for eventual 
untoward events. 
Detailed ar Basic Information? 
Should the written information really include a terrifying list of poten­
tial complications? My personal opinion is that the information should 
include all complications that are normally expected, but not those seen 
only exceptionally. Whatever happens, the legal and moral responsibility 
remains with the physician. If a consent form is more than one page of 
simple text and if it includes a lot of medical terminology, then it has been 
written for the protection not of the patient, but of the doctor or the spon­
sor of the research. 
The Meaning oj Words 
We said that the researcher should do his best to prepare a text com­
prehensible to a lay person. In spite of all efforts, however, there may be 
a great gap between the understanding of the words, and the actual expe­
rience. No words can bring the experience of a disease to a healthy per­
son. Likewise, a patient may not fully understand the real meaning of 
"febrile neutropenia." There is no remedy to this inadequate capacity of 
words, other than our responsibility to propose trials of true scientific 
value and to provide continuous psychological support to our patients, 
regardless of whether they do or do not participate in research. 
Specijic Aspects oj Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III Trials 
Phase I Trials 
At first glance, there seems to be no conflict of interest between a clin­
ical researcher and a patient consenting to participate in a phase I trial of 
a novel anticancer drug. After a thorough, compassionate presentation of 
their situation, patients with advanced cancer will usually consent to be 
included in the trial of a new drug: for most patients, uncertainty and 
hope linked to the new drug is preferable to the definitively grim prog­
nosis that may be offered by supportive treatment alone. However, it is 
precisely this line of reasoning of a patient with advanced cancer that may 
offer an opportunity to manipulate the patient in order to obtain his con­
sent: patients included in phase I trials rarely realize that the main objec­
tive of the trial is not to test the efficacy of the new drug, but to study its 
pharmacokinetics, preferred application schedule, and toxicity.21 Consent 
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to participate in a phase I trial and to all the associated additional inves­
tigations, frequent visits to the clinic, and eventual side effects often stems 
from false hopes that the patient has a chance for a positive response­
when this chance is really less than five percent. 
It seems that a phase I trial would be much more acceptable to patients 
if the <lose escalation schedule would permit a quicker, albeit admittedly 
more risky, testing of the drug in its anticipated effective <lose range. 
When a patient consents to the trial, he should have some chance of win­
ning. This would allow the clinical investigator to communicate with the 
patient with open cards, instead of hiding his real objective of testing the 
pharmacology and toxicity of the drug behind an unrealistic promise of 
therapeutic improvement. 
Phase II Trials 
From the ethical point of view, phase II trials are the least problematic 
type of clinical research in oncology. The interests of the researcher are 
very close to those of a well-informed, consenting patient. 
Randomized Phase III Trials 
Inherent in the performance of phase ID trials are conflicting interests, 
possibilities for manipulation of patients' consent, and pressures for dis­
tortion of physicians' ethical principles. 
From the patient' s perspective, randomized clinical trials can be 
grouped under three categories: 
• Trials comparing two treatments of approximately equal antici­
pated effectiveness and similar comorbidity. Numerous trials com­
paring different chemotherapy regimens fall into this category.
• Trials comparing radical treatment with a more conservative
approach, stemming from a hypothesis that the less aggressive
treatment is not less effective. Trials of radical versus organ-pre­
serving surgery, of routine postoperative radiotherapy versus
surgery alone, or of long-term adjuvant chemotherapy versus
short-term perioperative chemotherapy may be mentioned in this
category of randomized trials.
• Trials comparing the standard treatment of known low potential to
influence the downhill course of the disease against an innovative
treatment.
The patient should have :r:elatively few problems in consenting to a 
trial of the first type. The patient's dilemmas with trials of the second and 
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third types stem from their misunderstanding of the difference between a 
hypothesis and the real role of a particular treatment that is still to be 
established.22 Furthermore, patients also have their preferences regarding 
choice of treatment. The patients' preferences may be related not only to 
treatment of the cancer itself, as the most common end point to be evalu­
ated in a study, but also to the acute and late side effects, long-term mor­
bidity, and the expected interference with the patient's normal life. It is 
quite natural that patients look at the problem through their own eyes, not 
through the eyes of a scientist. When experts hide their opinion under 
"collective equipoise," patients' preferences should be considered.23'24 
Thus, Mrs. Thomton wrote that she would refuse postoperative irradia­
tion if so many doctors feel that it is unnecessary and may be even harm­
ful. Why should she offer her l?ody to scientifically prove something that 
is very likely to be true?17 Similar is the dilemma of that patient with inop­
erable pancreatic cancer who believes that someday an effective treatment 
for his condition will be found. As he has not much to lose, why should 
he consent to a randomized trial (and, thence, to a 50% chance of getting 
only supportive treatment) and not ask for some kind of innovative treat­
ment right away? 
Finally, months or years after entering the trial and completing the 
treatment, the patient's disease may progress. As a patient is often 
inclined to seek an explanation for his or her condition in the outer world, 
so also eventual progression of the disease may appear to be linked to the 
particular treatment option to which he or she had been assigned by ran­
dom choice. The patient may feel that his well-being had been sacrificed 
for the sake of the progress of medical science. Whether expressed openly 
or in a more discrete mode, the patient will have even more grounds for 
such a statement in case he had actually been assigned to a treatment 
option that proved to be inferior in subsequent analysis. Therefore, the 
. roles of the clinical investigator and of the physician do not end after the 
results of the trial have been made known to the scientific and lay com­
munity. Responsibility for the patient continues. The ground for poten­
tial conflict diminishes if the relationship has been based on sincere, 
humane mutual understanding rather than on hierarchy and the physi­
cian' s professional superiority. 
Has the patient the right to know the preliminary results of a study in 
which he was invited to participate? This question is particularly press­
ing in randomized clinical trials, in which patient accrual is usually pro­
tracted over several years and in which new patients are still entering the 
trial while the events (remissions, complications, or survival) from earlier 
patients have already been recorded. The present practice is that the can­
cer patient is not entitled to know the preliminary experience and the 
interim results. Indeed, some authors state that even the physicians par­
ticipating in the study should not be told about the preliminary results. 
The reason for this is clear: when the interim results show an advantage 
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of one of the treatment arms, the uncertainty principle may be seriously 
compromised and neither doctors nor patients will accept further ran­
domization. 
Beyond the scope of this presentation are the practical implications of 
the idea that the patient has the right to be informed about the prelimi­
nary results of the trial he is about to enter. Here, I will say only that tri­
als with a long patient accrual period very often become unethical. Many 
years of slow recruitrri.ent of patients into a trial will frequently lead to a 
situation with an obvious but statistically still unconvincing advantage of 
one treatment over the other. In such a situation, accrual of new patients 
cannot proceed without ignoring their right to be informed about the pre­
liminary results. Completion of a trial in a short tirne is therefore highly 
recommended, not only for scientific but also for ethical reasons. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Dissecting and analyzing the communication process rn�y be both 
dangerous and artificial: such an attempt is not far from discussing what 
we mean by "love" through a detailed analysis of the motivations and 
actions of those involved. Being aware of the limitations of such an 
approach, I nevertheless have found no other way to present my personal 
view of the various general problems linked to communication with the 
patient, and in particular with the patient in clinical research. 
In everyday communication, words can be an adequate medium only 
for very simple messages. Whenever emotions are involved-and this is 
the case in every decisive moment of our lives-movements and gestures, 
physical contact, silence, and the mere feeling of spiritual proximity are 
among the invaluable means for conveying messages. 
Everyone responsible for another person is also responsible for his 
spiritual adaptation. Our roles are changing constantly: the physician of 
today may be a patient at the same tirne, or will- certainly be a patient in 
the future. When it comes to clinical research, it is unacceptable that 
physicians involve patients in trials in which they themselves would not 
be willing to participate.2S-27 This is a clear sign of the erosion of moral 
principles among the medical community. The situation may be worse 
than just a predominance of utilitarian ethics over Kantian ethics, accord-
. ing to which a human being can never become a means. Professional 
ainbitions linked to the fruits of clinical research, or even financial reim­
bursement offered as compensation for involving one's patients in 
research may have wider and more profound influences on the behavior 
of our profession than we would even wish to think. 
The resolution of these dilemmas may be sought in true partnership 
with patients.28 Some principles and practices of clinical research should 
probably change. Nobody should be forced to perform clinical research. 
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A physician should join a clinical research team only after ali the implica­
tions of such a decision have been considered; sincere motivation for con­
tinuous communication with the patients in clinical research is not among 
the least important of these implications. 
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The Nordic countries, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland, started relatively early with the establishment of national committccs 
dealing with scientific misconduct within the health scienccs. They originally included slightly differcnt parts of the dishoncsty spectrum, 
when launching their independent control bodies, but have since then converged, with thc cnd result that ali four countries now include 
ali aspects of the spectrum. In other words, thc ranges now cover alleged fabrication and plagiarism on one side, and quarrels about 
authorship and terms of procedure within cooperating groups of scientists on the other. The Nordic experiences have made it possible 
to estimate a prevalence rate of 1-2 presented cases per million inhabitants, of which only approximately 1/5 is serious. The preventive 
actions have been publications of guidclines for: scientific co-operation; raw <lata storage; authorship. Further, educational initiatives 
include postgraduate courses for senior scicntists; postgraduate courscs for junior scientists; influence via inquiries and investigations. The 
Nordic experiences point strongly to the neccssity of an indcpendent national control body. 
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Ethics related to biom"eaical research, with man as the subject, has developed ra9idly after the disclosure of the World War II and preceding years' serious atrocities against prisoners, ethm�c roups and political opponents, often in relation to medi· al experiments.The Declaration oy eneva, the Helsinki Declarations and severa] otheyguidelines as a consequence focused primarily on t�e protection of human research subjects, their security,find their free will to consent after thorough information. This aim is stili central to ali sets of ethical guidelines and implementing control bodies. However, in recent years the accumulated experiences with research in man have pointed to three other aspects of ethics related to research: the methodological standard of a project, the temporal responsibility of scientists towards the research subjects, and, finally, the scientist's own ethics, i.e. his or her moral standards refl.ected in his or her credibility. Before turning to this last condition for good scientific standards, two of the above-mentioned other conditions have to be briefl.y described. The methodological standards of a biomedical project involving man are closely linked to the ethics of research, because even safe projects are considered ethically unac­ceptable, if methodological flaws prevent the results from ever being beneficial to patients, either the tria! patients or the large group of other patients that usually might benefit from original research through projective universality.
© Scandinavian University Press 1999. ISSN 0284-186X 
The temporal responsibility of scientists involved in re­search on man is not totally new, but formerly was usually restricted to reporting on side effects and other unforeseen events during a study. Now it has been widened to the extent that scientists are obliged to secure that the in­troductory evaluation in a research ethics committee can rest on a globa! survey of the literature, and that they with a similar search technique follow the international devel­opment during the complete project period. The reaso11 is obvious, that for instance a tria! starting with a placebo group involved because of 110 know11 effective treatme11t at that tirne will 110 lo11ger be ethically acceptable, if another tria! elsewhere later demo11strates a new effective treat­ment, thus necessitati11g a re-evaluation of the whole pro­ject (1). The last part of the temporal responsibility is the cli11ical researcher's duty to inform ali the participa11ts of the results a11d the perso11al co11sequences after termination of the tria!. 
MISCONDUCT IN CLINICAL RESEARCH The fourth compone11t of ethics of research is the scien­tist's own ethics, i.e. his or her credibility a11d good behaviour. Owing to a 11u111ber of scandals, reported in the i11ternational biomedical literature, the Nordic countries early 011 decided to set standards for good scientific be­haviour, to establish 11ational bodies to deal with individ­ual cases, and to work for an effective preve11tion (2, 3). 
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Table 1 
Danish case.1· of a!leged scientific dislw11es1y 1993-1997 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Tota! 
Treated 9 3 1 2 9 24 
Dismissed 6 2 1 8 o 17
Tota! 15 5 2 10 9 41 
The Nordic contro/ systems Five to six years' experience with the concepts of misbe­haviour and fraud, and with figures for their absolute and relative representation of handled cases in the Nordic systems, based on inter-Nordic meetings (4), have made it possible to conduct an early survey. In what follows, committee structures and experiences will be mentioned country by country, in alphabetical order. 
Denmark established its system in 1993 (5). The structureis a non-legally based, independent national committee with eight members representing the universities, the Re­search Council, the scientific societies, the hospital author­ities, the research ethics committees, with alternates, covering ali health sciences including dentistry and phar­macy. The chairman is a High Court Judge. At present the committee has no lay or industry representation. The secretariat is located in the Ministry of Science, together with the research councils and the Central Research Ethics Committee. The Danish definition of scient(fic dishonesty is wide: fabrication of data, selective and undisclosed rejection of undesired results, substitutions with fictitious data, - erroneous use of statistical methods with the aim ofdrawing other conclusions Ihan those warranted by theavailable data, -distorted interpretation of results or distor,?:io' of conclusions, . - plagiarism of the results or entire articles o other researchers, - distorted representation of the results o otherresearchers,wrongful or inappropriate attribution o_i;,,{uthorship,misleading grant or job applicatio�Other types of dishonesty concern the scientific message itself only to a small degree, bul rather concern the at­tempts of researchers to distort the perceptions in the 
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Table 3 
Dcmish cases from 1993-1997 distributed on !)'pes 
of disho,u:sty 
Fabrication 2 1 
Plagiarism 3 o 
Theft 2 o 
Ghost authorship 2 
False methodologic description 3 1 
Twisted sta tistics 2 o 
Suppression of data 4 o 
Unwarranted use of data 4 o 
Authorship quarrels 8 1 surrounding_ world of themselves and their relations with other scientists through exaggerations or omissions: - covert duplicate publication and other exaggeration ofthe personal publication list,- presentation of results to the public, thus by-passing acritical professional forum in the form of journals orscientific associations,- omission of recognition of original observations madeby other scientists,- exclusion of persons from the group of authors despitetheir contributions to the paper in question.These lists are not exhaustive bul illustrate the wide scope of scientific dishonesty. Cases handled by the Danish system can be raised by whistleblowers, institutions, or by the Committee itself. The sequence of hand/ing is: - an inquiry,- an investigation,- reprisals, that are left to the scientist's institution, withan obligation for the institution to inform the Commit­tee about reprisals or other reactions.The annua/ incidences within the Danish system are:cases referred: 8/MIO inhabitants/year; cases treated: 5/ MIO inhabitants/year; cases of scientific dishonesty: 1/ MIO inhabitants/5 years. 
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Table 4 
Deviations from good sciemific practice 
Unauthorized rcmoval of biobank material 
Unauthorized publication 
Gift authorship 
Exclusion of authors 
2 
3 
Inadequate citation 2 
Inadequate agreements between teams of scientists 5 
mittee, which has the largest experience with concrete 
cases, will be reported after the complete Nordic survey 
(3). 
Finland established its system in 1994. The structure is a 
number of non-legally based institutional committees, with 
an independent national committee (7). 
The Finnish de.fini/ion oj scientific dislwnesty is narrower 
than the Danish one and is not restricted to the health 
sciences. Cases are raised by the institutions. 
The sequence oj handling consists of the establishment of 
an institutional ad hoc group, yet with a majority of 
external members. Appeal to the central committee is 
possible after the ad hoc group's conclusion. 
The annua/ incidence has been approximately: l -2 cases/ 
MIO inhabitants/2 years. 
Comments. In the beginning, the Finnish system, too, 
has experienced some resistance among scientists and 
institutions. 
No1way established its system in 1993 (8). The structure 
is an independertt, non-legally based, national committee, 
serving the primary, institutional, ad hoc investigations. 
The chairman is a medica! professor. 
The definition of scientific dishonesty is wide, similar to 
the Danish scope, outlined earlier. 
Cases are raised by institutions with a sequence of 
!wndling determined by the institutions. Thus, investiga­
tions are carried out locally and only if the results point to
scientific dishonesty is a case referred to the National
Committee.
The annual incidence is I case/4 MIO inhabitants/year. 
Comments. There has been some resistance within the 
scientific society. The number of cases has been low, 
possibly due to the obligatory first-line handling of alleged 
cases within the institution. 
Sweden established its system in 1997 (9). The structure 
is an independent, non-legally based, national committee, 
servicing the primary, institutional, ad hoc investigations. 
The definition oj scientific dishonesty covers a scope 
between, on the one side, Denmark and Norway, on the 
other, Finland. 
Cases are primarily referred to the chief of the institu­
tions involved, to the Dean, or to the Rector in university 
cases. 
The annua/ incidence cannot at present be calculated 
owing to the short period of function. 
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Comments. Sweden was early in publishing a 'Note for 
Guidance on Good Scientific Research' in 1996, a kind of 
publication that is much needed in all Nordic-and 
other-countries. 
The Danish experiences 
At the Nordic meeting in 1998 for tbe national committees 
dealing with scientific dishonesty within the health sci­
ences, Daniel Andersen surveyed the Danish experiences 
up until now (5). The number of cases from the period 
1993-1997 is reported in Table l .  The establishment and 
type of ad hoc investigative committees are presented in 
Table 2. The cases distributed on kinds of scientific dishon­
esty are shown in Table 3. In cases, with no proven 
scientific d1shonesty, the Danish committee stili found 
some deviations from good scientific practice. These cases 
are presented in Table 4. 
It can been seen that the number of cases is relatively 
small, considering that tbey cover a whole nation with 5.2 
million inhabitants, and that the independence of the 
National Committee probably secured an open access to 
the system, in other words that the figures presented are 
representative. Owing to the intensive preventive actions 
taken throughout Nordic countries, and to be dealt with 
below, the small-and cautiously judged: decreasing­
Nordic figures might also reflect tbe influence of tbese 
initiatives. 
Actions far prevention 
Tbrougbout tbe Nordic countries preventive initiatives 
bave been taken. In the following they will accordingly be 
dealt with as a wbole, not distributed on national policies. 
Jnformation of the scientific society bas been essential 
Sweden's 'Note of Guidance on Good Scientific Research' 
bas been mentioned earlier. Finland and Norway have 
taken similar initiatives and Denmark published in 1998 
four detailed sets of guidelines in Danisb and English: 
writing a project protocol in laboratory, clinical or epi­
demiological research; writing a contract of cooperation 
for collaborating groups of scientists; guidance concerning 
rights and duties in storing and using scientific <lata; and 
guidelines concerning authorship (10). 
The education of scientists in good scientific practice 
focusing on research ethics and researchers' ethics bas been 
an obligatory part of PhD training courses and of post­
graduate courses for senior scientists. Special attention bas 
been given to the definition of tbe true biomedical author­
sbip, probably tbe greatest conduct/misconduct problem in 
the grey zone between scientific misconduct and good 
scientific bebaviour (11, 12). 
The mere existence of an independent national system, 
with its inquiries and investigations, seems also to have 
contributed to prevention. Furthermore, the globa! impact 
of international experiences within this area has clearly 
shown that scientific dishonesty is not an esoteric fantasy 
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of groups of 'national missionaries', but is a reality that 
the research society has to take seriously. 
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